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I. Preliminaries
“In short, the investment problem is complex and requires treatment of many
magnitudes, each with a variety of dimensions. Because the problem is intrinsi-
cally so difficult, the literature on the subject reports a number of different an-
alytical approaches many of them complementary but not a few contradictory.”
Meyer and Kuh (1966), p.6.
A. Relevance of the Topic
The present doctoral thesis deals with the phenomenon of trust in the context
of the investment decision and the role of and interdependency between infor-
mation transparency and trust from an institutional investor’s point of view.
Trust is basic and ubiquitous. Nobody would doubt the high relevance of
trust for human, social, and thus, economic relationships as well. Trust is also
supposed to be “the unseen faith underlying the investment value” (Olsen (2008),
p.2189) and one of the fundamental preconditions for a proper functioning of
financial markets (Volkart (2011), p.64 and McMillan (2002)).
What seems to be intuitively plausible, is at the same time rather vague,
with the precise meaning and role of trust remaining somewhat blurry. Also,
academic contributions on trust in the context of investing are relatively rare.
The most important reason for this reluctance lies in the assumptions underlying
the prevalent neoclassical models of financial economics which tend to restrict, if
not prohibit, the analysis and integration of trust. This is why this essay aims at
shedding some light on the phenomenon of trust in the context of the investment
decision and at highlighting the role of information in trust formation in such a
context.
Despite the vibrant interest on the topic of trust in socio-economic research
over the last decade, no consensus has yet been reached amongst scholars con-
cerning either the definition or the measurement of trust.3 The first step in the
essay thus entails a review of the literature on trust which shows the multiple
dimensions and facets of this human and social phenomenon, in order to define
3The attendance of a conference on trust in November 2010 in Zurich—“Vertrauen
im Streit der Interpretationen: Hermeneutische und methodische Probleme heutiger
Vertrauensforschung”—organized by the Institut für Hermeneutik und Religionsphilosophie,
the Institut für Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung, and the Forschungsstelle für Sozial- und
Wirtschaftsgeschichte in cooperation with the Collegium Helveticum, confirmed that the
problem of trust has still not been “solved”.
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it for the purposes of the present essay.4
The insight extracted from the literature on trust is then applied to the
context of investing. It turns out that first, there are different forms of trust
which feed into the final investment decision. Second, the act of investing itself
can be modeled as a trusting action which is embedded in and influenced by its
social context. And third, the standard investment decision calculus of risk and
expected return can be extended to take account of the factor trust.
The relevance of these insights can best be demonstrated by modeling trust
and investing as a process which is embedded in a relationship between the
institutional investor as the trustor and the firm5 as the trustee. The main
elements of the process are the establishment of trustworthiness and the mani-
festation of trust in the act of investing, where the former is the precondition of
the latter. Consequently, the firm as trustee should be interested in establishing
a trustworthy reputation.
Trustworthiness is formed as the trustor observes competence, integrity, and
goodwill of the trustee, and is not primarily a matter of information provision.
However, in the establishment of trustworthiness with respect to investing in
listed firms, information does play a crucial role. Trustworthiness in the con-
text of investing has not only to be lived but also transmitted, an aspect that
underlines the vital importance of corporate communication. The significance
of information is accentuated by the one-sided dependency of the investor on
receiving relevant and reliable information from the firm. A firm’s endeavor to
transmit this information is referred to as transparency effort. Besides helping
investors to take better informed decisions, an enhancement of information pro-
vision itself can be seen as a trustworthy signal. First, because transparency
can only be lived with firm outsiders when a firm’s internal structure is well
manageable. And second, because a spirit of openness also implies that there is
nothing to hide.
Thus, any information transparency effort undertaken by a firm is linked
first and foremost to the establishment of a trustworthy reputation which is a
precondition for investors as trustors to fulfill the trusting act of investing.
4As trust is an area of ongoing research and contributions are vast and increasing rapidly
the present essay does not provide a complete survey of the literature. I rather chose those
contributions that are, from my point of view, relevant, in order to explain the breadth of
trust as a human and social phenomenon.
5The terms “firm”, “company”, and “corporation” are used interchangeably throughout the
text.
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B. Research Questions
The goal of this essay is to find suitable responses to the following research
questions:
• Research Question I: How is trust defined, is it also a phenomenon in
economic exchange, and can it be analyzed in economic terms?
• Research Question II: What is the role of trust for the investment decision
and within the investment relationship?
• Research Question III: What is the role of information in establishing trust
within the investment relationship?
• Research Question IV: Is there an interrelationship between the investors’
perception of trustworthiness and the transparency effort of a listed firm?
C. Changing Environments
Prior to embarking upon a more technical analysis of trust and its characteristics
in the context of investing, I want to show via some preliminary remarks, that
owing to its multiple forms and facets, trust remains a highly challenging topic
both in practical life and in research. It seems to be a defiance to the society
in general because of the incisive changes that took place over the last century
and that relate to the origin for trusting attitudes and actions to arise, which is
complexity and the consequent uncertainty individuals and organizations face.
Complexity results from social interaction and increases with the number of
uncertain and possible interrelationships (Luhmann (2000)).
What sounds rather confusing at first becomes evident when thinking of
the effects of an absence of trust. What would a world look like without the
“trusting atmosphere” that surrounds us? What if the butcher is a psychopath
and uses the knife not on the requested steak but on the customer in front of the
counter? What if the cleaning lady does not clean your fridge but steals your
diamonds instead? What if the banks do not return the money we put on their
accounts as promised? The trust literature refers to the effect of an absence
of trust as uncertainty. The resulting complexity would be overwhelming for
humans and likely to lead to fear and disaster. This is why trust is also called
the lubricant of social interaction.
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The last century saw many ways to deal with complexity in social life, hence
decreasing it, but simultaneously complexity increased on different ends. In pre-
modern times while the level of uncertainty and danger was in some ways higher
than nowadays, social systems were smaller and thus, less complex. Addition-
ally, social norms and sanctions were relatively strong and this made individual
trust less necessary. The increasing division of labor, the growing differentiation
of roles and individuality have all given rise to the need for more individual trust
than was the case in pre-modern times. Nowadays, as it has become impossible
to question everything we consume, faith in expert knowledge has gained in
significance (Bosshardt (2001)).6
The increasing size of social systems, a development fostered by the avail-
ability of ideas and economic resources, has also expanded the potential for
interaction and thus complexity. Mankind has responded to the expansion of
systems by ever greater institutionalization, in an effort to handle the increased
complexity. This can also be seen as one merit of modern societies. Just as close
social norms are instrumental for the proper functioning of smaller communities,
it is only through institutions that large communities and system are able to
function. Institutions transform subjective opinion into objective conventions
and are thus ways of gaining transparency. They also serve to stabilize expec-
tations through the provision of information and the potential for sanctions.
The larger the system, the greater the complexity of interaction and as a result
the more intense the need for suitable institutions. They constitute the rules of
the game of human interaction in a world of social interdependence (Ripperger
(1998)).7
Thinking of the state of the world today in terms of interconnectedness, it
can be said the world has become a village, wired to one big system. Infor-
mation technology has exercised an enormous impact on the functioning of the
world because of the exploitation and distribution of information, more memory
capacity and access possibilities across space and time, and the possibility of
immediate feedback and constant updating.
6The division of labor meant the start of proficiency. Detailed knowledge is dispersed among
experts, which implies that one person knows less about everything but more about some-
thing. This has had an impact on social exchange as there is growing ignorance about things.
Up to a certain point there remain ways to inform oneself but, in today’s globalized world,
it is illusory to believe that one can look behind all scenes.
7Hubig (2007) refers to Anthony Giddens (1995) when saying that today there is a trend
to a dissolution of the personalized inherited environments in favor of a variety of abstract
references of individuals to institutions and organizations. Through this trend, even greater
gaps of space and time are being made bridgeable and in a certain sense also controllable.
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Despite the enhancement of life through institutionalization, uncertainty
has still grown rapidly, apparently stimulated by information technology.8 This
indicates that despite more information being accessible, living environments
may once again have become more confusing. They move and change more
quickly and become ever more complex as reference and orientation points as
well as paradigms of identification change or disappear with the process of de-
institutionalization.9
According to Hubig (2007), a dissolution of the former culture of trust but
simultaneously the genesis of a new culture of trust can be noticed and is neces-
sary. Luhmann refers to this new form of trust as system trust which is seen to
evolve of personal trust. System trust is said to entail conscious renouncement
of the need to search for further information or to apply control mechanisms in
order to expand our possibilities of action (Luhmann (2000)).10
Coming back to the focal topic, the additional changes in the social struc-
ture described above have also left their mark on the financial system. And,
the investment decision per se can be said to be a complex undertaking as well.
First, because it means guessing about an unknown future. Second, because
such guessing is based on information that investors do not own. Investing en-
tails a one-sided dependency, since it involves receiving relevant and reliable
information in order to take a decent decision. Third, investing involves com-
plexity since it implies giving up full control over one’s own money. Fourth,
the investment decision is not only a decision to invest in a firm but is most
probably also part of a portfolio decision, and it is certainly embedded in an
economic environment involving numerous interrelationships. Finally, the na-
8Hubig (2007) calls our society a risk society. In 2007 more data was generated than can
be saved on memory space worldwide. Today more information is being produced than our
brain can process. Access to more information does not necessarily mean more knowledge.
It rather leads to a free view over a sea of data, which might primarily lead to disorientation
(Achermann et al. (2010)).
9De-institutionalization can be noticed through developments such as more fractal and dy-
namic progress, individualization, dis-embeddedness, and anonymous community building in
virtual networks. On December 26, 2010 the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Biswas (2010)) wrote
“Bloggen, twittern, chatten: Die Ernüchterung ist absehbar. Permante Pflege der virtuellen
Identität als neue Überforderung.”
10As system trust is a derivative of personal trust, humans easily confuse the two. They may
put too much good faith into the system, although caution would be needed. Hubig (2007)
warns against a “trap of trust” which means that old “known” ways to act on a personal level
shall not be applied thoughtlessly to the system setting. The internet is a good example for
the tension that inheres system trust. It is a system that is built on trust. It would not be
able to function without trust which in turn would cause serious limitations for our society.
As this system trust is very similar to personal trust, people often do not act cautious
enough, for example when providing personal information (Bierhoff (2008)).
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ture of investing and its environment is dynamic, an aspect which is amplified
through global interconnectedness.
Some of the complexity aspects described are reduced through the institu-
tionalization of financial markets. Interacting parties on financial markets agree
to certain rules and conventions which diminishes uncertainty compared to what
would be present in an informal investment setting. At the same time the sys-
tem itself has expanded due to global interconnectedness. This increases scope
for action as well as the potential for complex interrelationships and the need
for experts because not everything can be overlooked by each single individual.
This development consequently increases the ignorance of each individual and
dependency on others.
The description of these developments highlights that investing is not only
a decision for a specific firm but that various other aspects play a role as well.
Further, even though investing is nowadays highly institutionalized, the invest-
ment context remains highly complex. In order to be able to take decisions and
perform actions, the investor has to find ways to deal with the present complex-
ity. It will be shown that trust is indeed a crucial element for investing, investing
itself can be seen as an act of trust, and that even though system trust is essen-
tial for financial markets, trust can only result from each and every individual
in the market, namely, trusting in the integrity of their exchange partners.
D. Proceedings
The remainder of this essay is divided into six sections and organized as follows.
I start by introducing in Section II the idea of trust as a way of handling the
complexity the investor faces regarding the investment decision.
In Section III the various dimensions and forms of trust are considered by
gathering information from different areas of social sciences. This section serves
as an overview and introduction to the topic of trust. I chose contributions
which, from my point of view, appear relevant in explaining the breadth of
trust as a human and social phenomenon. In particular, I review the different
perspectives on trust from an economic point of view.
Section IV introduces the procedural and dynamic nature of trust from two
perspectives. First, regarding the initial process of establishing the necessary
expectation of trustworthiness in order to actually fulfill the trusting action.
And second, by looking at trust as embedded in the ebb and flow of a relationship
and its influence on updating the perception of trustworthiness and the form of
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trust.
Section V applies the insights of Section III and IV to the context of invest-
ing. I show the different forms of trust involved in the investment environment
and their interrelationship, and discuss the theoretical framework for investor
trust. I then place the investment decision in a wider perspective, namely the
process of investing, and specify this process from an institutional investor’s
point of view. The standard decision calculus of risk and expected return is
extended to include the factor trust. I further widen the process of investing
and show, that when looking at the investment decision as embedded in a re-
lationship between the asset manager and the firm, this relationship might be
the site where trust originates and develops. Finally, I model the investment
process together with the trust process.
In Section VI I elicit the role of information and information transparency
both within the investment context as well as for the process of trust. I first
go into the role of information for the investment decision from a theoretical
and empirical point of view and define information transparency within the
context of investing. I then point out the different roles that information plays
within the process of trust and integrate these aspects of information into the
investment-trust process model of Section V.
Section VII describes the empirical investigation and summarizes the results
of a survey done with institutional investors on the perception of trustworthi-
ness and transparency regarding a listed firm. This was intended as a challenge
to the theoretical discussion on the topic. The perception of trustworthiness
and transparency is measured in terms of several factors. Competence, in-
tegrity, and goodwill are used for gauging overall perceived trustworthiness and
substantial information, participation, accountability, and openness generating
overall perceived transparency. The interrelationship between the trustworthi-
ness and transparency perception is analyzed. Potential differences between
the overall trust in a firm and in its management are checked upon, and in-
vestor and relationship characteristics are included in the analysis. Further, the
interdependency of different forms of trust within the investment context are
examined.
Finally, the last section concludes by responding directly to the research
questions, highlighting insights, limitations, and further ideas.
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II. Introduction: Life is Complex, So is Investing
“The enormous complexity with which we are struggling in the exploration of
the human organism, climate change or the financial markets, brings us espe-
cially one thing: the realization that everything is much more complicated than
we imagined, and that we are only at the very beginning of the decoding of the
world.” Achermann et al. (2010), p.4.
I would like to start this essay by observing that all human beings face two
phenomena: one is complexity, a fundamental feature of human life which follows
from the causal interconnection of multiple uncertain events and which increases
both with the number of possible, but uncertain events as well as with the
number of possible interrelationships. The other concerns the problems human
agents face in handling this complexity. Not everything in life is uncertain, but
uncertainty is by definition present whenever humans interact with each other
and have to take decisions which refer in some way to the future (Luhmann
(2000), Ripperger (1998), and Steigmaier (2008)).
A. Forms of Uncertainty
Ripperger (1998) distinguishes between different forms of uncertainty in order to
later apply them as criteria for demarcation for different forms of trust. Objec-
tive uncertainty is caused by coincidence, whereas subjective uncertainty refers
to the uncertainty of human agents regarding their assessment of the world,
summarized under the term error. Subjective uncertainty might be caused by
a lack of information or the inability to process information correctly.
Further, Ripperger distinguishes between exogenous and endogenous uncer-
tainty, a distinction which does not refer to the cause but rather the matter
in question. Exogenous events and their probability of occurrence cannot be
influenced by agents, e.g. natural events. In contrast, endogenous uncertainty
arises through the interaction of agents insofar as decisions and actions might
influence others’ decisions and actions. This form of uncertainty can be further
broken down into problems of coordination and motivation: coordination refers
to the competence and capability of agents, whereas motivation relates to the
willingness of agents to perform in a certain way. This last form of uncertainty
is referred to as behavioral uncertainty.11
11Clearly, different forms of uncertainty may influence each other.
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From an economic perspective, uncertainty per se is not the problem but
rather the potential economic consequences, i.e. the consequences for the agents’
utilities. Decisions with different consequences are uncertain in the sense that
it is not known which consequence occurs, i.e. agent utility is contingent. Rip-
perger (1998) defines this form of uncertainty as risk. Risk includes the pos-
sibility of utility loss or missed utility gain following from choosing a certain
strategy of action beyond the control of the agent, and which is caused through
the occurrence or not-occurrence of objectively or subjectively uncertain events
which can be exogenous or endogenous.12
B. Dealing with Uncertainty
Human beings need to find ways to handle the risk they face. One way to reduce
the complexity of action is risk limitation by negotiating an explicit contract.
Risk limitation can be realized either by decreasing the probability of the dam-
aging event or by decreasing the size of damaging consequences for the agent.
Exogenous risk cannot be controlled directly by the agents but its economic
consequences can be reduced, for example the risk of an earthquake cannot be
influenced but an insurance contract can be arranged to minimize the financial
consequences. While the total amount of risk is not reduced, the individual risk
is. In the case of endogenous risk both the probability of negative occurrence
and the damaging consequences can be influenced by the agents involved but
need to be compensated accordingly. The agents can decide whether and how
to interact, for example through the possession of a collateral, and arrange for
coverage given the deal decided upon (Ripperger (1998)).
The above approach sounds reasonable, so why consider an alternative at
all? First of all, because no contract is free. And secondly, the perfect contract
is a fictitious construct (Volkart (2008b)). In designing contracts future con-
tingencies need to be anticipated but the degree to which they match reality
always remains uncertain. And even regarding “certain” past or present infor-
mation, information asymmetries and bounded rational players are always part
of the game. Thus, reasons for seeking alternative arrangements may focus on
12This distinction between uncertainty and risk will be used in Section III, B.2 to distin-
guish between different forms of trust. Further on in the text the two terms will be used
interchangeably. For a discussion on the classical distinction between uncertainty and risk
where uncertainty refers to a situation where the probability distribution of the occurrence
of events is not known, whereas for risk it is known, see for example Farrar (1962) or Volkart
(2011), pp.204 and 205.
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the need to overcome any gaps with respect to remaining uncertainties. It will
be shown that trust can be seen as another, functionally equivalent mechanism
for stabilizing uncertain expectations and reducing the complexity of human
interaction in the face of uncertainty (Luhmann (2000) and Ripperger (1998)).
C. Investing and Uncertainty
Focusing now on the specific matter of interest in this essay, what can be said
about uncertainty in the investment setting13?
The basic idea of investing is that an agent14 who does not need money for
immediate consumption lends it to another agent with the goal and promise of
receiving it back in the future together with some form of compensation. The
present essay concentrates on institutional investors15, i.e. those who profes-
sionally invest money in listed firms, with the goal of receiving a certain return.
This principle sounds simple but the investment decision is nevertheless a
complex undertaking. I summarize below the various potential uncertainties
which arise in such a situation and which are crucial for the following sections:
• Investing is always a problem of a relationship between two or more agents.
• Investing always refers to the future. Even though the investment decision
has to be taken in a very moment, it involves a guess about the future and
its realization.
• In order to make an investment decision the potential investor needs in-
formation which she16 herself can only provide to a certain degree.
• From the first moment of the investment the investor gives up control
over her money. Therefore, investing means to handing over full control
of one’s money to someone else.
• The act of investing not only mean a loss of control but also implies willing-
ness to rely on someone else for further information. The investment deci-
sion has to be continually re-evaluated and renewed over time. The need
to rely on external sources of information remains also post-investment.
13Investing in this essay always refers to the context of financial investment.
14The term “agent” refers to economic players that can be human beings or organizations.
15Throughout the text the term “investor” will be used for both debt and equity investors
unless otherwise stated.
16Throughout the text the female form is used in place of all individuals.
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Although the extent of the above mentioned uncertainties will vary depend-
ing on the form of financial investment the investor chooses, i.e. generally spoken
whether debt or equity investment, they always remain present.17
I view the investment decision in the context of institutional investing as
incorporating both institutional and individual elements. Individual freedom is
limited in an institutional setting, but institutions are nevertheless represented
by individuals, the asset managers on the investor side and the management on
the firm side.18
For the asset manager the decision to invest in a company depends not only
on the specific features of the firm in question but is seen within a portfolio
context embedded in the investment environment. As I focus on the invest-
ment decision within a market setting, the current situation of the markets
and institutional parameters such as the economic and legal environment also
influence the investment decision. Figure 1 applies the different forms of uncer-
tainty introduced at the beginning of this section to the context of institutional
investing.
Figure 1. Forms of Uncertainty within the Investment Context. This figure shows
the different forms of uncertainty and their reasons (displayed in gray) which the investor
faces in the context of the investment decision (adapted from Ferber (2004), p.25). *Mgmt
stands for Management
Institutional investing may incorporate both objective and subjective uncer-
tainty, i.e. uncertainty resulting from unexpected changes in economic develop-
17Most forms of uncertainty are more distinct for shareholders than for other types of investors.
18I will pick up this thought again in Section V, C.
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ment, and human error regarding the specific market developments. This last
form of uncertainty may be either exogenous, e.g. the impact of capital market
rules, which are not directly controllable by each market participant, or endoge-
nous, e.g. firms’ profitability as influenced by the agents of the firm in terms
of their decisions concerning strategic positioning, choice of an honest manage-
ment, and credible communication. Finally, so-called “internal uncertainty” also
exists. This refers to the uncertainty stemming from market participants such
as asset managers to believe in their own capabilities in investment analysis.
Looking at the different aspects of uncertainty which accompany the invest-
ment setting, the main question revolves around the issue of whether trust, in
addition to explicit contracts, can serve as a mechanism for stabilizing uncertain
expectations. As to date only very little research on trust within the investment
context has been carried out, the next section gives an introduction to the pol-
ysemous phenomenon of trust. The insights gained will then by applied to the
context of investing in the later sections.
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III. Dimensions of Trust
“Asking too little of trust is just as ill advised than asking too much.” Gambetta
(2000), p.235.
Trust is of primary significance for human life. Thus, it is natural that every
strand of social science has been working on the trust phenomenon with the
result that, due to the partially competing views and assumptions of the different
disciplines on human behavior, various definitions of trust have arisen. This
problem of definitional elusiveness is simply a reflection of the nature of trust
itself. The meaning of the word varies depending on the person who uses it and
on the context it is being used in. There is no final consensus as it is an area of
ongoing research. In this section insights on trust from philosophy, psychology,
sociology, and economics are brought together. The goal is to describe the
fundamental aspects and the numerous facets of trust as a human and social
phenomenon. These are later applied to the context of investing.
A. The General Necessity and the Personal Capacity to Trust
Sociology focuses on the necessity for human beings to trust. While one might
be able to choose whom or what to trust and to what extent, humans need
trust as a way to “reduce the complexity” they are objectively confronted with
(Luhmann (2000) and Steigmaier (2008)). Complexity for Luhmann (2000)
derives from the causal connection of several uncertain events, and increases as
their number and interrelations rise. Trust in the sense of Luhmann is not just a
way to simplify life. While trust allows for the reduction of existing complexity,
it also creates new opportunities and thus new complexity. It might make life
easier, but more importantly, it opens up the possibilities of experience and
action. In other words, trust transforms objective uncertainty into subjective
certainty which increases the tolerance of uncertainty (Bierhoff (2008)).
According to Luhmann (2000), humans would live in a permanent state of
existential fear if they were truly conscious of the extent of uncertainty surround-
ing them. As to psychological research such a level of awareness is thankfully not
common.19 Generally, the human species is geared with a positive attitude to-
wards life. Humanity is imbued with a fundamental desire for self-preservation,
19Interestingly, behavioral science has been able to document a hormonal link between trust
and fear. Ocytocin, a trust stimulating hormone is produced at the same place in that part
of the brain which is also responsible for feelings of fear (Zinkant (2008)).
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although to some extent this might represent a form of self-deception (Peter-
mann (1996) and Fehr (2009)).
The personal capacity for trust is not the result of a conscious decision but
something the individual learns during the process of socialization. It is nor-
mally seen as a character trait whose formation is largely determined in early
childhood. Culture has a significant impact (Fukuyama (1996), Guiso et al.
(2006), and Marková and Gillespie (2008)), as do parental relationships and
personal experiences with others (Bierhoff (2008), Fischer and Kaplow (2008),
and Ripperger (1998)). This form of trust is called generalized trust or dispo-
sition to trust. It is a crucial component in the general attitude of individuals,
and normally considered very hard to influence in later years (Kenning and Blut
(2006) and Ripperger (1998)). Whether the generalized trust level of a person
shapes the amount of trust that a person is willing to offer regarding a specific
situation is still a matter of dispute. Nevertheless, it is believed to be a strong
general attitude affecting overall behavior, but having only little influence on
other specific forms of trust (Kenning and Blut (2006)).
B. Characteristics of a Situation of Trust
In defining trust two strands in the literature can be distinguished. The first
one focuses on trust as a belief, an expectation. For example, Rousseau et al.
(1998) define trust as a “psychological state comprising the intention to accept
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of intentions and behavior of
others” (p.395). According to psychology, trust is a positive attitude towards
someone or something.
But, and this refers to the second strand in literature, trust also has to be
a “practical” attitude since an advantage only results if the action following
and fulfilling the expectation manifests itself as trustful (Hartmann (2008)).
Application is necessary, just as Aristotle said: “The very insight does not move
anything, but only the practical thinking which is pointed to a certain purpose.”
(Cited in Grimm and Capurro (2007), p.16.) For Luhmann (2000) the trusting
action is revealed by the placing a of a so-called “risky advance”20.
In this sense, trust is both an expectation and an action (Ripperger (1998)).
Trust is also a “social” attitude as it would not be needed if only one person
existed. Besides interdependence, indeterminacy is also a condition for trust
(Olsen (2008)).
20In German “risky advance” is “riskante Vorleistung”.
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To summarize, three fundamental prerequisites must be met for trust to be
a possible strategy of action:
• Trust always refers to a subject.21
• Trust implies some form of uncertainty which entails a potential for neg-
ative consequences, i.e. vulnerability.
• This vulnerability is positively, voluntarily, and willingly accepted.
B.1. Reference Subjects
Trust is always geared to a subject, even if this is not realized consciously.
There is a trusting, trust giving party (the trustor) and a trust receiving party,
the reference subject to be trusted (the trustee). The reference subject can
be a person or a group of people, social roles, organizations, products, or soci-
ety as a whole. Figure 2 illustrates the trust relationship between trustor and
trustee and the two facets of trust: First, the establishment of an expectation
to trust through examination of the trustworthiness of the trustee, and second,
the trusting action by actually demonstrating trust.
Figure 2. The Trust Relationship. This figure depicts trust as a relationship between
the trustor and the trustee. This relationships starts with the examination of the trustee’s
trustworthiness by the trustor who establishes an expectation of trust. Trust is fulfilled when
the risky advance is placed by the trustor. The trustee can reciprocate trust or disappoint the
trustor. The relationship is embedded in and influenced by its social context (own illustration).
21Normally it refers to another subject, except regarding the intra-personal problem of self-
confidence or self-efficacy.
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Even though not all subjects can be unequivocally assigned to one of the
following two categories, it is helpful to start by distinguishing institutions and
individuals (Bosshardt (2001)).
The term “institution” refers to the rules of human interaction in a world of
social interdependence. Thus, not only are organizations institutions, but also
social conventions and procedures. Institutions serve to stabilize expectations by
providing information and potential sanctions, and thus, help reduce complexity
in human interaction (Ripperger (1998)).
A distinction is made between institutional and individual forms of trust.
Trust in institutions refers to the smooth and frictionless functioning of insti-
tutions, whereas trust in individuals is related to the individuality of human
agents and there freedom of choice. The English language actually provides
two words to mark this distinction by speaking of confidence in institutions and
trust in individuals (Bosshardt (2001)).
There are several limits to this classification and some further aspects need
to be mentioned owing to their relevance for the focal topic of investor trust.
First, there are clear connections between these two forms of trust. One is
that institutional factors have a great influence on the general behavior of people
and society as a whole. Institutional elements influence general risk propensity
and trust behavior strongly on an individual, organizational, and society level.
Institutional factors form the environment in which trust originates (Rousseau
et al. (1998)).
Second, individuals often play certain roles, which are themselves also forms
of institutions. For example a medical doctor or the management of a company
can be seen as individuals and also as performers of a social function. This
results in a mix of institutional and individual trust (Bosshardt (2001)).
Third, institutional trust can be unilateral or bilateral. While trust in in-
stitutions is mainly unilateral, e.g. with respect to the economic or legal en-
vironment of a company22, it may be also relational, as in for example trust
between organizations. Bilateral forms of trust are referred to as dyadic trust
or relational trust (Mayer et al. (1995)). Relational trust derives from the
experience of interaction, and can be observed on both an inter-personal and
inter-organizational level (Bierhoff (2008)).
Finally, a distinction may also be made between personal and system trust.
22Of course human beings have an influence on social rules but this is normally over a longer
period of time.
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System trust can be thought of as a form of institutional trust, and the term
also has a specific meaning in sociology. While psychology focuses on individ-
ual trust as both a concept of personality and interaction, in sociology, trust
is at the beginning treated as something personal and therefore limited. This
limitation arises through the unpredictability of the actions of others in a so-
cial system. System trust moves beyond this limitation of personal trust by
consciously allowing for uncertainty, for example, as a result of abstaining from
control mechanisms. This serves to reduce complexity and opens up new op-
portunities for action within the system. While some complexity is reduced,
new complexity is simultaneously created as new opportunities become avail-
able (Luhmann (2000)).
B.2. Uncertainty
Trust always entails diving into the unknown, no matter what form it takes.
This basic element of uncertainty is reflected in all definitions.
Figure 3 relates the different forms of uncertainty introduced in Section II
to various forms of trust as methods of handling uncertainty.
Figure 3. Forms of Uncertainty and Trust as Response. This figure shows the different
forms of uncertainty and trust, narrowing down trust in the strictest sense to an opportunity
to handle endogenous risk related to the intention of the reference subject, displayed in gray
(Ripperger (1998), p.40).
As a matter of fact, one general answer to uncertainty in life is simply to have
confidence. This is the general, positive attitude towards life mentioned earlier
in Section III, A. While humans may be said to have confidence with respect to
overall, objective uncertainty, i.e. with respect to things that are not under their
control, the term trust is used to refer to a specific risky situation. Subjective
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risk regarding exogenous events, i.e. events which cannot be influenced directly,
can be addressed in terms of hope. Trust can thus be seen as an alternative
of action in situations of endogenous risk, when the choice of action of another
player is uncertain and may influence one’s own utility.
Just as endogenous risk can be broken down into problems of coordination
and motivation, trust can also be further narrowed down to problems of compe-
tence and intention. Conflicting opinions exist concerning whether trust refers
to both competence and intention or simply to intention. Here the moral aspect
of trust is touched upon. Competence may be seen as a form of confidence,
reliance or belief in the capability of another party. In contrast, trust in the
strictest sense of the word, can be seen as a way of handling intentional uncer-
tainty in a specific relationship.23
B.3. Willingness to Be Vulnerable
As mentioned above, trust can only arise if there is a potential for damage.
Making a risky advance without knowing if such an action will be rewarded
or abused creates vulnerability. Mayer et al. (1995) define trust as “[...] the
willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based
on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to
the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party”
(p.712).
They emphasize two crucial things: The trusting party experiences vulnera-
bility, i.e. being conscious of the fact to lose something significant or dear, and
accepts this uncertainty willingly.
Mayer et al. (1995) also refer to relational trust and how it differs to confi-
dence. Confidence and trust are both means of coping with situations entailing
general uncertainty, i.e. both concepts “refer to expectations that may lead to
disappointment. Luhmann argued that trust differs from confidence because it
requires a previous engagement on a person’s part, recognizing and accepting
risk exists. [...] If you do not consider alternatives (every morning you leave the
house without a weapon), you are in a situation of confidence. If you choose an
action in preference to others in spite of the possibility of being disappointed
by the action of others, you define the situation as one of trust.” (Mayer et al.
23The distinction between uncertainty and risk used here is helpful in demarcating the dif-
ferent forms of trust. Unless otherwise stated the terms risk and uncertainty are used
interchangeably in the following pages.
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(1995), p.712, citing Luhmann (2000).)
Willingness with respect to trusting implies that actors are aware of the
given uncertainty and do not shy away from it. This does not mean that the
players expect bad behavior and are suspicious about being betrayed. Quite
the opposite is the case. People are willing to trust others only if they expect
cooperative behavior because trust is a positive attitude.
C. The Temporal Dimension of Trust
By definition, trust always refers to a future state which is uncertain, contingent,
and not perfectly predictable (Bosshardt (2001)). Or in Luhmann’s words: trust
“anticipates the future” (Luhmann (2000), p.8). If one party demonstrates trust
to another party, they anticipate the future, they pretend the future to be
certain. This implies that trust is by definition prospective, see Figure 4.
Figure 4. Temporal Dimension of Trust. This figure illustrates the temporal dimension
of trust. Trust is prospective by definition. It anticipates the future without limiting the
economically relevant and possible contingencies (Ripperger (1998), p.47).
Although trust is by definition prospective, the literature distinguishes retro-
spective and prospective trust (Bosshardt (2001)). Retrospective trust is based
on directly or indirectly acquired information about the past, it is a part of
knowledge in this sense, and therefore, a correlate for certainty (Bosshardt
(2001)). In this context, the meaning of the concept “familiarity”24 is worth
looking at. Luhmann (2000) sees familiar worlds as those dominated by the
past. It is relatively easy to live in a familiar, intimate environment since the
past does not leave any possibilities open and complexity is thus reduced. Fa-
miliarity is formed out of regularity which creates certainty, a form of base
24Which in German is intriguingly called “Vertrautheit”.
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stability. Trust, on the other hand, always points towards the future, even if
“past information is drawn over”, brought into the present in order to attempt
a determination of the future. Once personal experience is established, the in-
formation and experience of the past is “extrapolated” into the future, building
on retrospective trust to reach into the future with prospective trust (Luhmann
(2000) and Ripperger (1998)). The temporal dimension of trust becomes evi-
dent once trust is seen as a process originating within a social relationship (see
Section IV). Retrospective trust can then be seen as a starting point for the
process of trust (Bierhoff (2008) and Stegmaier (2008)).
D. Trust from an Economic Perspective
Within economics, the initial period of reluctance has been overcome and the
topic of trust has established itself as thriving field of research. The last decade
in particular has been witness of several major advances. There has been sub-
stantial progress in the measurement of trust using experimental tools and sur-
vey measures. Still, some partially justified concerns of economists with respect
to trust do remain.
It is common sense that trust serves as a lubricant for the economic system.
According to Arrow (1972), “virtually every commercial transaction has within
itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction over a period of time” (p.24).
Even though today trust is not just treated as background environment anymore,
the exact role of trust is still not clear. Is it just an epiphenomenon of good
institutions or does it play an independent causal role in shaping important
aggregate economic outcomes (Fehr (2009))?
The comments in the following sub-section reflect the fact that trust is a
relatively new and ongoing area of research within economics drawing on a va-
riety of definitions and approaches. I first look at the implications of different
behavioral assumptions when defining trust. I then describe the most promi-
nent economic approaches to trust. I close with some remarks concerning the
treatment of trust within an economic framework, both in economic terms and
as an economic tool.
D.1. Trust and the Economic Behavioral Assumptions
Within the prevailing economic framework of the neoclassical school of thought
there is neither room nor necessity to think about trust. Why?
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The answer is largely related to neoclassical assumptions of complete and
symmetric information and individual rationality. Trust always involves incom-
plete knowledge. If agents have complete and symmetric information and are
perfectly able to process it, a situation of trust can never arise or would not
make sense. Further, trust in the strictest sense may arise due to uncertainty
regarding the motivation of the counterpart. However, perfect individual ratio-
nality implies that agents always choose the option with the largest expected
outcome according to their preferences, but only as long as they do not harm
other agents. Maliciousness is not included in such a framework.
This means that actually the concept of trust can only be dealt with in
a framework that allows for imperfect and asymmetric information, bounded
rationality, and opportunism and betrayal. New institutional and behavioral
economics are thus areas of economic research that offer a possible theoretical
framework for trust since they both allow for such aspects. Some approaches
using rational choice theory also offer potential but these are not infrequently
subject to criticism in the prevailing literature on trust.
D.2. Modeling Trust In Economics
Trust as a Principal-Agent Relationship
Ripperger (1998) models the decision to trust as a rational decision process
between the trustor as the principal and the trustee as the agent (see Figure
5).25
Trustor and trustee follow a rational decision calculus as described below:
• The placing of trust by the trustor is based on:
– the cost/utility calculus of the trustor
– the preferences of the trustor
– anticipated constraints with respect to the trustor’s scope for action
∗ which in turn depends on the risk associated with the action in
question (perceived risk regarding the trustee), and
∗ the subjective risk appetite of the trustee.
25Ripperger (1998) gives a good introduction to the principles of principal-agent theory on
the pages 63–82. For basic contributions on the topic in general see among others Fama
(1980), Fama and Jensen (1983a), Horsch et al. (2005), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Pratt
and Zeckhauser (1985), Rees (1985a), Rees (1885b), and Ross (1973).
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• Whether the trustee rewards the risky advance placed by the trustor is
based on:
– the cost/utility calculus of the trustee which is influenced by:
∗ intrinsic incentives, and therefore by the preference structure of
the trustee, and
∗ extrinsic incentives in terms of reputation mechanisms which reg-
ulate the possibilities of cooperation through access to social cap-
ital.
Figure 5. Trust as a Principal-Agent Relationship. This figure picks up the idea of
Figure 2 of trust as a relationship. Here trust is illustrated as a principal-agent relationship
between the trustor as the principal and the trustee as the agent (own illustration).
This principal-agent relationship can be modeled as an implicit contract
between the trustor and the trustee which highlights the behavioral risk involved
for the trustor in a situation of trust (see Figure 6).
Before performing the trusting action the potentially trusting party is con-
fronted with an adverse selection problem when deciding on the trustworthiness
of another agent—the potential trustee—because the trustee owns private in-
formation concerning her preferences and intentions of behavior, in sum, her
motivation. In a screening process the trustor will try to identify agents with
the characteristic of trustworthiness. Agents who would like to be trusted are
interested in signaling trustworthiness.
After the trusting action is executed the principal faces hold-up risk because
the risky advance is an irreversible investment and implies a form of one-sided
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Figure 6. Behavioral Risk in the Trust Relationship. This figure describes the behav-
ioral risk involved in a situation of trust between the trustor as the principal and the trustee
as the agent before, when, and after the placement of trust (Ripperger (1998), p.76).
dependency. The hold-up risk increases, the more valuable and specific the
risky advance is. At this point the trustee can choose between honoring or dis-
appointing the trustor. Through the trustee’s choice of action she can either
deliver value—increase utility—or cause loss. Finally, another problem might
arise, namely a situation of moral hazard, if the trustor is not able to distinguish
between the level of trustee effort and non-controllable exogenous events.
The Trustor’s Decision Calculus
One strand of economic literature defines trust as a decision under risk. This
implies that the trustor assesses probabilities concerning the behavior of the
other party and uses the resulting expectations as the basis for her decision: i.e.
she estimates the trustworthiness of the trustee and the size of the potential
profit/loss of the risky investment. Within this view the decision can be seen
as gambling choice or a trusting choice problem.
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Exponents of rational choice theory see trust as a gambling choice, thus,
the same as a bet (Dasgupta (2000), Gambetta (2000), and Coleman (1990)).
Trusting can be an acceptable option where transactions range over a period of
time, i.e. if the own effort has to be performed before the other party delivers
her effort. The transaction is seen as realized once the risky advance is actually
placed. Whether the expected trusting action is actually performed depends on
the expected profit of the risky advance compared to the expected loss, given
the expected behavior of the trustee. The expectation of the trustor is thus fully
determined by the motivation of the trustee and the knowledge of the trustor.
The better informed the trustor, the clearer her decision to trust. The search for
information follows a rational calculus as well. The trustor looks for information
up to the point at which the marginal cost of the information search does not
exceed the related marginal gain. Further, structural independence is assumed,
i.e. every agent’s decision to act is independent of the actions of others (Weibel
(2002)).
Where the decision calculus of the trustor is seen as a trusting choice instead
of a gambling choice the focus shifts to the trustworthiness of the trustee and her
willingness to reciprocate (Deutsch (1960) and Luhmann (2000)). According to
Deutsch (1960), to “[...] trust another person to produce a beneficial event X (or
to suspect another person will produce a harmful event Y) an individual must
have the confidence that the other individual has the ability and the intention
to produce it” (p.123). The trustor is in a situation where she can either gain or
lose through interaction. Whether she gains or loses depends on the trustee. The
resulting expectation concerns the competence and intention of the trustee but
focuses in particular on the motivational aspect of the trustee in reciprocating
trust. The more intrinsically motivated the trustee seems to be, the stronger
the likelihood that the trustor will be willing to advance trust, irrespective of
the specific situation.
There are two main criticisms put forward by many trust researchers regard-
ing the rational choice approach to the phenomenon of trust (Weibel (2002)).
The first regards the idea of seeing trust as vulnerability. According to Deutsch
(1960) one can only speak of a situation of trust when the possible loss is greater
than the potential realizable gain. The other focuses on the trustworthiness of
the trustee. In a bet estimated trustworthiness is simply not relevant.
Even though Institutional Economics allows for behavioral uncertainty the
approach still does not fully capture the essence of trust since the uncertainty
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aspect is defined away from the outset. It is known ex-ante which strategies
are optimal for everyone, how the agents will behave, and the principal simply
anticipates the optimal behavior of the agents.
The Trustee’s Decision Calculus
Although most of the trust research focuses on the decision calculus of the
trustor, the decision calculus of the trustee is crucial as well since this influences
the initiation of trust by the trustor (Ripperger (1998)). The trustee’s deci-
sion calculus is given by her preferences and external constraints. Therefore,
it makes a difference for the trustor whether she expects rational, reciprocal or
even altruistic preferences of the trustee. In the rational choice approach, the
trustee computes not only the current profit of a betrayal but also the poten-
tial loss of betrayal resulting from any future relationships with the trustee or
others. Coleman (1990) concludes that the trustee will more likely reciprocate
favorably the longer the relationship is expected to last, the greater the gain of
a longer relationship, and the more comprehensive the communication between
the agents is (Weibel (2002)).
Trust as a Tendency to Cooperate
Another way economists look at trust is by seeing it as a tendency to cooperate.
There are again two different views and areas of research regarding trust as
cooperation.
The first view follows formal game theory and tries to specify in which sit-
uations cooperation may be the optimal choice for rational agents (Dasgupta
(2000), Kreps (1996), and Williamson (1993)). In modern trust literature co-
operation is not necessarily equated with trust. Cooperation can arise in the
absence of trust. It may but it does not have to be based on trust. In games
of pure cooperation individual trust does not refer to the good conduct of the
other players but to their rationality and to prevailing conventions and norms
(Bosshardt (2001)). Conflict games such as the prisoners’ dilemma are used to
show that “trust” is rational because it can be shown that cooperation yields a
higher payoff for both players than if one betrays (Axelrod (1984)). The cri-
tique is similar to that above in the classical case of cooperation. The trustor
does not analyze the trustworthiness of the other agent and does not have a
trusting expectation about the intentions or behavior of the other party (Rip-
perger (1998)). Rather, the trustor decides to place trust—to cooperate—if the
25
situation fulfills certain conditions. She knows that where there is potential for
further interaction or where third parties could be informed of the defection,
offering trust is acceptable. Since all players “know” about each others’ strate-
gies and their interdependencies, the uncertainty involved becomes analyzable,
the future can be anticipated. Given realistic conditions of iteration, i.e. the
possibility of sanctioning and social embeddedness, trust reduces to reputation
(Hubig (2007)).26
The second view on trust as cooperation encapsulates what is today the main
area of economic research on trust. It refers to the empirical documentation
of cooperation between players who only rarely interact with each other, also
referred to as trust between strangers.27 This concept of the so-called “pure”
form of trust is contrary to many trust researchers’ point of view who claim that
trust can only originate within a relational setting over time and that “blind”
trust cannot exist (Camerer (2003) and Lewicki et al. (2006)).
This form of trust includes interaction at a level of individuals, just as social
aggregates which produce socially efficient outcomes (see among others Cole-
man (1990), Fukuyama (1996), Gambetta (2000), La Porta et al. (1996), and
Putman (1993)).28 The general attitude of the people of a society is supposed
to shape the way cooperation works and therefore influences economic develop-
ment. Thus trust between strangers becomes ever more important, the greater
and more complex systems and their players become, and the higher the fre-
quency and scope of interaction. This is also said to have a strong influence on
the performance of large organizations (Fukuyama (1996) and La Porta et al.
(1996)).
There have been great advances in this area owing to the substantial progress
made in measuring trust empirically with experimental tools—e.g. the so-called
“trust game”29—and with survey measures. Still, the causal role of trust remains
26Game theory shows that repeated interaction can lead to cooperation. Moreover the social
environment matters if communication is possible since reputation is built up and it works
as an incentive and sanction mechanism. I will come back to the role of reputation for trust
in Section VI.
27One attempt of measurement, see Camerer (2003), lies in defining the slippery concept in a
game, perhaps asking “Would you lend money to somebody who does not have to pay you
back, but might feel morally obliged to do so? If you would, you trust her. If she pays you
back, she is trustworthy.” (p.3.)
28Although being originally a sociological concept, the topic of social capital has gained signif-
icant attention also from an economic perspective over the last years, in particular regarding
the understanding of the creation and distribution of social trust and the effect on economic
development. See for example for an overview Franzen and Freitag (2007) and Marková and
Gillespie (2008).
29Engelmann (2010) explains the trust game originally introduced by Berg et al. (1995) as
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an area of great dispute, mainly because the measurement of “pure” trust is so
difficult (Fehr (2009)).30
There is indeed evidence that trust affects important economic variables
such as GDP growth, inflation, or the trade volume between countries: High
trust societies, that is societies with a large share of trusting people, are nega-
tively correlated with inflation rates and positively with GDP growth rate across
countries (La Porta et al. (1996), Knack and Keefer (1997), and Zak and Knack
(2001)). Higher bilateral trust between countries is associated with more trade
(Guiso et al. (2006) and (2009)). Further, very interesting work, especially
regarding the topic of the present essay, has been done by Guiso et al. (2004),
Guiso et al. (2008), and Guiso (2010) on the interrelationship of trust and fi-
nancial development. I will look at this in detail in Section V.
A Working Definition of Trust
After having described the various economic approaches to trust, I now close
with the definition given by Fehr (2009) who defines trust in the following way:
“An individual (let’s call her the trustor or investor) trusts if she voluntarily
places resources at the disposal of another party (the trustee) without any legal
commitment from the latter. In addition, the act of trust is associated with
an expectation that the act will pay off in terms of the investor’s goals. In
particular, if the trustee is trustworthy the investor is better off than if trust
were not placed, whereas if the trustee is not trustworthy the investor is worse
off than if trust were not placed.” (p.3.)
This definition coincides with the characteristics of a situation of trust dis-
cussed in Section III concerning the existence of a reference subject, uncertainty,
and vulnerability. It sees trust as positive expectation and voluntary act. Ad-
ditionally, it specifies the decision calculus of the trustor as a “trusting choice”.
follows: “In a typical version of the trust game, [...], two anonymous players called the
“investor” and “trustee” interact by sequentially exchanging monetary amounts as follows:
The investor is allocated a certain amount of money by the experimenter, say 10 MU, and is
asked to send any amount from her endowment to the trustee. Known to both participants,
the amount transferred by the investor is tripled by the experimenter. The trustee’s role is
to decide how to share her endowment with the investor, that is, how much money to send
back. The amount sent by the investor is taken to reflect trust-taking, as she voluntarily
makes herself vulnerable by placing her resources at the disposal of the trustee. Her motive
for doing so is that the social risk she took could increase her financial wellbeing, if her trust
is reciprocated. The amount returned by the trustee, then, is a measure of prosociality and
trustworthiness.” (p.230.)
30I will deal with the various challenges of the measurement of trust a little further in Section
VII, A.1.
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D.3. Reservations Concerning an Economic Treatment of Trust
Although there are several theoretical tools available to integrate trust as an
important social fact into economic frameworks considerable reluctance still
prevails.
Reasons for Reluctance
One reason is the general calculative approach of economics which seems to be
a fundamental contradiction given the nature of a phenomenon like trust (Rip-
perger (1998) and Williamson (1993)). According to Williamson (1993), trust is
“reserved for very special relations between family, friends, and lovers” (p.484).
The rationality orientation of economics compared to other social sciences is
said to be incompatible with trust. Trust “[...] would be seriously degraded if a
calculative orientation were “permitted”” (p.486).
Another open and valid issue is the phenomenon’s “softness” and its fuzziness
which makes a direct measurement of trust difficult, if not impossible. Some
see trust as a pre-economic construct which means that it refers to qualitative
aspects that have cognitive and emotional effects which might in turn influence
quantitative economic measures.31 Not all economists think that it is reasonable
to analyze trust because only part of the variance of the economically relevant
category may be explained (Kenning and Blut (2006) and Williamson (1993)).
As trust is clearly relevant for social exchange, one could easily dismiss the
problem by simply asserting that economic theory is obviously too abstract and
unrealistic. However, when one returns to the origin of economic theory it be-
comes clearer why trust, just as other moral issues, is not included in the models.
The genius idea and goal was namely to objectify economic exchange and create
an instrument of social control, enhancing welfare for the society as a whole.
Trust as a Topic of Ethics
Economics developed out of political economics and thus out of moral philoso-
phy about a hundred years ago.32 The real driver behind the economic thought
was the changing status of the bourgeoisie and the nobility. The knightly virtues
of the nobility were gradually transformed into civil codes of ethics: knightly
competition was now mutual gain through cooperative behavior, and courage
31An example would be customer loyalty that might have an influence on turnover.
32Aristotle was the first to talk about it as an own discipline but saw ethics as having a primacy
since it determined what is good or bad and therefore defined the borders of economic
activity.
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and dignity became agreement and acknowledgment of contractual obligations,
respectability, and trustworthiness. The drafting of a contract demanded ac-
countability from both sides and also offered mutual advantage.
Supporters of civil ethics were convinced that moral and religious rules were
not strong enough to control the destructive passions of the human being. Such
thoughts reached their peak during the Age of Enlightenment. The passions
referred to were avarice, greeds, and lucre. Adam Smith summarized them
under the terms “advantage” or “self-interest” and declared them to be the origin
of economic action. Self-interest, however, also required a certain degree of
calculation and caution.
The newly discovered principle of self-interest provided a promising basis
for the functioning of society. The central advantage of a society guided by
self-interest is the predictability of human behavior. Individuals are no longer
completely exposed to the arbitrariness and randomness in the passions of their
fellow human beings. Behavior becomes more transparent, more calculable, and
more predictable. This is seen as an advantage not only for one person but for
everyone, i.e. for society as a whole. Everyone has the same rights and morality
is no longer individually contingent. The new declared morality was social by
definition as it is only activated within a relationship (Ripperger (1998)).
From a classical economics’ point of view, moral science—especially regard-
ing economic activities—was now regarded as unnecessary. In a world of perfect
individual rationality everyone acts by maximizing their utility but not at the
expense of anyone else. Since trust is a moral problem arising only if there is
uncertainty pertaining to the moral qualities of another person, trust will not
be treated in economics.
Even though classical economists such as Adam Smith did not explicitly ad-
dress trust, it was believed that prevailing institutions, i.e. legal, commercial,
and behavioral norms all served to channel the self-interested behavior in the
right direction. Furthermore, within his analysis of the division of labor, Smith
assumed a certain form of trust between the exchange partners, and in “The
Theory of Moral Sentiments” he said that humans want to live according to
certain rules of morality and that they naturally aspire to express love, grat-
itude, and admiration. For Smith it was clear that all human individuals are
part of a system of social norms. The isolation of economic theory from other
social sciences only began to gain force with the subsequent rise of neoclassical
economics (Bosshardt (2001), citing Smith (1976)).
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Leaving Room for Reason and Emotion
To resume, the original idea of classical economics was actually a good one
but Ripperger (1998) points out that the strict separation of the different social
disciplines creates a “schizophrenic view on the idea of man” (p.240). Ethics and
economics are not seen as two sides of the same coin, the individual is not seen
as one human being having one mind. The result is a dualistic comprehension
of the human actor and the need to distinguish calculus and emotion, even at
the level of trust. As will be discussed further below, the interrelationship and
interaction of reason and emotion is a tight one and depends strongly on the
context and the precise situation. Or as Volkart (2008a) puts it: “Concluding,
in general and particularly for the management of a company, there is a need
to always leave enough room for the interplay between reason and intuition.
[...] And the generation of trust, which is indispensable in the functioning of
the markets, cannot arise through reason alone, but nearly always requires the
addition of intuition.” (p.736.)33
E. Relevance of Trust and Trustworthiness in Doing Business
Trust is said to be one of the key variables in the relationship between an ef-
fective management of a firm and its stakeholders (Bauer et al. (2006)). As a
social lubricant it is said to exert a crucial influence in such areas as communi-
cation, cooperation, coordination, and conflict management, and through these
channels impact firm performance.34
According to Olsen (2008) trust has an extrinsic and an intrinsic value. The
primary extrinsic value of trust lies in its ability to reduce transaction costs.
It serves as a complement to legal contracts, where future contingencies are
not identifiable and malfeasance cannot be separated from bad luck. In such
cases trust allows for agreement and cooperation. The primary intrinsic value
lies in the reduction of suspicion and animosity, which once again enables more
cooperative behavior and rapid adaptation to environmental uncertainty.
33Translated from original German: “Als Fazit ergibt sich generell und insbesondere für die
Unternehmensführung die Forderung, dem Zusammenspiel von Verstand und Intuition stets
ausreichend Raum zu geben. [...] Und die für das Funktionieren von Märkten unentbehrliche
Vertrauensbildung kann oft nicht nur aus dem Verstand heraus erfolgen, sondern erfordert
zumeist auch Intuition.”
34Some of the numerous empirical studies are provided by Bstieler (2006), Davis et al. (2000),
Dirks and Ferrin (2001), Dyer and Chu (2003), Kale et al. (2000), Tsai (2000), and Zand
(1972). Further empirical studies regarding the interrelationship of trust and information
and communication will be provided in Section VI.
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Wilson and Kennedy (1999) argue that trustworthiness is a productive, eco-
nomic asset, similar to information or knowledge. As all stakeholders have
certain beliefs and values associated with a firm, the repeated observation of
these characteristics creates a trustworthy reputation for a firm. The perceived
trustworthiness then has a positive impact on business flexibility, and it saves
managerial time and monitoring costs. Despite taking time and money to evolve
and maintain, trustworthiness appreciates in value through experience.
Barney and Hansen (1994) come to the conclusion that trustworthiness may
be a source of competitive advantage when reacting to the variance of trustwor-
thiness of exchange partners. In particular, the firm culture, and through that
the reputation of the firm provide opportunities for sustained competitive ad-
vantage since they are very strong, socially unique and highly complex, and thus
relatively immune to imitation and rapid diffusion by competitors. This point
of view demonstrates how important a firm’s culture and reputation are. These
are largely determined by the values and beliefs of past and present owners, of
employees, but especially those of the management.
F. Summary Section III
The goal of Section III was to introduce some of the multiple facets of the trust
phenomenon.
Trust always relates to another subject. This may be individuals, institu-
tions, or a whole system. Depending on the reference subject it may be either
unilateral or dyadic. In the case of relational trust, trust can be defined as a
relationship between a trustor, the trust giving party, and a trustee, the party
to be trusted, which is embedded in and influenced by its social context.
Trust is needed when a situation entails some element of uncertainty. In
general, people may respond to the uncertainties of life by assuming an attitude
of confidence. Trust, however, is always related to a specific situation and to
particular forms of risk arising from the uncertainty generated by the choice of
others and its impact on the trustor. This uncertainty may follow from igno-
rance concerning the competence of the trustee, or from the lack of knowledge
concerning her intention. Trust in the strictest sense is associated only with
the latter uncertainty regarding trustee motivation and the potential negative
consequences for the trustor. This trustor vulnerability is fundamental in any
situation of trust.
Trust is both an expectation and an action performed by the trustor. The
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expectation is related to the positive beliefs concerning the trustworthiness of
a potential trustee. However, only after a risky advance has been made, is the
trust act complete, since only then is the vulnerability of the trustor exposed.
Trust has a temporal dimension. It is prospective in that it always concerns
an unpredictable future, and also anticipative in that no specific constraints are
set (as in a contract) with respect to possible contingencies. Trust may also be
retrospective when referring to information acquired about the past.
From an economic perspective the relationship between trustor and trustee
may be seen as a principal-agent relationship where the decision to place trust
follows a rational cost/utility calculus. If trust is seen as an implicit contract
between a trustor and a trustee, the behavioral risk involved becomes a problem
of adverse selection in that before the placement of the risky advance the trustee
owns private information about her trustworthiness. Once the trusting action is
performed, the principal faces a hold-up risk as the risky advance is a one-sided
irreversible investment, a situation which may be abused by the trustee. Finally,
moral hazard may prevail since the trustor might not be able to distinguish
between the reciprocating effort of the trustee and the impact of exogenous
events.
Rational choice theory sees trusting as a gambling choice, similar to a bet.
In contrast, standard trust literature emphasizes trust as a trusting choice. Such
literature focuses on aspects of trustor vulnerability, i.e. potential loss is sup-
posed to be greater than potential gain, and on the aspect of trustworthiness.
Some economists define trust in terms of cooperation as in formal game theory.
However, as cooperation may occur in the absence of trust, this approach is not
altogether convincing.
The greatest part of the most recent economic research on trust is actually
dedicated to empirical documentation of the level of trust concerning coopera-
tion between strangers. This form of trust is also called generalized trust or the
disposition to trust when referring to the general trust attitude of an individual.
In the case of a social system as a whole, it is called social trust.
Economists have approached the subject of trust with considerable reserve,
as problems regarding its true nature and measurement abound. Where the
moral qualities of individuals were concerned, ethical rather than economic anal-
ysis was seen as being more appropriate. However, the newer schools of economic
thought operate with a broader concept of human action, and now acknowledge
trust as being highly relevant for both social and economic analysis.
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IV. A Procedural View on Trust
The temporal nature of trust mentioned in Section III, C already indicates a
procedural view on the topic. There are two facets that I would like to point
out: one is the process of being able to perform the initial trusting action, while
the other is the development of trust within a relationship setting. Looking at
trust dynamically the initial trusting action is of crucial importance, as it is the
basis for further interaction, but the perception of trustworthiness and the level
of trust are capable of adaptation over time and through interaction.
In standard economics these procedural qualities of trust are missing as there
is no adaptation of beliefs and preference levels in response to the outcomes of
choices. The assumption of structural independence, i.e. every agent’s decision
to act is independent of others’ actions, leaves no room for modeling reciprocal
effects (Weibel (2002)).
The trust process starts when the potentially trusting agent evaluates the
reference subjects, i.e. the potential agents to be trusted, and builds up an
expectation of trust. At any particular moment trust can be thought of as the
aggregation of the perception of certain factors regarding the reference subject
which then finally leads to the trusting action. This first sub-process is embed-
ded in and strongly influenced by a specific context, as well as by psychological
and sociological factors. The information available is processed, whereby most of
the various mechanisms used in information processing operate subconsciously
and tend to follow an optimistic pattern (Bierhoff (2008)).35 After this initial
act of trust it is up to the trustee to either reciprocate positively or to disap-
point the trustor (as has been shown in Figure 2 and 5, Section III, B.1 and
D.2.). When the relationship, in whatever form, continues, the dynamic nature
of trust comes into play. Within a relationship trust changes over time through
experience. Within the ebb and flow of a relationship trust is continuously re-
evaluated by the receiving and processing of new information (Rousseau et al.
(1998)).
A. Establishment of a Trustworthy Expectation
As mentioned in the introduction, the starting point of the process of trust can
be thought of as the result of perceiving different factors concerning the reference
35According to Hartmann (2008) attitudes in general are said not to be consciously brought
about but to result.
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subject, the so-called antecedents of trust. On the basis of such antecedents, an
overall opinion or attitude with respect to the trustworthiness of the opposing
party is formed, and the expectation of trust emerges.
The antecedent factors needed for the emergence of trust have been widely
discussed.36 The three most important components which describe a large
portion of trustworthiness are ability, benevolence and integrity (Mayer et al.
(1995)), or in the words of Rawlins (2008): “Trust is one party’s willingness to
be vulnerable to another party based on the confidence that the latter party is
competent and dependable, has integrity and acts with goodwill.” (p.5.)
A.1. Considering the Context
Even though the exact process of trust is unknown, people seem to start with
some baseline level predicated upon previous life experience and then adjust it
to the unique features of the situation (Olsen (2008)).37 The level of trust deriv-
ing from the perceptions of ability, benevolence, and integrity of the potential
trustee and from the natural propensity of the trustor may be constant38, but
the actual behavioral manifestation of trust will definitely depend on contextual
factors, for example, on the perceived level of risk or the availability of alterna-
tives (Mayer et al. (1995)). “In sum, the trustor perception and interpretation
of the context of the relationship will affect both the need for trust and the eval-
uation of trustworthiness. Changes in such factors as the political climate and
the perceived volition of the trustee in the situation can cause a reevaluation of
trustworthiness.” (Mayer et al. (1995), p.727.)
Trust lies on a continuum between knowledge and belief. This allows for an
area of conflict between the basic attitude towards trust and the specific ex-
pectation regarding the particular reference subject. The proportion of rational
and emotional elements clearly depends on the context and forms specific trust
(Kenning and Blut (2006)). Both elements are always existent, have a com-
plementary effect and depending on the reference subject, the content of the
relationship, and the resulting expectations, produce different forms of trust. In
the context of anonymous relationships the actors involved often have to decide
to trust, whereas in intimate relationships in which trust appears to be inher-
ent, trust seems to be naturally existent, is “habitus” (Hartmann (2008)). The
36For a good overview of various studies see Mayer et al. (1995) p.718.
37This refers again to the aspect and influence of familiarity.
38As to Mayer et al. (1995) they might also be context specifically influenced.
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co-existence of the two elements clearly contradicts the view that trust is purely
an emotional issue.
A.2. Cognitive and Emotional Elements of Trust
There is a lively ongoing debate concerning whether trust may be viewed as
emotional or cognitive.39 In the older literature in particular, cognitive processes
are seen to be the basis of every trust process in which knowledge plays an
important role. This knowledge is based on experience, depends on the context,
and is up to a certain point always incomplete (Bosshardt (2001)). Cognitive
trust gains in strength through repeated interaction. It is very strong, suppresses
other forms of trust, and is given prominence in economic theory (Kenning and
Blut (2006)). The other basis of trust takes the form of affective trust. This
refers to the emotional connection between the parties. This affective trust
results from an individual’s specific emotional experience. It is not the same as
generalized trust, although it is very much influenced by it, and it is not easily
manipulable (Kenning and Blut (2006)).
According to the latest psychological and neuroscience research human de-
cision making is generally best understood as a synchronous dualistic process,
an entanglement of affective and logical influences, as “cognition in an affective
wrapping” (Olsen (2008), p.2191). From a neuroscience perspective emotion is
not seen as the antithesis of rationality but rather as something which assists
reasoning. It takes account of the fact that most of our thinking takes place
outside of our conscious awareness and that emotion influences our thinking
very subtly.
As stated by Olsen (2008) from an evolutionary perspective there are two
separate but interrelated processes in human decision making:
39As mentioned earlier, a precondition for a trusting relationship to arise is freedom of choice
for all parties. There is the freedom to offer a risky advance and the freedom to disappoint
expectations (Bosshardt (2001) and Luhmann (2000)). The option to disappoint is not only
a question of complexity, of controllability, and of the ability to assess factors of trustworthi-
ness. This freedom is rather normatively intended. To call somebody trustworthy means to
acknowledge that it is someone that can be trusted. The cognitive awareness of trust does
not contradict this normative desire because the cognitive awareness of potential damage
is also a constitutive dimension of trust. And as trust entails the possibility to be disap-
pointed it is clear and important, that the act of placing trust requires careful examination
(Hartmann (2008)). In this sense “blind trust” does not exist. If complete knowledge were
available, trust would not be needed. If there was no knowledge at all, a more appropriate
term would be belief or faith (Bosshardt (2001)).
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• The oldest process is the “experiential or associative process”. It is re-
productive, retrieves memories of similar past events in processing infor-
mation, and encodes information from concrete examples, images, and
narratives. It is rather holistic, context sensitive, and emotionally driven.
Decisions must “feel correct” as well as “look correct”. Feeling is always a
key element in any decision because it supplies the trigger to action. When
situations are very complex and information is incomplete, ambiguous or
contradictory, the associative system involving feelings may be quicker
than a rational system since it uses heuristics (rules of thumb).
• The other decision process is the rational or rule based process. It uses
symbolically represented knowledge processing. Information is evaluated
and integrated using formal logic. It requires more effort and is more time
consuming but it yields more precise solutions when situations are not
very complex.
Applied to the context of trust, it seems that there needs to be a minimum
level of cognitive trust for affective trust to take hold. Olsen (2008) summarizes
the current research regarding decision makers: cognitive trust seems to be pri-
marily related to the perceived competence and reliability of the provider, and
to situations where the hazard of being evaluated is more familiar to the trustor.
Competence is demonstrated by credentials, command over information, expe-
rience, and past performance.
People tend to rely on affective trust more heavily when the decision is com-
plex and hard to judge, when time pressure is great, when the trustor perceives
herself as being in an inferior social position, or when the information gap be-
tween the trustor and trusted party is large. Affective trust appears to be a
function of the care demonstrated by the trustee and the degree to which she
has a personal value system similar or apparently similar to that of the trustor.
Care is usually seen to be a function of fairness, compassion, and integrity.
Frowe (2005) gives an example of the interaction of cognitive and affective
elements in professional to client relationships. Professionals see trust as a func-
tion of information and judgment. Judgment, as the affective element, involves
the use of experientially learned “discretionary powers” by the professional, while
trust principally concerns the freedom of the professional to employ tacit or non-
learnable skills in the interest of the client.40 The affective element appears to
40See also Polanyi (1966) who coined the term “tacit knowledge”.
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garner greater weight in situations where the trustor feels less knowledgeable.
Figure 7 illustrates the process of trust. At the very beginning is the es-
tablishment of an expectation of trustworthiness by evaluating factors such as
competence, integrity, and goodwill, which is also influenced by the trustor’s
general propensity to trust. The actual trusting action will further depend on
the characteristics of the specific situation. This aspect is referred to as the
perceived risk of the situation and will additionally influence the final outcome:
the trusting action. Trust in this sense entails taking risk within a relationship
(Mayer et al. (1995)).
Figure 7. Process of Trust. This figure shows the process of trust which starts with
the establishment of an expectation of trustworthiness through the assessment of certain
factors and the general propensity to trust. The actual trusting action depends further on the
perception of the risk of the situation (own illustration, input taken from Mayer et al. (1995)
and Rawlins (2008)).
The role of perceived risk in such a context remains contentious and is still
not fully understood.
B. Trust and the Role of Perceived Risk
The presence of risk has been defined as a necessary condition for the occurrence
of trust. In this sense it seems plausible to see trusting as a special case of risk
taking, as the trustor willingly accepts any residual risk remaining after a careful
assessment of the trustee’s intentions, abilities, and motives (Eckel and Wilson
(2004), Johnson-George and Swap (1982), and Molm et al. (2000)).
According to Olsen (2008) and Ryan and Buchholz (2001), trust is an at-
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tribute or antecedent of perceived risk, to be imagined in a fashion similar to
that shown in Figure 7. These authors see perceived risk as the flip-side of
situational trust, i.e. the combination of the perception of the initial specific
situation and the general trust attitude.41
Given that trust is a special case of risk taking, the question is what influ-
ences the willingness to bear the risk involved? While it appears sensible to
relate it to the trustor’s risk disposition and preferences, there is still no final
consensus on this facet of trust.
For Ben-Ner and Putterman (2001) the willingness to bear risk is deter-
mined by the information the trustor has on the trustee (with respect to her
trustworthiness), the trustor’s former experience with trustworthiness in other
transactions, and the trustor’s preferences and disposition.
Following Eckel and Wilson (2004) agents do not perceive trust decisions
to be risky gambles. They state: “It appears that when people are uncertain
about the trustworthiness of their counterpart, subjects make inference about
reliability from all information about the counterpart that is available to them,
conditioning their decision to trust on this information. [...] People pride them-
selves on their ability to “read” others and make a decision about whether some-
one is trustworthy.” (p.464.) Hence, trusting seems rather to be perceived as a
problem of judgment (Frowe (2005) and Eckel and Wilson (2004)).
According to recent psychological research (Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010))
risk attitudes are not related to trusting. Kanagaretnam et al. (2009) also find
that risk attitudes do not significantly account for the variation in trusting
behavior except in one case where social value orientation is neutral.
As to neurobiological and behavioral research, trust seems to be shaped by
risk preferences, social preferences, and beliefs about others’ trustworthiness
simultaneously (Fehr (2009))42. Experimental studies show that people seem to
differentiate between different sources of risk, hence whether it is related to the
uncertain behavior of the trustee or to random mechanisms. This distinction
between social and asocial risks seems to be encoded in our genes. In particular,
Fehr (2009) refers to the evidence and influence on trust of so-called “betrayal
aversion”. Betrayal aversion basically means that “people are more willing to
take risk when facing a given probability of bad luck than to trust when facing an
41The procedural view of Olsen (2008) and Ryan and Buchholz (2001) will be resumed in
Section V, B.2.
42Fehr (2009) provides an excellent overview regarding the latest research of neurobiological
and behavioral research on trust.
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identical probability of being cheated” (Fehr (2009), p.2).43 Risk aversion and
betrayal aversion are inversely related to trust, but the relationship to betrayal
aversion is more distinct. In contrast, low sociability is associated with low trust
(Fehr (2009) refers to research by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004), Bohnet et al.
(2008), Kosfeld et al. (2005), and Naef et al. (2009)).
As risk is inherently related to investing, I will take up the discussion on the
relationship of risk and trust in Section V.
C. Changing Levels and Forms of Trust
The two previous sections focused on the trust process in the initiation of trust.
Its dynamic nature, however, becomes particularly clear in a relational setting.
In a relationship the trust process is a flow of trust giving and trust honoring
or disappointing, in a constant feedback loop. The individual experience of
interaction serves as the basis for drawing conclusions about the credibility
and reliability of the potential trustee. Thereafter, the principle of reciprocity
follows. It is a constructive process between the processes of opening up and
trusting of which both are contingent and correlated. According to Mayer et
al. (1995) the outcomes of trust—i.e. the risk taking behavior—will lead to an
update of those factors that influence the perception of trustee trustworthiness
and the level of trust.
It has further been shown empirically that a strong willingness to open up
by the trustor is associated with a high level of trust (Bierhoff (2008)). The
process of trust can only be started by putting oneself at risk. One can only
see if trust is warranted by exposing oneself to the possibility of abuse. At this
point the ethical element of trust comes in, since the trustor shall respect the
trustee’s possibility to elude herself out of the situation (Stegmaier (2008)). If
the trustee honors the counterpart’s leap of faith, mutual trust originates as the
ideal solution to a problem involving double contingency (Luhmann (2000)).
Generally, trust is supposed to increase over time. In this respect it is thus
interesting to think about situations entailing high initial trust levels (McKnight
et al. (1988) and Lewicki et al. (2006)). Meyerson et al. (1996) coined the term
43According to Fehr (2009) the “[...] existence of betrayal aversion is likely to be very important
for institutional design questions because some of the most important risks that people face
in their economic activities are socially constituted, such as the risk of being cheated by the
trading partner or the risk of expropriation by politicians or corrupt civil servants. Thus, the
existence of betrayal aversion is likely to be a potent inhibitor of trade and economic activity
which renders the design and implementation of efficient legal enforcement institution all
the more important.” (p.12.)
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swift trust. This relates to situations that are complex, of limited history, and
thus offering little time in which to evaluate past performance. Common exam-
ples in business are so-called temporary systems where groups of experts may
be assigned to fulfill a complex task in a limited amount of time. The presence
of a reputable “coordinator” aids trust formation among group participants.44
Harrison et al. (1997) find evidence for such swift trust in situations of informal
investment decision-making processes.45
C.1. Forms of a Trust Relationship
Barney and Hansen (1994) distinguish three forms of trust relationships in busi-
ness transactions:
• Weak form of trust: There is limited opportunity for the exchange partner
to take advantage of the counterpart.
• Semi-strong form of trust: Formal and informal regulatory principles exist
to facilitate exchange, as potential opportunism exists.
• Strong form of trust: All parties know that opportunistic behavior would
violate a commonly shared standard of behavior.
In the presence of the weak form of trust, trustworthiness is easy to achieve
and exchange partners will receive all benefits without substantial governance
or other costs. The quality of goods can easily be evaluated and there are no
investments that are very specific. The markets for crude oil or soy beans are
examples of weak forms of trust as quality assessment is relatively easy and
traders are already highly competent. The semi-strong form of trust is the type
of trust most common in economic models of exchange. Regulatory mechanisms
are in place so that opportunistic behavior costs more than it benefits. But the
creation and implementation of regulatory standards is of course not free of
charge. In the case of the third form of trust, strong trust, there is significant
potential for vulnerability. Regulatory norms may be in place or not. Here the
focus lies on the potential violation of common values, principles, and standards
initialized by the exchange parties.
44I will come back to the importance of such reference points within networks in financial
markets later on.
45I will take up this concept later on with respect to the process of the development of investor
trust.
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Weak and semi-strong forms of trust are endogenous, whereas this third form
is clearly exogenous to a particular exchange structure. While for individuals
the strong form of trust is not uncommon, with respect to the firm level it is said
to emerge from a culture associated with specific control and reward systems.
C.2. Stages of Trust
The separation of reason and emotion led to a distinction being made between
personal and calculative trust (Williamson (1993)) or between relational and
calculative trust (Rousseau et al. (1998)). According to Rousseau et al. (1998),
calculative trust means that “[...] parties trust but verify under conditions where
willingness to trust is limited to specific exchanges” (p.369). Just as personal
trust is seen as a first step towards subsequent system trust, calculative trust is
also seen as a first stage of trust which, through repeated interaction, becomes
relational trust. Information originates within and through the relationship
and forms the basis of relational trust. Through this process the cognitive,
rational elements are transformed into affective trust. Thus, relational trust rises
and solidifies through interaction, and has a lot more potential for overcoming
moments of crises than calculative trust.
The process of trust can be looked at in terms of a stage model which fol-
lows the general process of development of a relationship (Bierhoff (2008) and
Petermann (1996)). Like Rousseau et al. (1998), Bierhoff (2008) assumes that
an initial rational basis of exchange is gradually supplanted by more “valuable”
stages over time which are based on coordination and emotional bonding. Re-
lational trust is enhanced through a cognitive process and suddenly jumps to a
new level. The reduction of complexity is therefore not a make-or-break decision
but a gradual development (Bierhoff (2008)).
Lewicki and Bunker (1996) present a stage model for business relations in
which trust develops over time as knowledge about the other party grows. It
mutates from “calculus-based trust” which tends to be characterized by intima-
tions of difference between individuals, to “knowledge based trust”, characterized
by intimations of agreement between individuals, and finally to “identification
based trust” which is characterized by intimations of mutual value sharing.46 I
will take up this model later on in order to analyze the development of trust
within the context of investing.
46Another transformation model is given by Shapiro et al. (1992) which distinguishes between
“deterrence-based trust”, “knowledge-based trust”, and “identification-based trust”.
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D. Summary Section IV
Trust can be looked at in terms of a static snapshot or as a process. The
procedural view can be divided into an initial process needed to arrive at the first
act of trust, and a dynamic aspect of trust which evolves within a relationship
setting.
Before performing the trusting action the trustor assesses potential trustees
with respect to their competence, integrity, and goodwill. All of these factors
strongly shape the perceived trustworthiness of agents. Together with the gen-
eral trust attitude of the trustor these beliefs on the trustees’ trustworthiness
lead to the formation of expectations of trust. The actual trusting action will
depend further on the specific characteristics of the situation, i.e. the perceived
risk. The synthesis of all these factors will determine whether the trustor will
make a risky advance or not. Trusting in this sense is risky behavior.
Given that trusting is a special case of risk taking, the decision to place
trust should also be determined by the risk preferences of the trustor. However,
recent psychological and behavioral research shows that trust is not, or is only
partially associated with the disposition to risk. So-called betrayal aversion and
social preferences also influence trusting behavior significantly.
Trust is based on cognitive and emotional processes. Depending on the
context and situation the mix of the two factors result in a specific form of trust.
Affective trust often arises in complex, ambiguous, or contradictory situations,
when information is incomplete, time pressure is high, or the trustor perceives
herself as being inferior. It is often associated with caring, and taken to be a
function of fairness, compassion, and integrity. In contrast, the cognitive form
of trust is rather rule based and takes longer to evaluate. However, it seems
that there always has to be some form of cognitive trust present for affective
trust to take hold. Cognitive trust is more strongly related to competence and
reliability.
An actor’s experience of the initial placement of trust feeds into associated
perceptions of trustworthiness, and may also affect the general attitudes towards
trusting. Within a relationship trust will take on different forms and proceed
through various stages as knowledge about the other party grows.
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V. Trust in the Context of the Investment Decision
“Trust is the unseen faith underlying the investment value.” Olsen (2008),
p.2189.
In this section I apply the insights of the former sections to the context of
investing. In view of the objective complexity an investor faces as described in
the introductory section, I first show the different forms of trust involved in the
investment environment and their interrelationship, and discuss the theoretical
framework for investor trust. I then examine the investment decision from
a wider perspective, and specify the investment process from an institutional
investor’s point of view. The standard decision calculus of risk and return is
then extended by the factor trust. I further broaden the process of investing
by incorporating a relationship perspective and show, that when looking at the
investment decision as embedded into a relationship between an asset manager
and a firm, this relationship may be seen as the location where trust originates
and develops. Finally, I model the investment process together with the trust
process.
A. Forms of Trust Within the Investment Context
Figure 8 places the context of investing in a market setting. It shows the forms
of uncertainty involved and the different forms of trust as coping mechanisms
(Ferber (2004)). The context of investing is an excellent example for demon-
strating that despite the acquisition and processing of as much information as
possible, there are still forms of uncertainty that cannot be controlled. An
investor cannot control the developments of a whole economy or an industry
sector. Technical innovation and political or legal changes are not in her hands.
The investor will respond to this objective uncertainty with a specific level of
confidence when defining a portfolio strategy and choosing an asset allocation.
Subjective uncertainty within the context of capital markets follows first
from exogenous uncertainty. These are events beyond the direct control of the
investor which occur within a certain context. Ripperger (1998) classifies the
reaction to such uncertainty as hope, i.e. confidence in the generalized norms of
behavior accepted within a social system. In the focal context of investing it can
be called system trust, or confidence in the rules of the market place.47 Besides
47Calling this form of trust hope does not mean that trust in the capital markets is to be
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Figure 8. Investment Uncertainty and Trust. This figure shows the uncertainty involved
in the investment context and the different forms of trust as coping mechanisms in the gray
bubbles (adapted from Ferber (2004), p.25). *Mgmt stands for Management
trusting in the fair processing and settlement of securities, the investor must
also place trust in the conventions regarding the presentation of market and
corporate information, i.e. have faith in the accounting standards and auditing
system of a country or system. System trust is of considerable importance in the
investment context as it significantly reduces the complexity within the system
and its absence may quickly lead to systemic paralysis.
The facet of internal uncertainty refers to the investor’s ability to handle the
tools and instruments of financial markets and securities analysis. The investor
needs to believe that she is capable of dealing with complexity, of distinguishing
important from unimportant information, and of making the “right” decisions.
Even if the investor consults third parties, the final decision is in her own hands.
Thus, self-confidence in personal competence is a precondition for a good invest-
ment decision.48
Trust in the narrow sense might emerge in the endogenous relationship be-
tween the trustor as the trust giving party and the trustee, the subject of trust.
The investor, as the trustor, needs to put trust in the targeted firm. This means
the investor has to appraise the company’s competence and motivation. Com-
seen as a global “feeling”. Rather, the investor trusts that her decisions regarding buying or
selling of securities will be settled in accordance with the rules of the market place and that
there is no discrimination by a market maker.
48Ferber (2004) added this aspect for the context of institutional investing to the original
framework developed by Ripperger (1998).
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petence refers to the actual performance. The investor needs to believe in the
firm’s strategic positioning and its ability to realize its value maximizing strat-
egy. Trust, in the strictest sense, finally also touches upon the issue of behavioral
uncertainty. The question here is to what extent the investor puts trust in the
integrity of the people involved, particularly in the management, and also, the
extent to which the investor can rely on honest communication of information
which she is dependent on when undertaking the investment decision.
B. A Theoretical Economic Framework for Investor Trust
As shown in the previous section investing is a complex process involving various
forms of uncertainty. This section deals with the question of how these forms
of uncertainty are integrated into investment models in financial economics and
which theoretical assumptions facilitate the integration of trust.
B.1. Perfect Rational Agents and Complete Information
As described in Section III D.1 in the perfect world of the neoclassical school of
thought there is no room for trust. This is also true for the prevailing theoretical
framework in the area of finance where uncertainty is addressed in a normative
market model as follows (see Fama (1970), Jensen (1969), Markowitz (1952),
and Volkart (2011), p.232):
• The problem of choice under uncertainty is defined as a situation where
an agent faces a set of alternatives the consequences of which are subject
to probability distributions.49
• Agents act rationally and are self-interested, maximizing their expected
utility.50
• Markets are frictionless: there are no transaction costs or taxes, no regu-
latory constraints, assets are perfectly liquid and infinitely divisible.
• There is perfect competition.
• Markets are fully efficient regarding information processing.
49Deciding means to choose between one of two or more actions. To decide “account must be
taken of the possible states of the world, and also of the consequences implicit in each act
for each possible state of the world. A consequence is anything that might happen to the
person.” (Savage (1972), p.13.)
50See further Section III D.1.
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• Investors are generally risk averse (ceteris paribus) which means that they
prefer more certain to less certain income streams.
Under these assumptions Jensen (1969) summarizes the investment decision
problem under uncertainty as follows: “The portfolio problem arises within this
framework when the investor has assets in one period which he does not wish
to consume in that period, but rather desires to carry over into the next period.
His portfolio problem at any time t then becomes the selection of a combination
of investments which yield him maximum expected utility. [...] That is, the
investor will always choose a portfolio which is efficient in the sense that for the
period under consideration it provides maximum expected return for a given
level of risk and minimum risk for a given level of expected return.” (p.171.)
Thus, the forms of uncertainty mentioned above—the temporal aspect of an
unknown future and the uncertainty regarding the intentions and capabilities of
the players—are normatively assumed away by postulating a probabilistic world.
Genuine uncertainty is replaced by probabilistic risk wherein, in principle, distri-
butions of possible future outcomes can be known with certainty (Olsen (2008)).
Risk is defined only in terms of variance around the mean return.
A good example is the “Efficient Market Hypothesis” which states that a
security’s price is its “fundamental value”51 (Fama (1970)). This means that
for the investor the price of an asset is given by the market, i.e. agents receive
all information they need to be able to figure out the correct distributions and
prices are right. In the probabilistic universe transparency is given by definition
as all agents are fully knowledgeable52. In such models, trust is superfluous
(Olsen (2008)).
B.2. Asymmetric Information, Incomplete Markets, and Bounded
Rationality
Only by softening the rigid neoclassical assumptions and allowing for different
information levels between agents, i.e. by admitting market imperfections, can
room be made, at least in principle, for the analysis and incorporation of trust
51The fundamental value of an asset equals the discounted sum of expected future cash flows.
52Investors also form expectations correctly, that is, they process all available information
correctly and the discount rate is consistent with a normatively acceptable preference spec-
ification. Most often it is also assumed that individual rationality also means consistent
beliefs (the rational expectations equilibrium). Agents’ beliefs are correct when their sub-
jective distribution of future realizations of unknown variables is indeed the distribution
that those realizations are drawn from (Barberis and Thaler (2003)).
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in a capital market context. As the standard decision calculus of an investor is
based on risk and expected return, it seems reasonable to try augmenting these
two measures by considering the impact of trust.
I have shown that trust in the strictest sense is not just a problem of general
uncertainty but also a means of coping with motivational risks, i.e. uncertainty
with respect to the behavioral intentions of the potential trustee. This implies
that people need to be able to choose between good or bad, between honoring
or neglecting commitments, i.e. there is room for trust as soon as allowing for
opportunism. Only if the trustee has the option to take advantage of the trustor
and her vulnerability, may be stated that the trustor is able to make a trusting
choice.
That the trustee may use private information to her own advantage and not
the one of the trustor as well has already been described in Section III, D.2 when
explaining the behavioral risks involved by modeling trust as a principal-agent
relationship. When applied in the context of investing, the information asymme-
try which exists between the management and the investor community is clearly
pivotal. Once it is assumed that the management may take advantage of pri-
vate information, external investors will demand a certain premium in order to
compensate them for the missing information or for their uncertainty regarding
management intentions. Ferber (2004), by referring to Tiemann (1997), calls
this surcharge a premium of mistrust.53
Besides the various approaches to trust from the perspective of new institu-
tional economics, a number of behavioral approaches have also emerged. These
try to explain, on the one hand, how investor trust is formed by relating it
to the investor’s perceived risk of an asset, and on the other hand, by asking
what the effect of aggregated trust in a population is on financial markets.54 I
will now focus on the former approaches that try to explain the role of trust in
the investment process and deal with the latter aspect of aggregated trust on
financial markets in the next sub-section.
53I will take up this thought in Section VI, A as a way to explain the interrelationship of trust
and information and its potential effects.
54While behavioral finance has the potential to analyze trust since it covers the psychological
aspects of information and risk behavior (Barberis and Thaler (2003), Shefrin (2007), and
Shiller (2003)), it has generally tended to shy away from the topic (Olsen (2008)). Ferber
(2004) uses a behavioral approach to trust in the context of the investment decision of
institutional investors.
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Olsen (2008) summarizes several trust-risk relationships identified in the
literature thus:
• There appears to be an inverse relationship between trust and perceived
risk.
• Trust is used as a proxy for more objective measures of risk by investors
when there is:
– high investment complexity,
– time pressure increases,
– familiarity decreases,
– an investment is judged to be difficult to evaluate.
• In the face of strong trust investors might believe that the recommended
investment will be both safer and more profitable which might lead to an
inverse relationship of risk and return.
• Trust seems to be related to more than just personal levels of risk aver-
sion.55
For Ryan and Buchholz (2001), Olsen (2008), and Guiso et al. (2008),
various components add up to the perception of a potential investment, one
of them being trust, or more precisely, the various forms of trust as shown in
Figure 9.
Figure 9. Risk and Trust Factors Influencing the Investment Decision. This figure
depicts the various factors that influence the investment decision. Trust is here an antecedent
of perceived risk. The perception of the various components is adjusted by experience through-
out the investment relationship (adapted from Ryan and Buchholz (2001), p.180).
According to Ryan and Buchholz (2001), the perceived initial investment
situation, the generalized trust level regarding the market, and the integrity of
55See Section IV, B for a detailed discussion.
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the management, sum up to the situational trust level, i.e. the perceived risk
of the investment. The actual investment decision is taken by including the
factors perceived risk, the risk-taking propensity, and the expected return. The
actual investment outcome, thus the experience with the investment target as
trustee, will shape the generalized attitude regarding the market, the situational
trust level regarding the specific investment, and also the risk-taking propensity
since over time the investment decision becomes embedded in an investment
relationship.
According to Olsen (2008) the different factors that might influence the risk
perception regarding the investment decision are the perception of personal con-
trol and the perception of trust. The first aspect of personal control is addressed
by traditional finance. The characteristics of the investment object—for exam-
ple the statistical return distribution of the financial asset—and the investor’s
personal investing acumen feed into this factor. The latter aspect of perceived
trust incorporates additional implicit or explicit real world indeterminacy. This
influence will vary according to the circumstances, and is what Ryan and Buch-
holz (2001) call situational trust. Situational trust is heavily influenced by the
investor’s perception of a firm’s management competence and integrity. Even
though the positive feature of the measures of traditional finance is their ob-
jectivity, Olsen criticizes the traditional risk metrics such as variance of return
and market beta because they do not allow for “trust as risk influence” (Olsen
(2008), p.2194).56
Another approach is presented by Guiso et al. (2008) which best summarizes
the influence of the various forms of trust on the investment decision. For these
authors the “decision to invest in stocks requires not only an assessment of the
risk-return trade-off given in the existing data, but also an act of faith (trust)
that the data in our possession is reliable and that the overall system is fair”
(p.2557). Trust is “the subjective probability individuals attribute to the possi-
bility of being cheated. This subjective probability is partly based on objective
characteristics of the financial system (the quality of investors protection, its
enforcement, etc.) that determines the likelihood of frauds such as Enron and
Parmalat. But trust also reflects the subjective characteristics of the person
trusting” (Guiso et al. (2008), p.2557 and 2558).57
56The influence of trust on perceived risk will be small in the case of securities where default
is rather unlikely and quite large in the case of securities where the future is less predictable
and investors have to rely firmly on corporate executives or other experts, as in an IPO.
57Here they refer to the aspect of cultural influence that forms our general attitude to trust
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B.3. Aggregated Trust and Financial Markets
Seminal research has been done by Guiso et al. to help understand the impact of
aggregated trust on financial markets (Guiso et al. (2004), Guiso et al. (2008),
and Guiso (2010)). The authors focus on people’s general propensity to trust in
their evaluations and find that more trusting people are more likely to invest in
riskier assets.58 Their results are robust after controlling for risk and ambiguity
aversion. For them trust is not a proxy for loss aversion or for other determinants
of stock market participation, such as correlations with general optimism. They
also test for more specific forms of trust i.e. in institutions that facilitate stock
market participation, and find again that the more trust there is, the larger
the effect on stock market participation. They suggest that the effect of trust
could partly explain the participation puzzle59. In their paper of 2006 Guiso
et al. use Dutch and Italian micro-data as well as cross-country data to show
that culture has a clear influence on stock market participation.60 Trust is all
the more important, the more unfamiliar investors are with the stock market,
or the more they lack data, although this effect is likely to remain even when
sufficient experience and data are available. Where mistrust is deeply rooted,
all information is doubted.
Olsen (2008) uses the effect of trust and its relationship on perceived risk as
a hypothesis for thinking about anomalies such as the “small firm effect”, “home
bias”, and the “market behavior of IPO shares”. On a macro-level Olsen (2008)
relates trust to market anomalies like the “risk premium puzzle”, “insufficient
diversification by non-professional investors”, and “market herding and stock
bubbles”.
A major decline in trust quickly demonstrates how sensitive the relation
between trust and the financial system can be, e.g. the financial crisis in 2007.
Guiso (2010) refers to this crisis as a trust-driven financial crisis.61 He points
out that the role of a decline in trust may be distinguished from a drop in
(Guiso et al. (2003) and (2004)).
58In high trust areas individuals are more likely to use checks, invest less in cash and more
in stocks, have higher access to institutional credit, and make less use of informal credit.
According to their work of 2008, less trusting individuals are less likely to buy stock, and
even if they buy stock, they buy less of it.
59The participation puzzle refers to the question of why so few people invest in the stock
market.
60This aspect is also confirmed by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001).
61Part of the decline of the markets has of course to be seen as a revision to correct for overop-
timistic investor expectations. The decline may have been necessary to punish dishonest
financiers and restore market discipline.
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confidence concerning institutional solvency or liquidity. For him the “collapse
in trust was provoked by the revelation of the opportunistic behaviors that the
unfolding of the crisis brought to light, of which the Bernard Madoff fraud is
emblematic, and has contributed to shed a dark light on the whole financial
industry” (Guiso (2010), p.2).
He confirms that it really does take a long time to build up trust once it
has been destroyed—this is not just a sentimental saying. The implications for
the future of financial markets need to be clearly acknowledged. The decline
in trust is likely to affect people’s willingness to enter financial contracts and
bear risk, and thus to increase the cost of risk capital and hamper the process
of financial development. The effects on financial transactions that are likely to
be felt in the coming years can be summarized as follows (Guiso (2010)):
• Trust and investment in risky assets: The consequence of a decline in trust
is likely to be a move towards safer securities (also Guiso et al. (2008)).
• Trust and investment in ambiguous securities: A decline in trust moves
investors towards more familiar contracts and more local contracts which
reduces portfolio diversification and amplifies home-bias.
• Trust and diversification across stocks and banks: There is a move towards
more familiar and more local assets and financial institutions. Addition-
ally, agents will enter more contracts to diversify the risk of opportunistic
behavior and reduce their exposure. Both effects are costly.
• Trust and the demand for advice and delegation: A decline in trust in in-
termediaries also means that investors may prefer to make their investment
decision on their own. This may lead them to seek more simple portfolios,
and this does not necessarily mean that they are better in terms of risk
and return.62
Guiso (2010) also proposes specific measures to help rebuild trust, i.e. to
raise the trustworthiness of financial intermediaries by limiting opportunistic
behavior. He points out that the problem of a trust crisis cannot just simply
be solved by increasing regulation. The role of regulation may even fail to
restore trust if intermediaries lack interest. Guiso (2010) expressly underlines
62Guiso et al. (2009) show a correlation between the decision to engage in a bank run and the
prevailing level of trust (this is from data before the crisis). Those who lost faith in banks
and the financial system withdrew their money first.
51
the significance of player attitude when seeking to coordinate the selection of
an honest equilibrium: “[...] there is no automatic mechanism that guarantees
that intermediaries will all agree to voluntarily adopt these policies. Rather, if
dishonest behavior is dominant among intermediaries, even the honest ones may
on their own be unwilling to adopt these measures and help the economy move
to a better outcome where competition drives out dishonest behavior.” (Guiso
(2010), p.20.)
C. Setting and Player Specifications
An elusive term like trust can be analyzed only within a specific context. The
more specific, the better the conclusions that can be drawn. This is why I
will specify more closely the principal-agent relationship between an investor
as the principal and trustor and a firm as the agent and trustee, where the
investor is an institutional investor and the firm targeted for investment is a
listed company.63 The focus is thus on a relationship between two institutions,
and even though being quite complex constructs, on an abstract level the two
individual institutions can both be seen as single entities.64 At the same time
all institutions are of course represented by individuals, who act accordingly.
The relationship at hand is illustrated in Figure 10.
C.1. Institutional and Individual Elements
The good news is that institutional arrangements help reduce complexity as the
parties agree publicly to act according to certain rules. On the firm side, for
example, the process of listing entails agreeing to stock exchange guidelines on
transparency and good faith. Other institutional parameters are rules provided
by the economic and legal environment on satisfactory accounting standards,
appropriate protection against securities fraud, and regulation requirements.
The human aspect of the people leading the firms, however, still remains evident,
i.e. their competence and human qualities, both positive and negative. Indeed,
management quality is one of the most important reasons for investing in a
particular firm (Ernst et al. (2009) and Manson and Harrison (2002)).
Regarding the counterpart, the term institutional investor65 covers to two
63These specifications relate in particular to the empirical analysis below.
64“It is brought out in economic theory that organizations sometimes behave like individual
people, so that a theory originally intended to apply to people may also apply to (or may
even apply better to) such units as families, corporations, or nations.” (Savage (1972), p.8.)
65The main types of institutional investors are pension funds, life insurance companies, and
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areas: institutional investment and asset management. According to Davis and
Steil (2001), institutional investment refers to “[...] specialized financial insti-
tutions that manage savings collectively on behalf of small investors toward a
specific objective in terms of acceptable risk, return maximization, and maturity
of claims” (p.12). Asset management66 in turn can be said to be the process by
which the assets collected by institutional investors are invested in the capital
markets.67 The human element on this side of the relationship centers on the
asset manager. Even though the asset manager is not as “free” in her investment
decision as an individual investor, due to regulatory and own institutional con-
straints designed to promote greater rationality ((Drill (1995) and Verma and
Verma (2008)), the institutional investment decision still incorporates certain
“human aspects”.68
Figure 10. Investment Relationship Between an Institutional Investor and a Listed
Firm. This figure illustrates the investment relationship between an institutional investor and
a listed firm. This relationship is conditioned by institutional and individual elements (own
illustration).
different forms of mutual funds. Also trading desks from financial institutions and corporate
treasury operations can be seen as institutional investors.
66Other terms used besides “asset management” are “fund management”, “investment manage-
ment”, “money management”, and “portfolio management”.
67In a legal sense, the asset manager may or may not be a part of the institutional investor,
thus, either internal or external to the institution itself.
68Those human aspects which may imply deviations from the rational decision making have
been covered in several studies, e.g. Beckmann et al. (2008), Glaser et al. (2005), Höhener
(1993), Kent et al. (2002), Menkhoff et al. (2009), and Shapira and Venezia (2001).
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C.2. Institutional Investment Process
Although institutional investors differ strongly in terms of contractual relations
between the owners of the assets and the asset managers, definition of liabili-
ties, the locus of risk bearing69, regulation70 etc., there are still certain steps
of institutional investment that are common to all types of institutional invest-
ment decision making (Bodie et al. (2005), pp.939–1003): First, the optimal
risk-return trade-off of the investor, the investor’s risk tolerance in pursuit of
return is evaluated.71 Second, constraints such as liquidity, investment horizon,
inflation sensitivity, regulations, tax and accounting considerations, and specific
needs which are linked to the nature of the liabilities, all need to be assessed.
And third, the investment strategy is developed and implemented by choos-
ing asset categories, monitoring market conditions (history and forecasts), and
determining expectations of rates of return over the holding period.
In other words this investment process can be split into the following three
steps (Davis and Steil (2001), Hagenstein et al. (2006), and Lottenbach (1995)):
• Strategic asset allocation: long-term decision on the disposition of the
overall portfolio.
• Tactical asset allocation: short-term adjustments in the light of short-term
profit opportunities (market-timing).
• Security selection: choice of individual assets both strategic and tactical.
Ferber (2004) also distinguishes a macro- and a micro-level of influence re-
garding the investment decision.72 Asset managers are part of an institutional
setting and are most often confronted with a more or less predefined strate-
gic asset allocation (macro-level) compared to individual investors who make
decisions solemnly according to their personal preferences. Nevertheless, on a
micro-level, asset managers might still influence the final investment decision as
69Risk can be either completely assumed by the institution (guaranteed returns) or borne
wholly by individual investors. There now seems to be a shift in the latter direction. This
implies that household influence on asset allocation is likely to grow.
70Considerable differences exist regarding the regulation of institutional investors. Regula-
tion affects fiduciary and contractual obligations, which in turn affects risk bearing and
information disclosure, and other investor protection provisions. See for example Spillmann
(2004).
71See for example Zellweger (2003).
72Ferber (2004) talks also about a meso-level which is too detailed for the discussion in this
essay.
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individuals, via their specific role within the investing firm, and their relation-
ship to the targeted company.73
C.3. Information and Institutional Investors
The enormous growth of the asset management industry during the last decades
has changed the picture of financial markets considerably (Leippold and Rohner
(2008)).74 In financial theory institutional investors assist the system in fulfill-
ing the function the system is supposed to fulfill75 and institutional investors
are taken to be a sign of highly developed markets. Institutional investors are
supposed to have access to superior information and to absorb and process in-
formation better than individual investors (Davis and Steil (2001)). The strong
presence of institutional players also affects the information system, as will be
shown in Section VI. In a study by the Deutsches Aktienmarktinstitut 2009,
institutional investors stated that the direct personal contact with the manage-
ment of a firm was their the most important information source. This is followed
by other sources such as the quarterly and as annual reports including the fi-
nancial statements, investor meetings, shareholder information, and company
websites (Ernst et al. (2009)).
D. Trust and the Investment Process
I now place the investment decision in a relationship-setting between the asset
manager and the firm to demonstrate how trust may play a role in the investment
process and how it may develop within the relationship. The investment-trust
73“In this basic sense, asset managers acting for institutional investors face the same problem
in investment as other agents in the economy do, be they households, companies, banks,
or the government. The main distinction is that whereas the other types of investor invest
largely on their own behalf, institutional asset management is a service involving manage-
ment (by a securities firm, insurance company, or mutual fund) of an investment portfolio
(bonds, equities, property) on behalf of a client (individual investor, company, bank, or pen-
sion fund). This disjunction requires communication and appropriate incentives or control
mechanisms between the parties to ensure an optimal outcome.” (Davis and Steil (2001),
p.52 and 53.)
74The most important reason for the strong increase of institutionalization on the supply side is
that saving was made attractive to households through the ease of diversification, improved
corporate control, deregulation, ability to take advantage of technological developments,
and enhanced competition. On the demand-side institutional growth may be explained
by demographic developments, growing wealth, and the difficult issues regarding the social
security pensions (Davis and Steil (2001)).
75According to Merton and Bodie (1995), these functions are (1) clearing and settling pay-
ments, (2) pooling of funds and subdivision of shares, (3) transfer of economic sources, (4)
managing uncertainty and control risk, (5) providing price information, (6) dealing with
incentive problems.
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relationship is depicted in Figure 11.
Figure 11. Investment-Trust Process. This figure depicts the investment-trust process.
It is divided into pre- and post-investment aspects. The act of investing marks the fulfillment
of investing as a trusting action. In the pre-investment stage the investment is screened and
evaluated and an expectation on the trustworthiness of the firm is established. Since investing
is part of a dynamic and relational setting, different forms of trust develop (own illustration,
input from Ferber (2004), Lewicki and Bunker (1996), and Meyerson et al. (1996)).
The investment-trust process is divided into a pre-investment and a post-
investment area. The investment-trust relationship starts when the interest in
the firm is sparked for the first time and it is from this very moment that a
perception of trustworthiness is or is not formed. This first contact can occur
after a process of strategic asset allocation when the asset manager is looking
specifically for a certain firm, or may be of more random nature through the
information provided directly by the firm, personal contact with the firm, or
of information provided by a third party. During the pre-investment period
potential investment opportunities are screened and appraised. Information on
the specific securities is gathered and processed and the securities are selected.
Up to the actual investment decision and the subsequent act of investing
money, economic consequences are only related to the costs of information search
and evaluation. During this time, the expectations related to firm trustworthi-
ness are established. But only the act of placing a risky advance, the actual act
of investing, marks the fulfillment of investing as a trusting action.
Where there is no personal knowledge or history of interaction with the
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targeted investment object or the investment decision needs to be taken quickly,
so-called “swift trust” may be helpful. It is a way to handle the unknown by
reflecting on similarities and commonalities, or by using the opinion of someone
with a good reputation.
Due to the dynamic nature of financial markets, the investment decision
is not a one-off decision but has to be constantly re-evaluated after the initial
investment decision. The post-investment period is thus characterized by perfor-
mance control and necessary adjustments. Like investing, trust is also dynamic.
Since investing is a form of relationship, the associated trust levels change as
time passes, and as new information is accumulated and experience gathered.
There is continuous re-shaping of perceptions concerning the firm, and the level
and form of trust. Initially it might be “calculus based trust”, then becoming
“knowledge based trust” after some time. The final stage is “identification based
trust” where a very strong identification with the investment object is reached.
Looking at investing as part of a relationship over time may also help un-
derstand the effects of disappointment. The later stages such a relationship are
said to have an increased potential for overcoming a crisis of trust since they
are firmly embedded in a relationship where personal elements have become
relatively more important.76
E. Summary Section V
The aim of this section was to demonstrate that trust plays a definite role in
the context of investment decisions.
The act of investing is not only strongly influenced by specific firm charac-
teristics, but various forms of trust feed into the final investment decision. The
investor needs to have a general positive attitude—confidence—in the economic
development and she needs to put trust in the financial market system. Trust
in the narrow sense refers to the positive attitude towards a specific firm and
its profitability which is derived from a belief in the company’s competence,
its strategic positioning, and faith in the integrity of the management and its
willingness and ability to provide honest information.
Within the neoclassical framework of modern finance investors base their
investment decisions upon the parameters of risk and expected return. The
probabilistic models which assume perfect rationality and complete information
76This could also explain why in cases trust is damaged at such a level, the negative impact
is even stronger as personal disappointment is particularly hard-felt.
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leave no room for the analysis or inclusion of trust. By allowing for information
asymmetries, market imperfections, and opportunism, new institutional eco-
nomics makes room for the possibility to explore trust by relating it to a risk
premium in case investors suspect managers of attempting to take advantage of
privately owned information.
There are a few behavioral approaches that discuss the relationship between
trust and risk within the investment setting, as well as the impact of social trust
on financial markets. From their point of view the various forms of trust shape
the risk perceptions of an investor with respect to an investment target. Besides
the objective measure of risk and expected return, individuals apply subjective
probabilities when estimating the reliability of the provided information, the
fairness of the overall system, and the possibility of being cheated.
The aggregated level of social trust in a society influences the way individuals
engage in financial markets. This is most clearly seen during and after major
financial crises. The empirical evidence indicates that in terms of their impact
on trust, there is a difference between a loss of confidence in the solvency of
financial players and the revelation of opportunistic behavior.
The investment decision of an institutional investor investing in a listed firm
is conditioned by institutional elements on both sides, but also by the relation-
ship between asset managers and target firms and their management. Thus,
institutional and personal elements of trust shape the final investment decision.
In the pre-investment stage the asset manager forms specific expectations re-
garding the trustworthiness of the firm by gathering suitable information and
evaluating the target. The actual act of investing can be seen as the fulfillment
of the trust act.
As investing is part of a dynamic environment, the investment decision has
to be continuously evaluated. Personal experience is built up as the relationship
progresses and feeds back into perceptions of trustworthiness, changing the level
and form of trust accordingly.
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VI. The Role of Information for Trust Within the In-
vestment Context
“The best device for creating trust may be to establish and support trustworthi-
ness.” Hardin (1996), p.29.
This section highlights the role of information and information transparency
within the investment context and for the process of trust. Information is cru-
cial for both investing and trusting respectively. Seeing investing as a trusting
action underlines why information plays such an important role but also in which
way it does not, where supposedly it should. In the first section below I go into
the role of information in investing, and the demand for transparency and its
interrelationship with trust. I then proceed by focusing on the role of informa-
tion in the establishment of a perception of trustworthiness, and integrate the
aspect of information in the investment-trust process77.
A. Information and Investing
In Section IV I pointed out that investing provides a suitable context for showing
that despite the acquisition and processing of as much information as possible,
certain forms of uncertainty cannot be reduced by information processing alone.
Still, information is at the core of finance (Stiglitz (2003)) and is the lifeblood
of capital markets (DiPiazza and Eccles (2002)). Information and its unfettered
flow are one of the preconditions for the functioning of financial markets (Volkart
(2011), pp.62-66). In the ideal case of perfectly functioning markets prices fully
reflect any necessary information, public as well as private (Fama (1970)).
At the same time raising capital on financial markets implies a natural infor-
mation gap in that it entails a separation of ownership and control78. Without
wishing to get into a discussion on market efficiency79, clearly the assumption
of strong market efficiency obviates the need for firms to expend any effort on
transparency (Labhart and Volkart (2009)). Firms would willingly provide all
information necessary for investors to allocate resources efficiently since disclo-
77The investment-trust process was introduced in Section V.
78As described by Berle and Means (1950) in their analysis of the modern corporation and by
Fama and Jensen (1983b).
79The dispute on market efficiency is still not settled. Labhart (1999) and Moll (2002) provide
a good overview on the history of market efficiency, while Stiglitz (2000) elaborates on the
contributions of the economics of information.
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sure can only serve to increase the market value of the firm.80
Once the possibility of asymmetric information is accepted81, from the in-
vestor’s perspective, information can be seen to play two key roles in market-
based economies: an ex-ante role as the basis for the investors’ decision mak-
ing in evaluating the return potential, and an ex-post role in allowing capital
providers to monitor the use of their capital resources (Beyer et al. (2009)). The
normative goal in the light of information asymmetries is to find mechanisms
that support the alignment of the intrinsic and the market value of a firm. From
this point of view corporate information disclosure82 is an unambiguous good.
Labhart and Volkart (2009) specify several positive effects stemming from
increased quality of information disclosure. First, it may lower the cost of capital
and thereby support a more efficient allocation of capital via two mechanisms:
on the one hand improvements in information flow and accuracy may increase
the liquidity of the shares in the market and thereby reduce the cost of capital,
while on the other hand investors may ask for a lower risk premium as improved
information means there is less uncertainty regarding the future development of
a firm. Further, a more constant and broad information flow may help offset the
impact of ad-hoc disclosure. Finally, by reducing investor monitoring costs with
respect to management by investors a positive effect on corporate governance is
also to be expected.
Several empirical studies support the benefits of information disclosure. Eug-
ster and Wagner (2010) distinguish four strands in literature as areas of improve-
ment: (1) a positive effect of increased disclosure on the cost of capital (Barry
and Brown (1985), Diamond and Verrechia (1991), Hail (2002), and Sengupta
(1998)), (2) improved stock liquidity (Leuz and Verrechia (2000) and Welker
(1995)), (3) impact on corporate reputation (Milgrom and Roberts (1982)), and
(4) impact on market valuation and returns (Eugster and Wagner (2010) and
Healy et al. (1999)).
Even though Labhart and Volkart (2009) argue that the possibilities of cre-
ating value through information are widely underestimated, and even though
80According to Grossman (1981), Grossman and Hart (1980), Milgrom (1981), and Milgrom
and Roberts (1986) firms will disclose favorable information to increase their market value.
Withholding information will be punished by the market because it will be interpreted as
unfavorable information with the consequence that all information will be disclosed.
81As for example nicely described by Akerlof’s (1970) market for lemons.
82Here corporate information disclosure refers to mandatory disclosure (disclosure through
regulated financial reports), voluntary disclosure, and disclosure about firm’s through infor-
mation intermediaries (Healy and Palepu (2001) and Nöldeke (2007)).
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clear supportive empirical evidence is available, corporations still tend to resist
demands for increased disclosure. As a matter of fact, there are also several argu-
ments against an increase in disclosure. The question is whether the additional
cost of collecting and providing information and expected legal costs outweigh
the positive effects of increased disclosure described above. Loss of competitive
advantage is one common argument against more disclosure since there is no
guarantee that all market participants will increase their transparency (Eugster
and Wagner (2010) and Labhart and Volkart (2009)). Recent work by Herma-
lin and Weisbach (2010) present increased disclosure as a double-edged sword
since, although principals may be able to make more informed decisions, it may
also generate additional agency problems and costs, including a rise in executive
compensation. Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) thus argue for an optimal level
of disclosure rather than a general plead for more disclosure.
A normative framework of financial public reporting that goes beyond oblig-
atory rules and regulations and makes concrete suggestions for implementation
was developed by Eccles et al. (2001) and Labhart (1999): Value reporting
is defined as “the official, external reporting of a company, which is designed
(i) to reduce the information asymmetries between the internal and external
view of value based management and (ii) is additionally part of value based
management” (Labhart (1999), p.30). This is illustrated in Figure 12.
Figure 12. Enhanced Value Driver Concept. This figure illustrates the effects of value
reporting on shareholder return via the impact of lower discount rate and reduced uncertainty
concerning operating cash flows (Labhart (1999), p.275).
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In an extended version of the shareholder value creation concept of Rappa-
port (1986), Figure 12 shows value reporting, and thus, information itself as one
of the value drivers of a firm (Labhart (1999)).
In fact information and communication policy is one of the five central areas
of corporate finance (Moll (2002), (Volkart (2008b), and Volkart et al. (2005)).
This also emphasizes the key role of investor relations for listed firms. Every
management should strive to limit scope for adverse market reaction by assisting
existing and potential investors in correctly interpreting information in order to
transform the intrinsic value created by the firm into a correct external view
(Labhart and Volkart (2009)). The endeavor to improve information provision
and communication is often referred to as transparency effort.
B. From Information to Transparency
Somehow, the concept of transparency seems easier to grasp than that of trust.
It is apparently easier to picture. But what exactly is meant by transparency
in the context of corporate information?
Volkart (2008b) characterizes transparency as the provision of honest, open,
and relevant information which aims especially at reducing information asymme-
tries between stakeholders. Rawlins (2008) defines it as “the deliberate attempt
to make available all legally releasable information—whether positive or negative
in nature—in a manner that is accurate, timely, balanced, and unequivocal, for
the purpose of enhancing the reasoning ability of publics and holding organiza-
tions accountable for their actions, policies and practices” (p.7) and decomposes
transparency into the following four components of communication:
• participation
• substantial information
• accountability
• secretiveness83.
Rawlins’ definition (2008) refers in the first place to the reciprocal aspect of
participation which enables the transformation of substantial information into
transparency. It is not only the availability of information but as Cotterell
(1999) also states: “the active participation in acquiring, distributing and cre-
ating knowledge” (p.419). The most relevant question here concerns defining
83A reverse item for openness.
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what the other (dependent) party really needs (see also Fung et al. (2007) and
DiPiazza and Eccles (2002)). Following Moll (2002) and Volkart (2008b), one-
sided information provision alone may not be sufficient to produce transparency
since the latter requires a two-sided process of effective communication.
Rawlins (2008) also mentions the aspects of secretiveness (used as the re-
verse item for openness) and accountability when discussing transparency. Both
of these attributes have an active dimension in that transparent organizations
are supposed to bear responsibility for their words, decisions, and actions. For
Swift (2001) one premise for accountability is that “organizations should ac-
count for their actions through the provision of information to stakeholders
and society” (p.16). Accountability is thus one facet of transparency which
is externally visible. Rawlins refers to accountability as balanced information,
thus as an equilibrium between good and bad information, between secrecy and
sugar-coating. This balance may be related also to the amount of information
available. Transparency does not mean that all information has to be revealed.
In fact, too much information may mean less understanding (Strathern (2000)).
One last crucial aspect refers to the fact that organizations are only able
to project true transparency externally, if it is a vitally lived principle firm
internally. This is why transparency is also seen as a positive signal as it is
taken to indicate a well established internal organizational structure, i.e. an
organizational structure which is is not too complex or hard to overlook, as
a precondition for the development of transparency. Thus, poor or missing
transparency is often taken as a signal, symptom, or reason for potential risk
and possible aberration (Volkart (2008b)).
C. The Transparency Movement
In the last hundred years transparency, as a concept of governance, has attracted
more and more public attention (Florini (1998), Fung et al. (2007), and von
Furstenberg (2001)).84 Its prevalence has been strongly supported through the
legal enforcement of transparency principles. The development of and the pos-
sibilities provided by information technology greatly serve to aid transparency.
Besides, the growth of market-based economies, globalization, and the spread of
84Fung et al. (2007) confirm that transparency is not a new idea in governance. For example
in the U.S. in 1913 Louis D. Brandeis recommended new laws to require public companies
to disclose profits and losses in order to stop insider deals and investor deception, referring
to the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906. Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) refer to Ripley
(1927) and Berle and Means (1932), cited in this essay as Berle and Means (1950).
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a global civil foundation for society can also be seen as drivers of a transparency
movement (Tapscott and Ticoll (2003)).85
In assessing various systems of public information provision86 Fung et al.
(2007) rate the system of corporate financial information as being highly effec-
tive and as being one of the most advanced, since information becomes deeply
embedded within the decision processes of both information users and corpora-
tions.
While there is clear room for improvement in corporate information systems,
one has to acknowledge that corporations have generally done well in adapting
to the severe changes of recent decades. Many firms make a serious effort to
track the investors’ needs and to respond to their needs. Technology is used to
make information readily available, readable, and comparable. Further, finan-
cial markets now have to incorporate not only interaction between investors and
firms, but also interaction between numerous other players in the system. This
increases transparency on the one hand but also complexity on the other, as in-
formation flows multiply with the number of players and channels. Clearly, the
bottle neck to corporate information is the firm itself but there is a great amount
of information additionally generated by third parties. Analysts, brokers, finan-
cial advisers, and other intermediaries all attempt to arrange information in a
way that suits the investors’ needs (Beyer et al. (2009), Fung et al. (2007), and
Nöldeke (2007)).
Beyer et al. (2009) demonstrate that even when an information system
arises endogenously, e.g. when it is in the interest of all parties in a corporate
environment to solve valuation and stewardship problems, a certain degree of
regulation in the disclosure system might still be necessary. There are several
reasons for this. First, there might be a misalignment of insiders’ and investors’
incentives which may make it difficult to convey information credibly. In this
sense, good regulation can be seen as a way of improving the credibility of in-
formation as parties commit to certain levels of disclosure. Second, information
85Roberts (2009) criticizes the ideal of complete transparency as an impossible fantasy, showing
the limits of transparency. After the most recent incidents regarding public transparency
around Wikileaks, Hebling and Bialetti (2010) also advise against the trend towards full
transparency as this would mean a world of informational overflow. Klenk (2009) points
out that in times of reorientation corporations need periods of less than total transparency.
According to Tapscott and Ticoll (2003), transparency has proved to be a constructive force,
e.g in the case of whistle blowers at Enron & Co or institutional investors that pull out of
the market (see also Dyck et al. (2010)).
86The assessment included the financial industry, and areas of safety, health, and education.
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has many properties of a public good87 as it is so crucial to the functioning
of the markets. Parties may have incentives not to provide information, even
though social welfare would be maximized.
Referring to the last century, it can be seen that the legal foundation of
transparency policies was primarily a reaction to negative events that touched
the public as a whole in some way.88 The U.S. financial industry is a good
example: the Securities and Exchange Act (1933/34)89 was the response to the
stock market crash of 1929; the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2001) was the response
to the bankruptcies of Enron, WorldCom, and other large, well-known, and
respected companies; present, the discussion and implementation of increased
regulation following the experience of the latest financial and economic crises
is a further example (Schenker-Wicki (2008) and Guiso (2010)). For Fung et
al. (2007) all these represent failure of the disclosure system to keep pace with
market innovations and demonstrate how costly a non functioning transparency
system can be.
The tightening of regulatory controls in the wake of crises needs to be viewed
critically, first, because transparency policies are viable political means to prove
the capability of governments to be able to solve problems (Fung et al. (2007)).
In addition, tighter regulation after negative events is not a signal of trust but
rather of mistrust (Guiso (2010)).90
D. The Interrelationship of Trust and Transparency
In general, trust and transparency are positively related and this holds for both
sides of the relation. Transparency breeds trust just as trust breeds trans-
parency. This is confirmed in a large body of empirical work. Norman et al.
(2010) show that the perception of trust—both affective and cognitive—in lead-
ers is influenced by their positivity and transparency. Irlenbusch and Sliwka
(2005) find that trustworthy behavior is stronger in more transparent employ-
ment situations. Ferrante (2006) demonstrates a positive impact on employees’
trust in the management and in the firm’s performance where accounting infor-
87Public goods are characterized by being non-rival and non-excludable, where the first aspect
refers to the property that the consumption of the good by one agent has no effect on the
availability for others, and the latter aspect means that it is impossible or very costly to
exclude someone from its consumption (Frank (1997)).
88See again Fung et al. (2007) for a thorough analysis of so-called “targeted transparency” in
different public areas.
89The Securities and Exchange Act orders publicly traded companies to disclose assets and
liabilities.
90See also Section V, B.3.
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mation is shared internally. The following paragraphs present different possibil-
ities for linking information and transparency to the phenomenon of trust.
D.1. Information, Transparency, and the Definition of Trust
A first link between information, transparency, and trust concerns the definition
of trust itself. Trust is a way of overcoming an existing information gap with-
out actually closing it. Consequently, in a state of transparency trust would be
useless, and what is more important in the present context, striving for trans-
parency offers an alternative to trust as a means of handling the risk resulting
from the information gap (Swift (2001) and Zowislo and Schulz (2006)). It is
precisely by accepting lack of access to all information that system trust may
arise and operate as a means of reducing complexity. Only by willingly accepting
vulnerability in terms of not knowing everything can personal trust develop.
However, information is also a fundamental aspect in deciding whether to
place trust at all because it is the basis for the establishment of trustworthiness.
This will be discussed later on in more detail.
D.2. Information and the General Attitude to Trust
Also the interrelationship between transparency and the general disposition to
trust is of interest. The attitude with which we encounter a stranger, a form
of blind trust, is not primarily a problem of information. Still, Kanagaretnam
et al. (2010) affirm in an investment game setting, that transparency increases
trusting behavior and trustworthiness in one-shot behavior, while in a repeated
setting, both increase even in the absence of transparency. For the authors
this indicates that disclosure efforts can be used to bring together agents who
are only loosely connected. Fisman and Khanna (1999) document a positive
relationship between trust and information when analyzing the general attitude
to trust (using cross-country data). This relationship becomes stronger in the
presence of two-way communication and as different stages of trust develop in
a relationship. Both studies show that the significance of information as well as
the various forms of trust change as the relational context progresses.
D.3. Information and Relational Trust
The dynamic nature of trust and information within a social relationship is also
confirmed by Chang et al. (2010) who demonstrate within a repeated trust
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game that trustworthiness is a belief about the probability of reciprocation. At
the beginning this belief is based on initial impressions as a guide to judgment
and is then updated in the course of interaction and in the light of experience.
The positive influence of communication on bilateral trusting relationships in a
trust game setting is further confirmed by Valley et al. (1998) and Buchan et
al. (2006).
D.4. Information and the Trust Process
As mentioned at the beginning, different forms of information play a role before
and after the initial engagement to trust and throughout the process of trust.
This is illustrated in Figure 13.
Figure 13. Forms of Information in the Process of Trust. This figure depicts the
origin of information—the trustor’s own experience versus experience of third parties—and
the reference subjects of information—referring either to the potential trustee or to third
parties as trustee—as a way to classify information and show the different influences in the
establishment of the expectation of trust (Ripperger (1998), p.99).
In the first part of the process the trustworthiness of the trustee is examined
as the basis for the formation of the expectation to trust. At this point personal
experience does not yet exist and the trustor will thus have to draw upon the
experience and information of others and the reputation of the trustee. This is
the decisive stage in the development of a relationship of trust and the reason
why information provision and communication are vital in this stage. The gen-
eral collective experience of others with others within a social system is called
the trust atmosphere. The more positive experiences within a social system, the
higher the quality of the trust atmosphere (Ripperger (1998)).
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The reputation of the trustee, i.e. the available public information concern-
ing the potential trustee, has a particular strong impact on trust.91 Although
being two distinct concepts92, reputation and trust are highly related as they
have the same origin, i.e. the perception of trustworthiness (Seemann (2008)).93
Trustworthiness is the quality of parties that causes reputation and trust. Trust
cannot be commanded. It has to be earned through trustworthy behavior.
Once personal experience is established the information and experience of
the past is “extrapolated” into the future. Positive past experience, familiarity,
or so-called retrospective trust provide a foundation to “risk into the future” in
the form of prospective trust (Ripperger (1998)).94
D.5. Transparency as a Signal of Trustworthiness
In the Swiss Code of Ethics transparency is one of seven principles. The oth-
ers are responsibility, integrity, respect, fairness, sustainability, and corporate
citizenship (Volkart (2011), p.1081). Tapscott and Ticoll (2003) define business
integrity as the basis of an open enterprise. Such integrity comprises honesty, ac-
countability, consideration (benevolence), and transparency. What binds trust
and transparency together is their ethical foundation in honesty and integrity.95
As mentioned before, transparency effort is not only necessary for the trustor
to reach a prudent decision on trust, it can also be seen as a signal, a leap of
91Reputation also has a strong influence on the trust atmosphere.
92The literature on reputation is quite young, starting with Shapiro (1983) but only really
taking off with the book by Fombrun (1996) titled “Reputation: Realizing Value from the
Corporate Image”. There is a subtle difference between reputation and trust. According to
Swift (2001) an “[...] organization with a good reputation can be relied upon to behave in
a manner consistent with reputation, but might not be trusted to behave ethically under
uncertain circumstances” (p.23). I see trust as something that emerges only upon personal
engagement. Though reputation will influence the establishment of a trust expectation, it
is not a substitute for one’s own experience. Cabral (2005) defines trust to be a situation
when agents expect another agent to do something, while reputation is a situation when
agents believe another agent to be something. In game theory trust and reputation are often
used interchangeably. The reputation of a player is the probability that she is a privately
observed type or will take a certain action (Camerer (2003)). Trustworthy behavior is in
this context often referred to as reciprocity. For extensive work on trust and reciprocity see
Basu (2006), Chaudhuri et al. (2002), Dohmen et al. (2009), Fehr and Gächter (1998), and
Sutter and Kocher (2003).
93Seemann (2008) defines the other factors making up corporate reputation to be credibility,
reliability, and accountability.
94See also Section III, C.
95As described above for trustworthiness to develop integrity is needed in addition to com-
petence and goodwill. According to Whitener et al. (1998), there are five components
that influence the employee perception of managerial trustworthiness. These are behav-
ioral consistency, behavioral integrity, sharing and delegation control, communication, and
demonstration of concern. Experiments show that the perception of CEO honesty is also
crucial for attracting investors (Tanner et al. (2010)).
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faith on the part of the potential trustee. If the trustee acts transparently, she
signals trustworthiness and indicates that there is nothing to hide (Tapscott and
Ticoll (2003)).96 As in trust, transparency implies a willingness to be vulnerable.
The trustee needs to trust the party with whom information is shared (Rawlins
(2008) and Ripperger (1998)).
Denize and Young (2007) confirm this aspect in an empirical study which
focuses on communication as the core of the process of a business relationship.
They also see trust as a dynamic experience and relationship-as-process. The
causality of trust and information is inextricably linked and reciprocal, and
the relationship should be seen from the perspective of both parties. Com-
munication builds connectedness. Within a relationship, trust and information
exchange influence each other.
Akkermans et al. (2004) assess trust and transparency in supply chain
management between multiple independent companies. This is an business
area where information transparency receives particular stress. Transparency
is achieved through reinforcing the dynamic interaction of trust levels between
partners and the alignment of transparency and trust. The authors also stress
the procedural and relational nature of trust as a reinforcement mechanism.
Past communication and a history of co-operative behavior are positively related
with trust and negatively with opportunistic behavior. Repeated interaction,
which they call habituation, supports trust and transparency in arriving at a
form of a psychological relief since familiarity breeds trust. They also state that
both concepts are based on plain and honest work, especially at the beginning
of a relationship. A virtuous circle develops in which trust and transparency
reach ever higher levels. They suggest managers to adopt an “open kimono atti-
tude”, i.e. to show all the information and knowledge one possesses to all parties
involved.
D.6. Trust, Networks, and Information Channels
Effective information channels within social systems are crucial for the devel-
opment of a culture of trust. Information on reputation needs to be transfered
rapidly and exhaustively (Ripperger (1998)). Olsen (2008) refers in this context
to the importance of communication and social networks.97 Also Levin and
96Tapscott and Ticoll (2003) refer in their book “The Naked Corporation” to the saying “If
you’re going to be naked, you’d better be buff!”.
97The importance of information channels within social systems is especially well observable in
virtual networks as the study of Hertzum et al. (2002) illustrates. They evaluate the effect
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Cross (2004) find that the ebb and flow of knowledge transfer among social ties
is mediated by trust.
E. Transparency and Trust in the Investment Relationship
Finally now, the insight of the previous sections is merged in order to com-
plete the picture on information, transparency, and trust within the investment
relationship.
E.1. Information and the Investment-Trust Process
This section highlights the role of information in the investment-trust process
as developed in Section V and which is shown in Figure 14.
Figure 14. Information and the Investment-Trust Process. This figure points out
the role of information in the investment-trust process (displayed in gray). Before personal
experience is established, the information from others and the reputation of the investment
target is crucial for further engagement. These aspects of information drive the initial forma-
tion of trust expectation which is the foundation for the actual act of investing. As investing
is seen as a relationship, personal experience is established, grows over time, and influences
the various forms of trust (own illustration, input from Ferber (2004), Lewicki and Bunker
(1996), and Meyerson et al. (1996)).
Before actually investing—the trusting action—the asset manager will in-
form herself about the targeted firm, using information provided by the firm
of trust on the assessment and use of different information sources. Using two case studies
they show that in the software-engineering environment people are very cautious about the
trustworthiness of information sources when there is interaction outside the network.
70
and third parties, in order then to perform the specific investment analysis.
This pre-investment stage is characterized by the search for information on the
competence and trustworthiness of the targeted firm.
Particularly in cases where the investor has no prior experience with the firm,
company reputation exerts a strong influence on investor perception. Owing
to its intimate relationship with trust, firm reputation is nowadays often its
most important intangible asset (Klenk (2009), Seemann (2008), and Volkart
and Schenker-Wicki (2006)). Especially for listed firms which are part of well-
established information systems reputation is crucial since all news, good and
even more bad, spreads like wildfire.
As the investment decision is part of a constant re-evaluation process per-
ceived trustworthiness remains important post-investment but its perception is
more strongly influenced by personal experience which accumulates over time
and may even induce a change in the form of trust experienced.
The investment relationship remains a relationship of trust. Even though
outside investors become direct stakeholders in the firm, the separation of owner-
ship and control ensures that they remain dependent on the provision of relevant
and honest information by the firm.
If the investment relationship is lived as an active relationship, maybe even
involving personal contact with the management of a firm or the investor rela-
tions department, the form of trust may change and thus influence the perceived
investment risk. A personal relationship is also an important source of infor-
mation when considering further engagement. Empirical evidence shows that
trust seems to be based on oral rather than written communication.98 In fact,
face to face communication has a stronger influence on investors than written
documentation and professional analysts often rely on information from face to
face meetings (Olsen (2008) and Shiller (2000)).
The trust and information flow have a reinforcing influence on each other.
Guiso et al. (2008) suggest a link between trust and local knowledge which
flows in both directions: more knowledge may overcome the barrier created by
the lack of trust, mistrust will be less of a problem for local investments, and
trust facilitates the collection and dissemination of information. They find that
increased familiarity generates greater stock market investments.
98A possible explanation is an evolutionary one, namely that oral communication is older than
written communication.
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E.2. The Financial System as a Small World
The strong embeddedness of the investment decision within a much lager system
is revealed not only by the formal aspects of market and portfolio activity, but
also by the social and professional structures of financial markets which serve
as information channels or even as information substitutes.
According to Olsen (2008), the financial system corresponds to a “small
world” network, or more precisely to an “aristocratic small world network”. A
small number of experts such as a company’s management, asset managers, and
financial analysts serve as opinion leaders and maintain relations with a circle
of followers, their clients.
The unique operational characteristic of such a network is that information
spreads quickly due to the large number of weak connections between opinion
leaders.99 As trust is strengthened by interaction, the large number of connec-
tions, although relatively weak, enhances the potential trust in the network,
which in turn enhances the sensitivity to new information.
Further, key opinion leaders play an important role regarding stability.
Where trust in a key opinion leader is lost, the whole network may easily col-
lapse and be difficult to restore. This is shown by related sharp negative market
reactions and long periods of volatility during recovery.
While such networks generally speed up the flow of information they may also
have less welcome amplifying effects since similar information is obtained from
multiple sources. On the other hand, one positive effect is that inconsistencies
in information may be attenuated.
E.3. The Non-Communicable Nature of Trust
Trust, just like information, is a precondition for the functioning of financial
markets (Volkart (2011), p.64). I have already identified different forms of trust
that influence the investment decision. Trust in the market system is one cru-
cial form. Zowislo and Schulz (2006) critically review the recent public call for
transparency as a means of raising trust. They refer to it as the “chimera of
transparency” and point out the “non-communicable nature of trust” as sincer-
ity becomes insincere when communicated (also Gambetta (2000), Luhmann
(2000), and Osterloh and Weibel (2006)).
Swift (2001) sees the prevailing public discontent with and critique of busi-
99For example if people attend the same golf club.
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ness despite the great effort being put into accounting and reporting systems
and the advancements made towards transparency as resulting from the highly
acclaimed principle of accountability. This principle is premised on managerial
opportunism described in economic agency theory. For Swift, such an approach
is not suitable for handling information gaps since it assumes so-called positive
distrust and suspicion. Accountability is concerned with institutionalization of
stakeholders’ legal rights of the access to corporate information rather than with
discretionary or voluntary disclosure. As a consequence, controls and regula-
tions create an “artificial” form of trust. In contrast, where the axiom of distrust
is replaced with an axiom of vulnerability and confidence in the goodwill of the
other party, trust is based upon interdependent relationships. In order to tran-
scend managerial opportunism, an organization has to establish a pattern of
and a reputation for trustworthy behavior (Swift (2001)).
O’Neill (2002) also critically reviews the belief in accountability as trans-
parency. For O’Neill (2002) intelligent accountability means that “well placed
trust grows out of active enquiry rather than blind acceptance. In traditional
relations of trust, active enquiry was usually extended over time by talking and
asking questions, by listening and seeing how well claims to know and under-
takings to act held up over time.” (O’Neill (2002), p.76.)
While there are valid aspects in these arguments, their context of application
should never be forgotten. Given the unsurmountable information gap between
a firm and its investors, striving for transparency is clearly an indispensable
precondition for a real genesis of trust (Volkart (2008b)). Communication is
able to generate trust if credibility can be conveyed (Gamper et al. (2006), Moll
(2002), and Hubig and Siemoneit (2009)).
Since investing can per se be seen as an act of trust and the investor is
dependent on the information of the firm in establishing a picture of the trust-
worthiness of the targeted company, it becomes even clearer how important
reliability and credibility of information are. If people do not believe in what
is communicated by a firm, there will be no way for investors to engage in a
relationship with the firm and even less chance of them being willing to bear
risk. Following Volkart (2008b), transparency, trust, and communication create
credibility, which is also an important ingredient for reputation. Where a good
reputation is absent, nobody, and in particular no one new, will surrender their
money to a company’s management.
Still, it remains true that trust is not primarily a problem of information.
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What connects the idea of trust and transparency is actually the ethical di-
mension (Rawlins (2008)). Information and communication are important for
trust formation in that they allow for honest transfers of relevant knowledge to
outsiders.
This does not change the inherent non-communicable nature of trust. Os-
terloh and Weibel (2006) refer to trust as a worthwhile investment within and
between organizations which deviates from more conventional forms of invest-
ments: First, many risky advances without legal coverage may be necessary
and it may take time until these investments yield fruit. Second, after a rather
cumbersome start, the utility gain grows disproportionately because trust breeds
trust. Third, strong erratic behavior destroys the level of trust sustainably. Con-
struction and destruction do not behave symmetrically over time.100 Fourth,
trust, unlike other forms of effort, cannot be demanded. “Trust me” is more a
promise than a command. The impact of such a promise is not in the hand of
the party uttering it, thus trust can hardly be “managed”. Finally, trust can
only be endowed and never be bought. Trust cannot be strategically exploited.
In fact, the more trust is consciously aspired to, the greater the likelihood that
trustworthiness is undermined. What can be done is to provide the conditions
necessary for the development of trust and trustworthiness.
F. Summary Section VI
Section VI sought to collect together various insights concerning information
and transparency and their significance for trust in the investment context. As
investing implies the separation of ownership and control it is only natural that
information asymmetry occurs. Potential investors are dependent upon the firm
for the provision of relevant information, so that a firm’s intrinsic value can be
transformed into its market value. Even though there are various arguments
for improved corporate disclosure, there are also arguments against it leading
to resistance and criticism from firm-side.
Efforts to advance the information provision by firms are referred to as cor-
porate transparency. Corporate transparency means that the firm provides rel-
evant information honestly and in an open way by including the dependent
party in a communication process. The objective is to find an optimum level of
100According to Olsen (2008) negative events and mistrust are attributed a greater significance
than positive events probably due to loss aversion, i.e. the general tendency of people to
exhibit as stronger preference for avoiding losses than for acquiring gains.
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disclosure rather than striving for an unreachable goal of full transparency.
Information is thus crucial for an investor wishing to invest in a firm for the
first time. As little or no personal experience exists yet, the information obtained
from others, as well as firm reputation, are both decisive and they strongly
influence the perception of the investor. Reputation can only be built up through
trustworthy behavior which signifies that investing can really be looked at as
an action of trust. Information in the pre-investment stage has fundamental
significance because without it any risky advance would be perceived as being
too risky for the investor.
Investors remain outsiders even following the initial investment, i.e. investing
remains an act of trust post-investment. Still, once the relationship has been
initiated, knowledge grows through experience, familiarity feeds in, and the
form of trust may change. Personal contact to the management of the firm will
further influence trust and perceived risk.
Information transparency and trust are phenomena that reinforce each other
through interaction and communication. After a crisis of trust, transparency
efforts may generate mistrust even though they are necessary to clean up the
mess. To restore trust, though, hollow transparency is not enough. Credibility
as well as the believe in honesty and integrity has to be restored.
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VII. Empirical Investigation on Trustworthiness and
Transparency Within an Investment Relationship
The insight gathered heretofore is now to be investigated empirically. From a
theoretical perspective, the establishment of a trustworthy reputation is the link
between transparency and trust in the context of investing. A company’s infor-
mation and communication policy plays a crucial role in this regard. My main
objective in this section is to document the empirical indications of a possible
interrelationship between the two phenomena perceived trustworthiness and per-
ceived transparency in the context of listed firms and institutional investment
activity.
In a first step, I decomposed the concept of trustworthiness into the compo-
nents competence, integrity, and goodwill, and the notion of transparency into the
components substantial information, participation, accountability, and secretive-
ness (a reverse item for openness). I asked institutional investors to evaluate a
specific investment target in terms of their perception of overall trustworthiness
and company transparency as well as in terms of the respective components. In
a second step, correlation and regression analyses were used in order to find out
which components of trustworthiness and transparency are most highly related
to overall perceived trustworthiness. In the theoretical discussion above it was
shown that the investment decision is not solely determined by the characteris-
tics of a specific asset. The decision is embedded in an investment environment,
several other forms of trust, just as investor and relationship characteristics may
impinge on the formation of perceived trustworthiness and trust. So finally, in a
third step I examined whether other forms of trust and investor and relationship
characteristics influence the perception of a specific target’s trustworthiness.
The results of the interrelationship analysis are presented in subsection C,
while subsection A explains the idea of the empirical study and the approach
used in analyzing the data. Subsection B provides some background information
on the sample, its general investment characteristics, and its relationship to the
evaluated company.
A. Idea and Approach of the Empirical Study
This section provides some background information on the empirical analysis
starting with some remarks on the measurement of trust, the notion behind
the survey design, and the approach used in data analysis. Further, relevant
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information on the company analyzed, as well as on the procedure and sample
characteristics is provided. Section A is cloded with some statistical remarks.
A.1. The Measurement of Trust
Trying to measure a concept like trust is a difficult, if not impossible undertak-
ing. It is a soft factor, highly subjective, and multidimensional. This has to
be borne in mind when approaching such a topic. I am quite conscious of the
obvious limits of the analysis conducted and make no pretense of truly quan-
tifying such evasive phenomena as trust or transparency. The present study
must rather be seen as an approximation which, by incorporating the context
and including as much information about the whole picture of the situation as
possible, puts trends of the perception of a behavior forth. This is also why
responses to factors apart from the core variables of trust, trustworthiness, and
transparency were assessed in the questionnaire.
Although great advances have been made on the measurement of trust over
the last decade the issue is far from closed.101 Two forms of trust measurement
can be distinguished: those based on experiments and those based on survey
analysis.
The great advantage of experiments is that they capture the behavioral
essence of trust. Trusting behavior can actually be observed, whereas in surveys
people might answer either referring to their experience in the past or how they
would like to or think they should behave in the future (Fehr (2009)).102 The
typical game played in experiments is the so-called trust game introduced first by
Berg et al. (1995).103 The most commonly used survey measure for generalized
trust is based on a question used by the World Value Survey of the American
General Social Survey with data that has been collected since 1972 and which
has been mainly applied to document cross-country differences. The question
is: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”104
In any case, the biggest challenge lies in finding a pure measure of trust, if at
101See especially Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010), Engelmann (2010), and Fehr (2009). Most
empirical work is nowadays done either regarding the measurement of the generalized trust
propensity and social trust or to show that humans might deviate from fully rational
behavior.
102Pros and cons of both are discussed nicely by Fehr (2009) and Engelmann (2010).
103The trust game has been explained in Section III, D.2.
104Normally response options are binary, thus “Most people can be trusted” and “Can’t be too
careful”. Guiso et al. also work with this question in their various papers.
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all possible. There are enormous difficulties here. For example, trusting behav-
ior in experiments could simply be an expression of an inclination to altruism,
gregariousness, or of a person’s ambiguity or risktaking propensity.
Besides measuring trust, the purpose of my empirical study was also to mea-
sure transparency and in such a way that the two measures could be interrelated.
This led to the use of the survey measure developed by Rawlins (2008) as it fits
the purpose best.105
A.2. Survey Design
Rawlins (2008) created an instrument for measuring the interrelationship be-
tween transparency and trust and applied it to the relationship between an
organization and its employees. I basically replicated Rawlins’ approach, and
applied the model to an analysis of the relationship between a firm and its in-
vestors. To fit the new context, I made slight changes in the questionnaire. In
particular, I expanded the evaluation of the transmission of substantial infor-
mation as this is of vital interest to the investor community.
The use of a single case has obvious limitations concerning generalization
of results. Nevertheless, the method seemed appropriate, as stated by Yin
(2009): a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real-life context, where the boundaries between phe-
nomenon and context are not clearly evident, and where multiple sources of
evidence may be used. Bearing this in mind I also decided to ask various ques-
tions regarding the relationship the respondents cultivate with the company in
order to be able to better appraise the responses provided.
Moreover, I expanded the approach of Rawlins in two respects. First, I asked
questions regarding other forms of trust besides the specific trust in the com-
pany at hand, with the goal of checking for interrelations between the various
forms.106 Secondly, I aimed to integrate several facets of the relationship be-
tween the institutional investor and the firm hypothesizing that they influence
the perception of both parties and thus the investment decision of the investor.
This is where I drew upon input from the work of Ferber (2004). Ferber set
his focus on the perception of trust within the investment decision of institu-
tional investors, and also used a survey as the empirical tool. He distinguished
105See for the precise questions used by Rawlins, Rawlins (2008) p.9.
106I used the question of the World Value Survey for the assessment of the generalized trust
propensity.
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between the macro- and micro-level of the investment decision. Compared to
individual investors who base their decisions on personal preferences, asset man-
agers are part of an institutional macro-setting and are most often confronted
with a more or less predefined strategic asset allocation. Nevertheless, there is
still scope for micro-level activity in that asset managers might influence the fi-
nal investment decision as individuals, in their role within the investing firm, or
through their personal relationship with the targeted company.107 Hence, how
other forms of trust apart from the specific trust in the firm are perceived, as
well as investor and relationship characteristics are also included in the analysis.
Two final remarks are needed before going into further detail concerning
analysis. In his paper Rawlins (2008) refers to the measurement of trust. His
approach is to decompose trust into perceptions concerning the factors compe-
tence, integrity, and goodwill. In order to maintain the link with the theoretical
discussion which needs the documentation of the behavioral dimension of trust,
I measure the perception of trustworthiness rather than trust.
Finally, owing to the dynamic nature of the setting and the reinforcing
elements of feedback between transparency and trustworthiness, establishing
causality is problematic. This has to be borne in mind when trying to capture
the two aspects of information exchange and trustworthiness, as both influence
each other.108
A.3. Data Analysis and Research Hypotheses
The core data derived from the inquiry was analyzed in three steps:
Step I: The perception of specific trustworthiness and the perception of
transparency are said to be the result of the perception of the respective com-
ponents of trustworthiness and transparency. In a first step I examined whether
the components of trustworthiness and transparency frequently mentioned in
the literature are similarly applicable to the relationship between a listed firm
and institutional investors, and also which components explain overall trustwor-
thiness and transparency best. On an overall trustworthiness level I looked at
whether there is a difference between investor perceptions of firm trustworthi-
ness in general compared to investor perceptions of the trustworthiness of the
specific firm’s management. Additionally I always checked whether there is a
107See also Section V.
108Denize and Young (2007) also use a survey measure with a similar goal.
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difference of opinion between asset managers and analysts, and between equity
and debt investors.
• Hypothesis IA: Overall trustworthiness is the result of the components
competence, integrity, and goodwill.
• Hypothesis IB: There is a difference between perceived firm trustworthi-
ness and perceived management trustworthiness.
• Hypothesis IC: Overall transparency is the result of the components sub-
stantial information, participation, accountability, and secretiveness (a re-
verse item to openness).
Step II: The literature suggests that the specific trustworthiness perceived
may be influenced by other forms or inclinations of trust, namely, an individual’s
general propensity to trust, the general attitude towards investing as an act
of trust, and various forms of institutional trust, such as trust in the stock
market, in economic development, or in large corporations. In a second step I
thus assessed the attitude of the institutional investors sampled regarding these
different forms of trust and their interrelationship. On the specific trust level I
distinguished again between the perception of the trustworthiness of the firm in
general and that of firm management. Additionally I checked whether there is a
difference of opinion between asset managers and analysts, and between equity
and debt investors.
• Hypothesis IIA: There is no interrelationship between the general trust
propensity and the perception of trustworthiness regarding a specific firm.
• Hypothesis IIB: There is an interrelationship between the general attitude
of institutional investors regarding investing as an act of trust and the
perception of trustworthiness regarding a specific firm.
• Hypothesis IIC: There is an interrelationship between different institu-
tional forms of trust and the perception of trustworthiness regarding a
specific firm.
Step III: Finally, I analyzed the interrelationship between the perception
of trustworthiness and transparency. Once again, the existence of a potential
difference between the overall trustworthiness of a firm and that of its man-
agement was checked for. Additionally, investor and relationship characteristics
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were included in the analysis to examine whether there is a difference in opinion
among asset managers and analysts, and equity and debt investors, whether
the respondents cultivate a personal relationship with the firm, and whether
disappointment with the firm has already occurred.
• Hypothesis IIIA: Overall perceived trustworthiness and overall perceived
transparency are positively related concepts.
• Hypothesis IIIB: Investor and relationship characteristics influence the
perception of trustworthiness and transparency and their interrelationship.
A.4. Case Description
Holcim, the company analyzed in this case study, is a globally active company,
present in around 70 countries, and with about 90,000 employees. Holcim is
listed on the Swiss Stock Exchange. The company supplies primarily cement
and aggregates. Holcim has a strong commitment to sustainability and, as can
be seen below, mentions the importance of values like trust and transparency
explicitly in its mission statement:
“Holcim’s corporate values—strength, performance, passion—are in essence
a promise to perform and thus help to build and sustain trust with our stake-
holders.
• Strength: being a solid partner; based on the integrity of our people, and
our global leadership and competence
• Performance: delivering on our promises to each other and to our stake-
holders, and providing the best solutions for our customers
• Passion: embodying dedication and commitment, and caring about every-
thing we do: our people, our customers, our communities and the envi-
ronment
We aim to deliver on this promise through our products, services, communica-
tions and, above all, the behavior of our people. This is vital, especially given
the pace of growth Holcim has sustained in recent years, both organically and
through acquisition. Operating with integrity: At Holcim, we recognize the
importance of operating with integrity and apply high standards of corporate
governance in the conduct of our business. By demonstrating responsible and
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transparent leadership and management, we earn the trust of our stakeholders,
which is essential to achieving long-term success.” (www.holcim.com)
As the firm has such a strong focus on trust and transparency in its mis-
sion statement, the present analysis can be seen as an evaluation of the stated
commitment.
A.5. Procedure and Sample
The questionnaire was administered as a web-based survey using the software
NetQuestionnaires. An email invitation including a personalized link to the
survey was sent to 1485 institutional investor contacts of Holcim’s investor re-
lations team. The survey was conducted over a period of one month including
one email reminder. 75 surveys were completed, given a 5 % response rate.109
Due to the nature of the investor contacts provided by the company this is
not a representative study. It is not possible to draw any conclusions regard-
ing sample demographics nor whether the sample represents the total investor
structure.110 The positive aspect of such an actively used set of contacts is that
the latter can be said to be “intimate enough with the organization to establish
trust judgments and evaluate its efforts at transparency” (Rawlins (2008), p.10).
Certainly this needs to be considered when drawing conclusions.
The questionnaire—which can be found in the appendix—was divided into
two parts: the professional perspective (Questions 1.–25.) and some questions
regarding the specific individual (Questions 26.–30). Equity and debt investors
were first addressed separately and their respective responses were subsequently
merged. So, whenever I talk about the investors I refer to both equity and debt
investors, unless otherwise stated. Owing to the possibility of “routing” within
the web-survey, analysts had to answer slightly fewer questions than asset man-
agers (they do not have direct responsibility for the assets under management).
Questions that were only posed to asset managers are marked with (AM), those
only posed to analysts with (A). Whenever reasonable, response options were
randomized.111
After an in-depth analysis of the data, the results were subjected to review
109Compared to Ferber (2004) and Rawlins (2008), which had a response rate of about 30%,
this is rather small but their samples and procedure were also quite different. A more
comparable inquiry done in 2009 by the Deutsches Aktieninstitut presented a 10% response
rate (Ernst et al. (2009)).
110This is a difficult aspect in any case as the exact investor composition is not fully known
to the company itself.
111Randomized response options are indicated in the text.
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by Holcim’s investor relations team and were found to be consistent with prior
investor opinion surveys performed by the company.
A.6. Statistical Remarks
The scaling characteristics of the data call for specific statistical methods (see
Schumann (2006), Siegel (1957), and Winkelmann and Boes (2009)).
Most of the survey data is of ordinal scale. Trustworthiness was treated
as an attitude and measured on a six-point scale of agreement, from “strongly
disagree” (- - -) to “strongly agree” (+++).112 The same ranking was also applied
in assessing perceptions of transparency. Relative importance was measured
using a five-point scale from “not important at all” (1) to “very important”
(5). Correlation analysis was used to analyze interrelationships between ordinal
variables. Field (2009) suggests using Kendall’s tau (τ), instead of Spearman’s
rho (ρ) in cases where the dataset is rather small and where there is a large
number of tied ranks. Kendall’s tau was thus used in the present study.
Furthermore, differences between certain groups of respondents were ana-
lyzed. Thus, nominal data was also considered. In order to ascertain whether
there is a possible interrelationship between nominal variables the chi-square
test (χ2) was applied.113 I used Cramér’s V as a measure of the strength of the
interrelationship based on the chi-square test. This is standardized between 0
and 1.114 The interpretation of cross-tabs was also applied here.
The original data was always analyzed using such non-parametric methods.
For testing interrelationship (Section VII, C) the data had to be aggregated.
I calculated aggregate mean values on the basis of the individual item values.
Statistically this is not precise but in terms of the context and the interpretation
of this data it is still justifiable, especially given the rather limited number of
data points.115 Aggregated data was analyzed with parametric methods using
Pearson’s r and linear regressions.
In order to be consistent throughout the text and to be able to compare
the aggregated and non-aggregated results of the correlation analysis, I present
Pearson’s r in the text, and the corresponding non-parametric measure in the
112For the analysis, the (- - -) to (+++) were transformed into 1 to 6.
113This test measures the discrepancy between the observed counts of two variables and what
you would expect the counts to be if the variables were unrelated.
114The closer it is to 1, the stronger the interrelationship. In the area of sociology 0.3 implies
already a significant interrelationship.
115This has been confirmed by empirical researchers both in the area of economics and soci-
ology and was also applied by Rawlins (2008).
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appendix. Overall, the main conclusions do not change, no matter which method
was applied.
B. Sample Characteristics and Its Relationship to Holcim
This subsection describes the characteristics of the sampled institutional in-
vestors and their relationship with the evaluated firm. It serves primarily as
background information in order to aid interpretation of the results for inter-
relationship analysis presented in subsection C. First, the main sample charac-
teristics are described. This is followed information on the general investment
information behavior of the sampled institutional investors, and on attitudes and
levels of the different forms of trust. After that, the relationship to Holcim is
described in detail and the reasons for investing or recommending Holcim as an
investment are analyzed. The subsection closes by presenting the institutional
investors’ evaluation of Holcim’s trustworthiness and transparency effort.
B.1. Main Sample Characteristics
Table I summarizes the main characteristics of the respondents of the sample.
The sample represents the point of view of various institutional investors and
is quite balanced in terms of asset managers and analysts. An equity investors’
point of view clearly dominates. Hence, statistically significant results are rather
rare on the debt investor side. The respondents are fairly experienced in the area
of asset management and bear responsibility for the funds under their control.
Almost the whole sample is male.
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Table I
Sample Characteristics
Characteristics Description Details or Remarks
Type of investor The sample includes various types
of institutional investors, most are
from different areas of banks or
mutual funds.
Pension funds (7), mutual funds
(14), insurance or reinsurance (8),
different areas of banks (27), hedge
funds (7), others (12).
Form of capital 13% answered from a debt in-
vestor’s, 87% from a equity in-
vestor’s point of view.
The strong focus on the equity side
is due to the fact that only 9%
of the total number of the institu-
tional contacts are from the debt
side.
Job position 40 asset managers (AM) and 34 an-
alysts (A) responded to the ques-
tionnaire.
The 40 asset managers include 10
partners, 23 senior portfolio man-
agers, and 7 junior portfolio man-
agers. The 34 analysts include 15
buy-side and 19 sell-side analysts.
One respondent did not specify the
position.
Investment style Most funds have a “growth-at-a-
reasonable-price” or “value” strat-
egy. On the debt side there is an
“investment grade” and “corporate”
focus.
Further strategies applied are
“growth”, “index”, “absolute re-
turn”, or a mix of the mentioned
strategies. Only asked to asset
managers.
Investment horizon Most invest on a long term basis
(44%), followed by medium (35%)
and short term (22%).
The more detailed possibilities to
answer were merged to these three
categories. Only asked to asset
managers.
Funds volume The funds volume under personal
responsibility is USD 100–5,000
Million.
This question was only asked to as-
set managers and answered by 20
of them.
Responsibility Most respondents decide as a team
(19) or on their own responsibil-
ity though subject to investment
strategy of the firm (13), 5 decide
completely on their own, only 2 af-
ter authorization.
None of the respondents does not
take any decisions at all. Only
asked to asset managers.
Years of experience Sample participants have consider-
able professional experience in the
area of asset management.
85% have more than 5 years of ex-
perience, no one less then 3 years,
with a range of 3 to 44 years.
Sex Most of the respondents are male. 72 male, 2 female, one not defined.
Age The respondents are 26 to 66 years
old.
On average the respondents are 40
years old.
B.2. Information Behavior
Respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of the following information
sources shown also in Figure 15: offering memorandum, rating agency, treasury
team, investor relations team, senior management, annual report, the company’s
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website116, research or investment recommendations, and media.
Figure 15. Sources of Information Used Throughout the Investment Process. This
figure presents relative importance by source type for analysts and for asset managers (AM)
from “very important” (5) to “not important at all” (1). For the asset managers the difference
before and during investment is shown as well. The diagram shows the percentage of total
responses for each category.
The evaluation results confirmed the theoretical assumptions in that they
showed that the relationship to a firm, including personal contact, is very im-
portant for the investor. This holds true especially for the asset managers of
both debt and equity. It is also noticeable that investor relations is not that
116The response option “website” refers to more than the use of the internet to access the
annual report.
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important for debt investors as a source of information.
Overall, the most important source of information about a company is per-
sonal contact to the senior management, followed by the annual report including
the financial statement.117 These results are consistent with the results of the
study done by Ernst et al. (2009). For debt investors, information provided
by the rating agencies is also very important. These sources are then followed
in order of importance by personal contact to investor relations, the company’s
website, and research or investment recommendations. The media is not impor-
tant.
Further, there are slight differences in terms of source importance before
and during investing. The website is relatively more important prior to invest-
ment, whereas once the investment exists, factors such as investment research
and recommendations, and input from analysts and asset managers gains in im-
portance. The paragraphs below provide more detailed information.
Sources of Information Used by Analysts
All of the given possibilities are important for equity analysts. The most fre-
quently stated sources were annual report including the financial statement and
personal contact to the senior management, followed by the website and personal
contact to the investor relations team. The information gained from research and
investment recommendations and media is relatively less important. One person
said that own models were most important.
For the debt-side analysts the offering memorandum and the annual report
including the financial statement were mostly stated as being most important,
followed by personal contact to the firm (treasury team, investor relations and
senior management). Other sources were not deemed important.
Asset Managers: Sources of Information Before Investing
The asset managers on the equity side agreed with the analysts (see above).
For the asset managers on the debt side offering memorandum and personal
contact with a company’s treasury department and senior management are most
important, followed by the annual report including the financial statement, a
company’s website, and research and investment recommendations. Personal
contact with the investor relations team, and rating agencies are less important
and information from the media is not important at all.
117Measured by the median and the mean.
87
Asset Managers: Sources of Information During Investment
There seems to be a slide shift over the process of investing for equity asset
managers regarding the sources of information. A company’s website becomes
less while research and investment recommendations become more important as
informational source. Furthermore, own research and models, and experience,
as well as colleagues, competitors, suppliers and customers gain in importance
over time.
Also on the debt side a difference of sources before and during investment
can be noticed. The offering memorandum quickly declines in importance. The
most important sources are personal contact to a company’s treasury department
and to senior management. Rating agencies gain in importance becoming as
important as the annual report, website, and research and investment recommen-
dations. Personal contact to the investor relations team is not that important,
while media information is not important at all.
B.3. Trust Levels
The respondents of the survey were asked to specify their general trust propen-
sity, their opinion on whether investing is an act of trust, and their attitude
regarding five stated forms of institutional trust, i.e. trust in the stock market,
in general economic development, in large corporations, in government, and in
(other) shareholders. The different trust forms were used in the interrelation
analysis presented in subsection C.
General Trust Propensity of the Sample
The general trust propensity was measured following Guiso et al. (2008) by
asking the same question as in the World Values Survey: “Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you have to be very
careful in dealing with people?”118
Figure 16 shows that all six types of people—very careful to very trusting—
can be found in the sample. The focus though lies in the middle, with a tendency
towards the more careful people. The answer most often given was (+). In terms
of two categories—rather careful and rather trusting people—the sample is quite
balanced.
118See for further information Section VII A.1.
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Figure 16. General Trust Propensity Distribution of the Sample. This figure depicts
the distribution of responses regarding the general trust propensity of the survey participants
with ratings possible on a six-point scale from “very careful” (- - -) to “very trusting” (+++).
Figure 17. General Trust Propensity of Analysts and Asset Managers. This figure
compares the distribution of responses regarding the general trust propensity of analysts and
asset managers with ratings possible on a six-point scale from “very careful” (- - -) to “very
trusting” (+++).
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Asset managers and analysts are not significantly different in their general
attitude towards trust. On viewing the distribution of answers (see Figure 17),
the only thing worthy of notice is that the outliers for asset managers are on
the very trusting end of the scale, while for analysts they appear at the opposite
end.
As far as debt and equity investors are concerned, the former are clearly on
the more careful side. They have no rating above (+).
Attitude Towards Investing
Generally, those sampled exhibit a diverse range of opinions concerning whether
investing in a company may be seen as an act of trust. However, the majority
(85%) of the respondents express a positive attitude with the median being
(++), see Figure 18. The remaining 15% do not agree that investing is an act
of trust.
Figure 18. Perceiving Investing as an Act of Trust. This figure depicts the distribution
of responses regarding the question whether investing is perceived as an act of trust with
ratings possible on a six-point scale from “very careful” (- - -) to “very trusting” (+++).
There is no statistically significant difference in opinion between analysts
and asset managers but the distribution does reveal that asset managers see
investing more as an act of trust than analysts do.
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The ten debt investors are completely on the positive side, i.e. they all agree
that investing is an act of trust.
The Impact of Trust on Investing
One question was posed in order to check for the potentially stabilizing effect
of established trust in the presence of negative signals. Figure 19 shows that
according to the respondents established trust seems to have a stabilizing effect.
79% of the 42 respondents said that they would not sell their stock owing to
rumor, 60% would not sell owing to external analysts’ negative expectation, and
52% would not sell owing to negative news or announcements. Faced with a sig-
nificant stabilization of the stock price or underperformance, up to 14% would
not sell. The question concerning downgrading by a rating agency was only put
to debt investors. If this were to occur 60% of the respondents said that they
would not sell. The results confirm the analysis of institutional investors and
trust done by Ferber (2004).
Figure 19. Stabilizing Effect of Trust. This figure shows the percentage of respondents
who would not sell their investment in the case of the given signal, once they have established
trust in a firm.
Facets of Institutional Trust
Table II presents the five different forms of institutional trust that the survey
participants were asked to evaluate. Responses were possible on a six-point scale
from “I do not trust at all” (- - -) to “I trust completely” (+++).
The sample results reveal the presence of considerable confidence in the eco-
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Table II
Attitude Towards Forms of Institutional Trust
This table shows the attitude of the respondents regarding different forms of institutional trust
rated on a six-point scale from “I do not trust at all” (- - -) to “I trust completely” (+++).
Institutional trust Mean Median Distribution
economic development 3.74 4 All six categories exploited; focus on (+).
stock market 3.58 4 All six categories exploited; focus from (–) to
(++).
large corporations 3.57 4 No complete trust (+++); strong focus on (-)
to (++).
shareholders 3.16 3 No complete trust (+++); focus on (–) to (+).
government 2.75 3 No complete trust (+++); strong focus on the
negative categories.
nomic development, the stock market, and large corporations. Shareholders and
the government are looked at with a bit more caution. Interestingly, there is
more overall confidence in systems (economy and market) than in situations
where people are perceived to be more concretely involved (corporations, share-
holders, government). For the latter three categories there is no complete trust
expressed by the respondents.
There are no statistically significant differences of opinion between asset
managers and analysts, nor between debt and equity investors regarding insti-
tutional trust. However, asset managers do tend to be slightly more trusting
than analysts.
B.4. Reasons to Recommend or Invest in Holcim
The question on the reasons that speak for an investment in Holcim was posed in
two slightly different ways. The analysts were asked why they would recommend
Holcim, whereas the current investors were asked why they are holding Holcim
in their portfolios. For further investigations the two questions were merged to
see which were generally the most important reasons speaking for Holcim.
Figure 20 shows the relative response frequencies of importance to the var-
ious options available. The reasons for investing in Holcim covered in the sur-
vey were: rating, industry, general strategy, geographic exposure & positioning,
operations and organizational structure, financials, dividend policy, risk & re-
turn, senior management, corporate governance, reputation, recommendations,
success in the past, future potential, sustainability or other ethical aspects, com-
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munication policy, and momentum.119
Figure 20. Reasons to Hold or Recommend Holcim. This figure presents the relative
response frequencies concerning the reasons for investing in Holcim, from “very important” (5)
to “not important at all” (1). Percentages refer to the number of responses per category. The
evaluation of rating was only put to debt investors.
Generally it can be said that all the given reasons are quite important for
the sample participants. On average—measured by the median—no score is less
than three.
• Very important—with a median score of 5—are geographic exposure &
positioning and the future potential of Holcim.
• Important—with a median score of 4—are rating, industry, general strat-
egy, operations & organizational structure, financials, risk & return rela-
tionship, senior management, corporate governance, reputation, success in
the past, and communication policy.
• Not so important—with a median score of 3—are dividend policy, recom-
mendations, sustainability or other ethical aspects, and momentum.
It is quite interesting that the topic of sustainability, despite its ostensi-
ble importance for Holcim, does not appear highly relevant for investors. The
correlation matrix (see Table III) provides further insight concerning interrela-
tionships between reasons.120
119The response options were randomized.
120The non-parametric correlations can be found in the appendix.
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Table III
Pearson Correlations Concerning Reasons for Investing in Holcim
This table shows the Pearson correlations concerning the reasons that speak for an investment in Holcim. * denotes significant at 5%, ** denotes significant at 1%.
Pearson Correlations
A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J. K. L. M. N. O. P. Q.
A. Rating 1
B. Industry .550 1
C. General strategy -.060 .312* 1
D. Geographic exposure .060 .092 .186 1
E. Operations & Organizations .060 .226 .056 .183 1
F. Financials -.100 .053 .489** .185 .251 1
G. Dividend policy -.158 .140 .309* .066 .239 .258* 1
H. Risk & Return -.316 -.113 -.054 .046 .224 .237 .340** 1
I. Senior management .632 .190 .244 .051 .200 .255 .069 .059 1
J. Corporate governance .350 .124 .199 .096 .294* .085 .320* .033 .495** 1
K. Reputation .350 .245 .088 -.038 .006 -.008 .235 -.152 .346** .589** 1
L. Recommendations .598 .105 .253 -.001 .025 -.073 .288* -.088 .078 .364** .517** 1
M. Success in the past .316 .049 -.092 .218 .064 -.084 .008 -.148 .230 .290* .256* .062 1
N. Future potential .060 .068 .027 .451** .122 .198 -.019 .218 .269* .024 .030 .079 .164 1
O. Sustainability .458 .136 .321* .301* .115 .066 .268* -.022 .084 .258 .184 .471** .026 .281* 1
P. Communication policy .060 .197 .020 .244 .099 .067 .129 -.096 .244 .249 .393** .103 .210 .193 .311* 1
Q. Momentum .158 .264* .015 .075 .250 -.035 -.163 -.205 .074 -.026 .115 .006 .248 .189 .075 .266* 1
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It turns out that geographic exposure & positioning is one of the two most
important reasons, and statistically significantly correlated with the other most
important reason future potential but also with sustainability. Future potential
is further correlated with senior management and sustainability as well. Sus-
tainability is especially strongly correlated with recommendations and also with
more tangible factors such as strategy, geographic exposure & positioning, and
dividend policy. Besides with future potential, senior management is further cor-
related strongly significantly with corporate governance and reputation. Finally,
reputation is correlated with senior management and corporate governance, rec-
ommendations, success in the past, and communication policy.
Thus, even though sustainability appears, in terms of its median score to be
relatively unimportant for investors, the correlation analysis reveals that those
people who appraised geographic exposure & positioning and future potential
as important, also saw sustainability as relevant for Holcim, and those who
believed in the future potential of the firm, also rated the senior management
and sustainability as important.
Further, I would like to mention here reputation which is strongly associated
with senior management, corporate governance, recommendations, success in the
past, and communication policy. This could be an indication what factors feed
into the establishment of reputation.
On looking at so-called “hard” and “soft” reasons, A.–H. and I.–Q. in Table
III respectively, the highest positive correlations are found among the latter
group but often both are mentioned to be important. For example, strategy
is positively correlated with financials but also with sustainability. Another
example is dividend policy which is positively correlated with strategy, risk &
return, corporate governance, and sustainability.
Furthermore, I checked on differences between the groups debt and equity
investors by doing a chi-square test. The results can be seen in Table IV. The
opinions of sampled debt and equity investors diverge somewhat concerning
what is important for investing in Holcim. For debt investors general strategy,
dividend policy, corporate governance, recommendations, and success in the past
are statistically significantly more important than to equity investors. The future
potential is important for both groups but relatively more important to equity
investors. Furthermore, geographic exposure & positioning and sustainability or
other ethical aspects are also more important to equity than to debt investors.
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Table IV
Importance of Reasons for Holcim to Debt and Equity Investors
This table shows perceived importance of respective reasons to invest in Holcim. Based on a
chi-square test and using Cramer’s V as measure of strength.
Reasons to Invest for Debt- and Equity-Investors Cramér’s V Sign.
Industry 0.110 0.930
General strategy 0.396 0.032
Geographic exposure & positioning 0.280 0.084
Operations & organizational structure 0.120 0.839
Financials 0.164 0.689
Dividend policy 0.559 0.002
Risk & Return 0.286 0.328
Senior management 0.159 0.739
Corporate governance 0.386 0.072
Reputation of the company 0.311 0.197
Recommendations 0.467 0.018
Success in the past 0.378 0.063
Future potential 0.404 0.063
Sustainability or other ethical aspects 0.356 0.097
Communication policy 0.205 0.672
Momentum 0.281 0.281
Figure 21 shows overall agreement regarding investment reasons.
Figure 21. Reasons for Analysts and Asset Managers to Recommend or Hold
Holcim. This figure compares the opinion of analysts and asset managers on reasons to
recommend or hold Holcim as an investment.
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As Figure 21 shows, the “softer” factors such as communication policy, sus-
tainability or other ethical aspects, recommendations, reputation, and senior
management are a little more important for asset managers than for analysts
(measured by the median). In contrast, operational structure and geographic
exposure & positioning are relatively more important reasons for analysts.
Cross-tab analysis confirms these differences and shows at a statistically
significant level, that reputation and sustainability and other ethical aspects are
more important to asset managers than to analysts. In contrast, momentum is
more important to analysts than to asset managers.121
B.5. Investors’ Relationship to Holcim
Table V summarizes the most important features of the relationship between
the participants of the survey and Holcim.
Table V
Sample Characteristics Regarding the Relationship to Holcim
Characteristics Description Details or Remarks
Investment status 70% of the asset managers are cur-
rently invested in Holcim. Of the 6
not currently holding, 4 were past
investors.
Most hold Holcim 1-5 years in their
portfolio, the range goes from 1-
30 years and a 2.0-5.5% fraction.
Only asset managers were asked.
Personal relationship 67% of the respondents cultivate
a personal relationship with either
the investor relations team, the se-
nior management, or the treasury
team.
The asset managers tend to focus
on the contact with the manage-
ment, whereas more analysts relate
to the IR team. Personal contact
is more important for equity than
debt holders.
Past experience 14% of the respondents admit hav-
ing been disappointed by Holcim.
Reasons for disappointment are
mostly unmet financial targets or
expectations. Two mentioned is-
sues on disclosure.
Consequences of dis-
appointment
- 5 did not take any action
- 7 sold their investment
- 3 told IR
- 2 told the management
- 5 changed their recommendation
News perception Most of the respondents heard
mostly positive (80%), 15% mostly
negative, 5% only positive news
about Holcim.
The questions referred to the per-
ception of news over the preceding
twelve months.
Information missing 15 of 75 respondents have a request
for further information.
121All three reasons are statistically significant at a 90% significance level, and have a Cramér’s
V of more than 0.362.
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Most of the asset managers (over 80%) are current or past investors of Hol-
cim. Sample participants cultivate quite a strong personal relationship with the
firm. Concordant with the view of Holcim, more people are in contact with the
investor relations team than directly with the senior management. Nevertheless,
contact with the latter is still important. Altogether, the respondents have a
positive attitude towards the firm, regarding both the news perceived during
the last twelve months, and the level of disappointment with the firm in the
past. 20% of the respondents request further informational details of the firm.
This points to some room for further improvement.122
B.6. Perception of Holcim’s Trustworthiness
The questions on the perception of Holcim’s trustworthiness are from core of
the questionnaire. Two questions can be used to measure the perceived overall
trustworthiness and eleven other questions measure the components of trustwor-
thiness: i.e competence (three items), integrity (five items), and goodwill (three
items). The precise content of every item used for evaluation can be found in
Table VI.
Table VI
The Components of Trustworthiness and Their Items
This table shows the components of trustworthiness with all their sub-items.
Component Item
Variable Item-Description
Trustworthiness Trust-F I trust Holcim to take care of its investors.
Trust-M I trust Holcim’s management.
Competence Compet-A I feel very confident about the skills of Holcim as a firm.
Compet-B Holcim’s management has the ability to accomplish what it says
it will do.
Compet-C The company is known to be successful at the things it plans to
do.
Integrity Integ-A I perceive to be treated fairly and justly by Holcim.
Integ-B I know I can rely on Holcim to keep its promises.
Integ-C The behavior of the people that work for Holcim seems to be
guided by sound principles.
Integ-D Holcim does not mislead any of its stakeholders.
Integ-E I am sure that information which is relevant for me is honestly
conveyed by Holcim.
Goodwill Good-A Whenever decisions are taken I know Holcim’s management is
concerned about its investors.
Good-B Investors’ opinion is taken into account when Holcim is making
decisions.
Good-C This company is interested in the well-being of its investors, not
just itself.
122The information requests were discussed with the investor relations team and have in part
already been implemented.
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As Figure 22 shows Holcim is generally perceived very positively. In fact,
respondents only used the positive side of the six-point scale from strongly
disagree (- - -) to strongly agree (+++). The analysis was therefore confined
to a three-point scale and focused on the difference between very strong (+++)
and not so strong (+) agreement with the statements. The response options
were randomized.
Figure 22. Investors’ Perception of the Components of Trustworthiness. This figure
presents the relative response frequencies regarding the overall perceived trustworthiness of
the firm (Trust-F), its management (Trust-M), and the components competence, integrity, and
goodwill (for precise content of each component see Table VI). Percentages refer to number
of responses per one of the three category of agreement, where (+++) indicates strongest
agreement.
Overall trustworthiness is measured by two items which focus on two differ-
ent aspects of trust in a firm: variable Trust-A describes the perceived trustwor-
thiness of a firm in general, whereas variable Trust-B moves the trustworthiness
of the management of a firm to the center of attention. Holcim’s management
is perceived as being slightly more trustworthy than the firm in general.
B.7. Perception of Holcim’s Transparency Effort
The analysis of Holcim’s transparency effort was split into two parts: com-
munication and information policy. Three statements appraise the perception
of overall transparency (Transp-A–Transp-C). Perceived overall transparency is
assumed to be made up of four components: substantial information, partici-
pation, accountability, and secretiveness, as a reverse item for openness. The
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precise content of every item evaluated can be found in Table VII.
Table VII
The Components of Transparency and Their Items
This table shows the components of transparency with all their sub-items.
Component Item
Variable Item-Description
Transparency Transp-A Holcim’s management wants to understand how its decisions affect
its investors.
Transp-B Holcim’s management wants to be accountable to its investors for
its actions.
Transp-C Holcim wants its investors to know what it is doing and why it is
doing it.
Participation Partic-A I am asked for feedback about the quality of the information pro-
vided by Holcim.
Partic-B Holcim involves people like me to help identify the information
investors need.
Partic-C I am asked for my opinion before decisions are taken.
Accountability Account-A Holcim presents more than one side of controversial issues.
Account-B Even information that might be damaging to the company is pro-
vided.
Account-C Holcim’s management is open to criticism.
Account-D Mistakes are freely admitted.
Account-E Bad news is provided in a timely fashion.
Secretiveness Secret-A Often important informational details are left out.
Secret-B Holcim is slow in providing information to its investors.
Secret-C Holcim only discloses information when it is required to do so.
Substantial info Info-D is useful
Info-E is relevant to me
Info-F is detailed
Info-G arrives in a timely fashion
Info-H is complete
Info-I can easily be understood
Info-J is accurate
Info-K is reliable
Info-L can easily be found
Info-M is consistent throughout different sources of information
Info-N can be compared to previous performances
Info-O can be compared to industry standards
Info-P tells only part of the story
Info-Q seems to be intentionally written in a difficult way to understand
The first part of the analysis of transparency concerned the interactive di-
mension of transparency, the communication policy. Here, three items focused
on participation, five on accountability, and three on secretiveness. As this topic
is very important to investors, I extended the component substantial information
compared to the original model of Rawlins (2008). It here consists of fourteen
items. These are described in the second part of the transparency analysis, the
information policy. The response options were randomized.
Communication Policy
Figure 23 shows that survey participants generally have a positive view of Hol-
cim’s communication policy. The “positive” evaluation of secretiveness (as re-
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verse item of openness) is particularly noticeable. The correlation analysis in
subsection C provides further insight on this aspect.
Figure 23. Investors’ Perception of the Communication Policy. This figure presents
the relative response frequencies regarding overall transparency (Transp-A–Transp-C) and the
different components of the communication policy of a firm, participation, accountability, and
secretiveness (for precise content of each component see Table VII). Percentages refer to
number of responses per category of agreement, where (+++) indicates strongest agreement.
Information Policy
Figure 24 shows that survey participants generally agree with the statements
concerning Holcim’s information policy. There is clear support concerning the
first twelve statements but some doubts concerning the last two statements “tells
only part of the story” and “is difficult to understand”. The correlation analysis
in subsection C provides further insight on this aspect.
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Figure 24. Investors’ Perception of the Information Policy. This figure presents the
relative response frequencies regarding the different items of Holcim’s information policy (for
precise content of each item see Table VII). Percentages refer to number of responses per
category of agreement, where (+++) indicates strongest agreement.
B.8. Summing Up
The relationship of the sampled investors to Holcim can be summarized as fol-
lows: Both “hard” and “soft” factors are important for the respondents when
deciding whether to invest or recommend Holcim. Altogether, the most impor-
tant factors speaking for an investment in Holcim are geographic exposure &
positioning and future potential. This is very clear and mainly driven by equity
investors. Asset managers tend to rank “softer” reasons as being more important
than do analysts. The correlation analysis revealed that sustainability is signif-
icantly related to both geographic exposure & positioning and future potential,
and the latter in turn to the senior management of the assessed firm.
It is also of interest to see that reputation as a reason for investment is
related to the factors senior management, corporate governance, recommenda-
tions, success in the past, and communication policy.
Concerning the different forms of trust, i.e. the general trust propensity of
a person, the general attitude towards investing as an act of trust, and the five
different forms of institutional trust namely, trust in the stock market, large
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corporations, the government, the economy, and shareholders, sample responses
reveal that generally, the sample consists of quite a balanced group, ranging
from rather wary to rather trusting people, with the focus lying in the middle
of the six categories. The debt investors tend to be more wary compared to the
equity investors, whereas analysts and asset managers do not show any relevant
differences.
The sampled investors’ general trust propensity is lower than referring to
trust in the context of investing. 85% of the respondents see investing as an act
of trust. The debt investors and the asset managers agree more on investing
being an act of trust than the equity investors and analysts do. Moreover,
according to the sample, once established, trust in a firm plays a stabilizing
role.
Regarding the five different forms of institutional trust respondents are
slightly less positive. There is most confidence in economic development, fol-
lowed by the stock market, whereas large corporations, shareholders, and the
government receive a slightly less positive evaluation.
In sum, Holcim receives a very positive investors response regarding its trust-
worthiness and its transparency effort, although there is some room for improve-
ment in the latter.
C. Interrelationship Between Different Forms of Trust, the Per-
ception of Trustworthiness, and Transparency Effort
The goal of the interrelationship analysis was to be able to answer three ques-
tions: The primary question concerned checking for the existence of an associ-
ation between overall perceived trustworthiness and the perceived components
of trustworthiness and transparency. The second question referred to whether
there is an interrelationship between different other forms of trust and the trust-
worthiness specifically perceived for Holcim. And finally, the third question
asked whether investor and relationship characteristics influence the interrela-
tionship between the perception of trustworthiness and transparency. The fol-
lowing subsection C.1 describes the main final model, working with aggregated
components.
Before working with the aggregated components, I checked the correlation of
all sub-items with their components and with the perception of overall trustwor-
thiness and transparency. This detailed analysis was done first and foremost to
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test whether the components and their sub-items as derived from the literature
review are also applicable to the investment relationship and further, owing to
the rather modest sample size, as an overall plausibility check. Some interesting
additional results were revealed. These are presented in subsection C.2.
Further, a correlation analysis concerning the various forms of trust was also
done but as this did not provide significant results, the variables were omitted
from the final model. The results of this correlation analysis can be found in
subsection C.3.
C.1. Main Model
Before starting the analysis on an interrelation between the concepts of trustwor-
thiness and transparency the data on the different components was aggregated.
All items belonging to a certain component of trustworthiness or transparency
were merged by taking the mean score of the available ranking, from a scale of
1 (- - -) to 6 (+++), where 1 means “strongly disagree” and 6 “strongly agree”.
Where responses were incomplete, I calculated the mean on the basis of the
answers given in order not to lose observations.
Thus, overall trustworthiness is given by the mean of two items—trust-
worthiness of the firm in general and trustworthiness of the management—and
by the components of trustworthiness which are competence (3 items), integrity
(5 items), and goodwill (3 items). The same aggregation was performed with
overall transparency (3 items), and the components of transparency, namely,
substantial information (14 items), participation (3 items), accountability (5
items), and secretiveness (3 reverse items of openness). The precise content of
all the different items of the components can be seen in Table VIII below.
I first performed a correlation analysis with the aggregated data, followed
by a regression analysis. The general goal was to explain overall trust in the
firm. As my model suggests that this trust comprises trust in the firm in general
and trust in the management, the regression analysis also looked at potential
differences regarding the perception of these two items.
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Table VIII
The Components of Trustworthiness and Transparency and Their
Items
This table shows the components of trustworthiness and transparency with all their sub-items.
Component Item
Variable Item-Description
Trustworthiness Trust-F I trust Holcim to take care of its investors.
Trust-M I trust Holcim’s management.
Competence Compet-A I feel very confident about the skills of Holcim as a firm.
Compet-B Holcim’s management has the ability to accomplish what it says
it will do.
Compet-C The company is known to be successful at the things it plans to
do.
Integrity Integ-A I perceive to be treated fairly and justly by Holcim.
Integ-B I know I can rely on Holcim to keep its promises.
Integ-C The behavior of the people that work for Holcim seems to be
guided by sound principles.
Integ-D Holcim does not mislead any of its stakeholders.
Integ-E I am sure that information which is relevant for me is honestly
conveyed by Holcim.
Goodwill Good-A Whenever decisions are taken I know Holcim’s management is
concerned about its investors.
Good-B Investors’ opinion is taken into account when Holcim is making
decisions.
Good-C This company is interested in the well-being of its investors, not
just itself.
Transparency Transp-A Holcim’s management wants to understand how its decisions affect
its investors.
Transp-B Holcim’s management wants to be accountable to its investors for
its actions.
Transp-C Holcim wants its investors to know what it is doing and why it is
doing it.
Participation Partic-A I am asked for feedback about the quality of the information pro-
vided by Holcim.
Partic-B Holcim involves people like me to help identify the information
investors need.
Partic-C I am asked for my opinion before decisions are taken.
Accountability Account-A Holcim presents more than one side of controversial issues.
Account-B Even information that might be damaging to the company is pro-
vided.
Account-C Holcim’s management is open to criticism.
Account-D Mistakes are freely admitted.
Account-E Bad news is provided in a timely fashion.
Secretiveness Secret-A Often important informational details are left out.
Secret-B Holcim is slow in providing information to its investors.
Secret-C Holcim only discloses information when it is required to do so.
Substantial info Info-D is useful
Info-E is relevant to me
Info-F is detailed
Info-G arrives in a timely fashion
Info-H is complete
Info-I can easily be understood
Info-J is accurate
Info-K is reliable
Info-L can easily be found
Info-M is consistent throughout different sources of information
Info-N can be compared to previous performances
Info-O can be compared to industry standards
Info-P tells only part of the story
Info-Q seems to be intentionally written in a difficult way to understand
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Correlation Analysis
Table IX exhibits a high and positive correlation between overall trustworthi-
ness and its components. Overall transparency is less strongly positively cor-
related with its components. This is also confirmed by the analysis of the
non-aggregated items (see Table XIV in subsection C.2.). The highest positive
and statistical significance was found for the component substantial information,
followed by the component integrity. Participation is not significant, exhibiting
almost no positive if not negative correlations. This confirms that Holcim’s in-
vestors do not associate participation with transparency.
Table IX
Pearson Correlations of Trustworthiness, Transparency, and Their
Components
This table shows the Pearson correlations between overall trustworthiness and its components and
transparency and its components. * denotes significant at 5%, ** denotes significant at 1%.
Pearson Correlations
Components A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I.
A. Trustworthiness 1
B. Competence .544** 1
C. Integrity .605** .448** 1
D. Goodwill .542** .470** .416** 1
E. Transparency .364** .149 .300* .418** 1
F. Subst. info. .630** .464** .442** .495** .341** 1
G. Participation .037 .035 .189 -.020 .168 -.009 1
H. Accountability .285* .156 .360** .199 .274* .281* .301* 1
I. Secretiveness -.376** -.260* -.276* -.353** -.350** -.337** .008 -.101 1
Regression Analysis
The starting point of the regression analysis was to look at the relationship
between trustworthiness and its components, transparency and its components,
and then trustworthiness and transparency, applying a stepwise procedure (see
model description in Table X).
The first model (in Table X 1. TRUSTWORTHINESS) with the three com-
ponents of trustworthiness performed best and was able to explain almost 50%
of the variance. However, although competence is highly correlated with over-
all trust, the regression analysis demonstrates that integrity and goodwill con-
tribute the most to the perceived overall trustworthiness, while competence is
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not a significant contributor.
The next best model, explaining for 35% of the variance, is the third one (in
Table X 3. TRUSTWORTHINESS). There I looked at the relationship between
overall trustworthiness and the components of transparency. For both trustwor-
thiness (in Table X 3. TRUSTWORTHINESS) and transparency (in Table X 2.
TRANSPARENCY) the only component that makes a significant contribution
is substantial information. Substantial information is also significantly impor-
tant for all components of trust (Models 4–6). Accountability is an important
contributor with respect to integrity, as is openness for goodwill. However, these
models are rather weak in terms of adjusted R2.
Table X
Regression of Trustworthiness, Transparency, and Their
Components
This table shows the regression results of overall trustworthiness, transparency, and their components
with a stepwise procedure applied. * denotes significant at 5%, ** denotes significant at 1%.
Models Beta t Adj. R2 Obs.
1. TRUSTWORTHINESS 0.481 72
Competence 0.256 2.450
Integrity 0.368** 3.876
Goodwill 0.300** 2.658
Constant 0.430 0.770
2. TRANSPARENCY 0.207 66
Substantial information 0.481** 2.689
Participation 0.080 0.749
Accountability 0.186 1.436
Secretiveness -0.195 -1.672
Constant 2.082 1.546
3. TRUSTWORTHINESS 0.354 64
Substantial information 0.858** 4.726
Participation 0.018 0.163
Accountability 0.146 1.074
Secretiveness -0.184 -1.543
Constant 0.909 0.655
4. COMPETENCE 0.202 66
Substantial information 0.690** 3.626
Participation -0.003 -0.023
Accountability 0.064 0.465
Secretiveness -0.127 -1.021
Constant 1.961 1.369
5. INTEGRITY 0.216 66
Substantial information 0.487* 2.392
Participation 0.167 1.367
Accountability 0.253 1.710
Secretiveness -0.210 -1.578
Constant 1.564 1.020
6. GOODWILL 0.203 63
Substantial information 0.531** 2.893
Participation 0.016 0.149
Accountability 0.018 0.134
Secretiveness -0.269* -2.297
Constant 3.406* 2.487
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In a second step I defined TRUSTWORTHINESS as the dependent variable,
given by the mean score of the two statements “I trust Holcim to take care of
its investors.” (variable Trust-F) and “I trust Holcim’s management.” (variable
Trust-M). If there was only one ranking for one of the items, this was taken as
the overall perceived trustworthiness.
Table XI
Trustworthiness and Transparency Within an Investment
Relationship
This table shows investor perceptions of trustworthiness and transparency components regressed on
overall TRUSTWORTHINESS in Holcim. The component variables are formed by taking the mean
score of the several items evaluated. All items included can be found in Table VIII. Stepwise, also
characteristics of the investor—form of capital (debt or equity investors) and the job position (analyst
or asset manager)—and of the relationship—past experience (occurred disappointment yes or no) and
personal contact (relationship to investor relations, the treasury team or the senior management yes
or no) are considered. Absolute values of t statistics are given in parentheses below the estimates. *
denotes significant at 5%, ** denotes significant at 1%.
Variable Models
TRUSTWORTHINESS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Competence 0.193 0.182 0.188 0.171 0.167 0.223
(1.574) (1.783) (1.832) (1.698) (1.418) (1.981)*
Integrity 0.289 0.305 0.313 0.334 0.579 0.539
(2.673)** (3.312)** (3.360)** (3.639)** (3.843)** (3.782)**
Goodwill 0.205 0.200 0.212 0.190 0.056 0.069
(1.555) (1.794) (1.872) (1.700) (0.427) (0.562)
Transparency 0.064
(0.522)
Substantial info. 0.428 0.485 0.489 0.505 0.335 0.239
(2.114)* (3.003)** (3.0150)** (3.163)** (1.795) (1.335)
Participation -0.053
(-0.511)
Accountability 0.071
(0.559)
Secretiveness -0.028
(-0.241)
Equity -0.109 -0.134 -0.213 -0.240
(-0.708) (-0.887) (-1.277) (-1.527)
Asset manager 0.191 0.199 0.295
(1.987)* (1.991)* (2.938)**
Past experience 0.059 0.109
(0.532) (1.029)
Personal contact -0.306
(-2.716)**
Constant -0.741 -0.788 -0.731 -0.972 -0.654 -0.105
(-0.551) (-1.183) (-1.085) (-1.438) (-0.869) (-0.143)
Observations 63 72 72 71 57 57
Adjusted R2 0.465 0.536 0.533 0.553 0.590 0.637
This time I included all components of trustworthiness, evaluation of overall
transparency, and the components of transparency as explanatory variables (see
Table XI). Again, I applied a stepwise procedure but excluded from Model
2 on those components which did not contribute to the model. The second
108
model confirms: integrity and substantial information contribute significantly
to overall trustworthiness, followed by goodwill and competence. From Model
2 on I also added specific control variables which help explain the relationship
the investor has to the firm. These are “form of capital”123, “position”124, “past
experience”125, and “personal relationship”126. These four covariates were coded
as dummy variables.
The inclusion of the relationship variables and investor characteristics (Models
3–6 shown in Table XI) resulted in the following:
• Integrity is the only variable that is robust to any changes in the model.
• The more relationship variables are added, the more substantial informa-
tion loses in significance.
• Competence gains in significance, whereas goodwill declines in significance.
• Asset managers perceive Holcim as more trustworthy than analysts do.
• It does not significantly matter if the respondent is a debt or equity in-
vestor, but shareholders tend to have less overall trust than debt holders.
• Those who do not cultivate a personal contact to the firm, perceive Holcim
as less trustworthy. This can only be shown in combination with the
variable past experience.
The third step of the regression analysis was to look at differences in the per-
ception of the trustworthiness of the firm in general (see Table XII), and of
the perceived trustworthiness of the management (see Table XIII), the sum of
which I defined earlier as being overall trustworthiness. The same procedure
was applied as before and which was shown in Table XI, changing only the de-
pendent variable first to trustworthiness of the firm (variable TRUST FIRM)
and afterwards to trustworthiness of the management (variable TRUST MAN-
AGEMENT).
It turns out that the perceived overall trustworthiness of the firm is primarily
driven by the trustworthiness of the management. Most effects are the same as
in the models 1 and 2. Perceived trustworthiness of the firm, especially for
123Where debt=0, equity=1.
124Where analyst=0, asset manager=1.
125Where disappointed by the firm in the past=0, no disappointment=1.
126Where a personal relationship to either the management, investor relations team, or the
treasury team=0, no personal relationship=1.
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the first models, is strongly associated with goodwill. But again, on adding the
relationship variables, the importance of the integrity element returns also in
the analysis of firm trustworthiness. The other interesting difference between
model 1 and 2 is that, when looking at the trustworthiness of the firm, the debt
versus equity view is more important than the job position. Here it can be said
that equity investors significantly perceive Holcim as less trustworthy than debt
investors do.
Table XII
Trustworthiness of the Firm and Transparency Within an
Investment Relationship
This table shows investor perceptions of trustworthiness and transparency components regressed on
the trustworthiness perceived of Holcim as a firm. The component variables are formed by taking the
mean of the several items evaluated. All items included can be found in Tables VIII. Stepwise, also
characteristics of the investor—form of capital (debt or equity investors) and job position (analyst or
asset manager)—and of the relationship—past experience (occurred disappointment yes or no) and
personal contact (relationship to investor relations, the treasury team or the senior management yes
or no) are considered. Absolute values of t statistics are given in parentheses below the estimates. *
denotes significant at 5%, ** denotes significant at 1%.
Variable Models
TRUST FIRM 1 2 3 4 5 6
Competence 0.205 0.128 0.151 0.150 0.059 0.128
(1.141) (0.869) (1.033) (1.018) (0.320) (0.692)
Integrity 0.128 0.173 0.196 0.204 0.676 0.633
(0.829) (1.312) (1.495) (1.541) (2.862)** (2.715)**
Goodwill 0.521 0.548 0.584 0.550 0.293 0.307
(2.533)** (3.237)** (3.462)** (3.187)** (1.318) (1.404)
Transparency 0.223
(1.164) 0.250
Substantial information 0.181 0.305 0.328 0.363 0.192 0.059
(0.576) (1.265) (1.374) (1.496) (0.622) (0.189)
Participation 0.002
(0.014)
Accountability -0.045
(-0.242)
Secretiveness 0.107
(0.631)
Equity -0.353 -0.372 -0.515 -0.548
(-1.634) (-1.704) (-2.029)* (-2.193)*
Asset manager 0.154 0.136 0.239
(1.075) (0.861) (1.433)
Past experience -0.047 -0.007
(-0.269) (-0.040)
Personal contact -0.315
(-1.660)
Constant -1.508 -0.712 -0.562 -0.813 -0.259 0.447
(-0.747) (-0.722) (-0.574) (-0.803) (-0.208) (0.346)
Observations 60 69 69 68 54 54
Adjusted R2 0.296 0.369 0.385 0.386 0.412 0.434
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Table XIII
Trustworthiness of the Management and Transparency Within an
Investment Relationship
This table shows investor perceptions of the components of trustworthiness and transparency regressed
on trustworthiness of the management of Holcim. The component variables are formed by taking the
mean of the several items evaluated. All items included can be found in Table VIII. Stepwise also
characteristics of the investor—form of capital (debt or equity investors) and job position (analyst or
asset manager)—and of the relationship — past experience (occurred disappointment yes or no) and
personal contact (relationship to investor relations, the treasury team or the senior management yes
or no) are considered. Absolute values of t statistics are given in parentheses below the estimates. *
denotes significant at 5%, ** denotes significant at 1%.
Variable Models
TRUST MANAGEMENT 1 2 3 4 5 6
Competence 0.147 0.201 0.191 0.172 0.246 0.304
(0.882) (1.427) (1.347) (1.226) (1.471) (1.834)
Integrity 0.488 0.461 0.449 0.474 0.505 0.463
(3.303)** (3.604)** (3.484**) (3.698)** (2.356)* (2.208)*
Goodwill -0.052 -0.070 -0.088 -0.109 -0.141 -0.126
(-0.291) (-0.453) (-0.563) (-0.700) (-0.756) (-0.690)
Transparency -0.112
(0.665)
Substantial Information 0.542 0.567 0.559 0.566 0.408 0.307
(1.962)* (2.514)* (2.469)* (2.511)* (1.537) (1.163)
Participation -0.076
(-0.526)
Accountability 0.085
(0.483)
Secretiveness -0.215
(-1.373)
Equity 0.169 0.138 0.104 0.078
(0.793) (0.651) (0.436) (0.336)
Asset Manager 0.161 0.228 0.325
(1.177) (1.590) (2.190)*
Past experience 0.155 0.209
(0.982) (1.337)
Personal contact -0.317
(-1.913)
Constant 1.080 -0.664 -0.748 -0.913 -0.802 -0.231
(0.585) (-0.718) (-0.801) (-0.961) (-0.751) (-0.213)
Observations 62 70 70 69 56 56
Adjusted R2 0.349 0.399 0.395 0.403 0.379 0.412
As a fourth step I also included the other forms of trust. However, as the
previous correlation analysis revealed, and as also shown in detail in subsection
C.3 (see Table XIX), no significant influence could be found, except for a slight
positive relation between the general positive attitude towards investing and the
specific trustworthiness of Holcim.
C.2. Validation of The Model and Detailed Analysis of the Data
Before aggregating the various sub-items of one component by taking means, I
first made a correlation analysis of all items and their components. This is now
presented starting with the trustworthiness model and followed by the trans-
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parency model. The problem of multicollinearity is discussed at the end.
Trustworthiness and Its Components
To answer the question whether the components of trustworthiness relate to
the perception of overall trustworthiness and to each other, I did a correlation
analysis of all items of trustworthiness components. This showed that almost
all of the items are significantly related to each other. Table XIV depicts the
Pearson correlations for all components of trustworthiness.127
The different components of trustworthiness are all statistically significantly
related at least at the 0.05 level with the two items of overall trust, except for
the second goodwill item. The question of whether investor opinion is taken into
account when Holcim is making decisions is not associated with trust. Actually,
this is confirmed by the component participation in the analysis of transparency
as can be seen below.
The strongest positive correlation with the perception of overall trustwor-
thiness of the firm (Trust-F) with 0.675 is given by the third goodwill item
(Good-C), i.e.: “This company is interested in the well-being of its investors,
not just itself.” The integrity items are also strongly related to the overall per-
ceived trustworthiness of the firm, with three of them exhibiting correlations
higher than or equal to 0.500.
The overall perceived trustworthiness of the management (Trust-M) is most
highly correlated with the first integrity item (Integ-A with 0.543), i.e. investors
belief that they are treated fairly and justly by Holcim. This is followed by the
integrity item focusing on the reliance of Holcim to keep its promises. Finally,
confidence in the skills of Holcim (Compet-A) is also highly related to the per-
ceived trustworthiness of the management.
Altogether, the analysis shows that the items provide a good measure of the
components of trustworthiness and trustworthiness itself.
127The non-parametric correlation analysis which can be found in the appendix gives very
similar results. Only the second item of goodwill performs slightly better.
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Table XIV
Correlation Analysis of the Components of Trustworthiness
This table shows the Pearson correlations for perception of overall trustworthiness of the firm (variable Trust-F), overall trustworthiness of the management (variable Trust-
M), and the components of trustworthiness with their items respectively. Competence is given by the variables Compet-A–Compet-C, integrity is given by the variables
Integ-A–Integ-E, and goodwill by the item variables Good-A–Good-C. * denotes significant at 5%, ** denotes significant at 1%.
Pearson Correlations
T-F T-M C-A C-B C-C I-A I-B I-C I-D I-E G-A G-B G-C
Trust-F (T-F): I trust Holcim to take care of
its investors.
1
Trust-M (T-M): I trust Holcim’s manage-
ment.
.328** 1
Compet-A (C-A): I feel very confident about
the skills of Holcim as a firm.
.404** .475** 1
Compet-B (C-B): Holcim’s management has
the ability to accomplish what it says it will do.
.272* .250* .375** 1
Compet-C (C-C): The company is known to
be successful at the things it plans to do.
.287* .310** .518** .379** 1
Integ-A (I-A): I perceive to be treated fairly
and justly by Holcim.
.538** .543** .427** .330** .328** 1
Integ-B (I-B): I know I can rely on Holcim to
keep its promises.
.504** .540** .431** .309* .189 .451** 1
Integ-C (I-C): The behavior of the people that
work for Holcim seems to be guided by sound
principles.
.478** .340** .603** .333** .316* .481** .432** 1
Integ-D (I-D): Holcim does not mislead any of
its stakeholders.
.500** .461** .199 .383** .290* .469** .356** .293* 1
Integ-E (I-E): I am sure that information
which is relevant to me is honestly conveyed by
Holcim.
.393** .295* .127 .215 .363** .448** .202 .269* .596** 1
Good-A (G-A):Whenever decisions are taken,
I know Holcim’s management is concerned
about its investors.
.424** .383** .251* .242* .265* .397** .308* .253* .543** .389** 1
Good-B (G-B): Investors’ opinion is taken
into account when Holcim is making decisions.
.159 .115 .212 .227 .229 .233 .282* .277* .263* .281* .203 1
Good-C (G-C): This company is interested in
the well-being of its investors, not just itself.
.675** .272* .321** .354** .320** .337** .339** .521** .481** .387** .394** .242* 1
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Differences in Trustworthiness Perception of Debt and Equity Investors
The correlations of the trustworthiness components with the trustworthiness
of the firm (Trust-F) is almost solely driven by the equity investors. Statis-
tical significance for both debt and equity investors was found for competence
(Compet-A) and integrity (Integ-B). When checking for potential differences in
perception across the statements of the two groups, the cross-tab and chi-square
analysis revealed, at least for some statements, that sampled equity investors
place more trust in Holcim than the sampled debt investors (see Table XV).
Table XV
Differences in Perception for Debt and Equity
This table shows the different perceptions of trustworthiness items for debt and equity in-
vestors.
Components of Trustworthiness Cramér’s V Sign.
Trust-M: I trust Holcim’s management. 0.411 0.002
Compet-A: I feel very confident about the skills of Holcim as a
firm.
0.258 0.082
Integ-E: I am sure that information which is relevant to me is
honestly conveyed by Holcim.
0.495 0.000
Good-A: Whenever decisions are taken, I know Holcim’s manage-
ment is concerned about its investors.
0.286 0.067
Good-C: This company is interested in the well-being of its in-
vestors, not just itself.
0.284 0.056
Differences in Analyst and Asset Manager Perceptions of Trustworthiness
The correlations between overall perceived trustworthiness of the firm and the
other trustworthiness components are mostly positive and statistically signif-
icant both for analysts and asset managers. With respect to the competence
item, the positive correlation is only driven by analysts. On the contrary the
integrity item “I am sure that information which is relevant to me is honestly
conveyed by Holcim.” (Integ-E) is only driven be the positive conviction of the
asset managers in the sample.
Checking on where the positive correlations of the components of trustwor-
thiness with perceived management trustworthiness (Trust-M) come from, there
are some slight differences compared to the perceived trustworthiness of the firm
in general (Trust-F). Competence (Compet-A) derives only from the equity side
and integrity (Integ-A) comes from both debt and equity, referring to trust in
the firm it comes solely from the equity side. Again, the competence variables
are driven by the analysts and additionally, integrity (Integ-D) and (Integ-E),
and goodwill (Good-A) and (Good-C).
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The cross-tab and chi-square analysis do not show any significant differences
with respect to analyst and asset manager perception.
Transparency and Its Components
The correlation matrix of overall transparency and its components and sub-items
(see Table XVI) does not look as convincing as the analysis on trustworthiness.
The positive evaluation of secretiveness mentioned already earlier is resolved
as correlations are negative. However, participation and accountability are not
clearly correlated with overall transparency. It seems that investors do not
associate these items as transparency effort of the firm.
Clear confirmation was given for the following statement: “Holcim shows ac-
countability by transmitting bad news or mistakes in time.”, item accountability
Account-E. And this accountability is also clearly related to the perception of
overall transparency:
• The first indicator of overall transparency Transp-A—“Holcim’s manage-
ment wants to understand how its decisions affect its investors.”—is sig-
nificantly related to the fifth item of accountability Account-E.
• The second indicator of overall transparency Transp-B— “Holcim’s man-
agement wants to be accountable to its investors for its actions.”—is sig-
nificantly negatively related to the second item of secretiveness Secret-B.
• The third indicator of overall transparency Transp-C—“Holcim wants its
investors to know what it is doing and why it is doing it.”—shows signifi-
cant positive relation with the aforementioned item accountability Account-
E.
• The latter point above is also confirmed by the analysis on substantial
information.
115
Table XVI
Correlation Analysis of the Components of Transparency (Part Communication)
This table shows the Pearson correlations for perception of Holcim’s communication policy, overall transparency (Transp-A–C), and the component participation with its
sub-items Part-A–C, accountability with its sub-items Acount-A-E, and secretiveness with its sub-items Secret-A–C, respectively. * denotes significant at 5%, ** denotes
significant at 1%.
Pearson Correlations
T-A T-B T-C P-A P-B P-C A-A A-B A-C A-D A-E S-A S-B S-C
Transp-A (T-A): Holcim’s management
wants to understand how its decisions affect
its investors.
1
Transp-B (T-B): Holcim’s management
wants to be accountable to its investors for its
actions.
.206 1
Transp-C (T-C): Holcim wants its investors
to know what it is doing and why it is doing
it.
.207 .324** 1
Partic-A (P-A): I am asked for feedback
about the quality of the information provided
by Holcim.
-.056 -.005 .058 1
Partic-B (P-B): Holcim involves people like
me to help identify the information investors
need.
.141 .195 .094 .451** 1
Partic-C (P-C): I am asked for my opinion
before decisions are taken.
-.267 .028 -.139 -.026 .105 1
Account-A (A-A): Holcim presents more
than one side of controversial issues.
.088 -.038 -.002 .182 .150 .389** 1
Account-B (A-B): Even information that
might be damaging to the company is pro-
vided.
.195 .027 .254 .049 .107 -.022 .205 1
Account-C (A-C): Holcim’s management is
open to criticism.
.166 .082 .070 .299* .332* -.129 .210 .081 1
Account-D (A-D): Mistakes are freely ad-
mitted.
-.025 -.154 -.119 .242 -.025 .069 .015 .057 -.033 1
Account-E (A-E): Bad news is provided in
a timely fashion.
.411** .090 .343** .228 .160 -.277 .111 .355** .173 .145 1
Secret-A (S-A): Often important informa-
tional details are left out.
-.109 -.163 -.197 -.029 -.098 -.249 .025 .002 -.021 -.032 -.232 1
Secret-B (S-B): Holcim is slow in providing
information to its investors.
-.051 -.434** -.124 -.086 -.096 .086 .135 .075 -.188 .039 -.153 .271* 1
Secret-C (S-C): Holcim only discloses infor-
mation when it is required to do so.
-.270 -.093 -.073 .090 .129 .239 .164 .021 .222 -.171 -.232 .220 .113 1
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Thus, accountability is associated with transparency and in particular the
rapidity in which both good and bad news is provided, and thus an important
contributor to the link between transparency and trustworthiness.
In the case of Holcim’s sampled institutional investors, participation is not
strongly associated with transparency. This is quite different in Rawlins’ analy-
sis of an employer-employee relationship, where participation as well as substan-
tial information and accountability were found to be a significant contributor
to transparency. This may simply reflect the fact that many institutional in-
vestors do not see themselves as owners of the firm but prefer to simply focus
on investment considerations.128
When looking at Holcim’s information policy, the Pearson correlations reveal
statistical significance across all items and also for two of the three evaluations
of overall transparency, Transp-B129 and Transp-C130(see Table XVII). The last
three items, especially the two reverse items, are not that significant. However,
the negative correlation here does indicate, even if not always statistically sig-
nificant, that those investors who strongly agree on the positive components,
tend to agree less on the negative items, and vice versa. The non-parametric
correlation analysis, which can be found in the appendix, confirms these results.
To sum up, Holcim’s information policy is highly associated with overall
transparency, in terms of accountability, and that Holcim wants its investors to
be informed of what it is doing and why. However, information policy is not
related to a desire on the part of Holcim’s management to understand how its
decisions affect its investors.
128See for example Rasonyi (2009).
129“Holcim’s management wants to be accountable to its investors for its actions.”
130“Holcim wants its investors to know what it is doing and why it is doing it.”
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Table XVII
Correlation Analysis of the Components of Transparency (Part Information)
This table shows the Pearson correlations for perceptions of Holcim’s information policy with the perception of overall transparency where Transp-A stands for “Holcim’s
management wants to understand how its decisions affect its investors.”, Transp-B stands for “Holcim’s management wants to be accountable to its investors for its actions.”,
and Transp-C stands for “Holcim wants its investors to know what it is doing and why it is doing it.”.* denotes significant at 5%, ** denotes significant at 1%.
Pearson Correlations
T-A T-B T-C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q
Transp-A 1
Transp-B .206 1
Transp-C .207 .324** 1
D. useful .089 .466** .365** 1
E. relevant -.126 .222 .231 .456** 1
F. detailed -.006 -.005 .337** .321** .337** 1
G. timely .091 .375** .360** .376** .329** .243* 1
H. complete -.018 .170 .327** .461** .398** .395** .337** 1
I. understandable -.073 .293* .409** .591** .243* .378** .319** .351** 1
J. accurate .011 .359** .383** .521** .681** .390** .420** .449** .412** 1
K. reliable -.068 .359** .207 .483** .586** .274* .214 .400** .317** .744** 1
L. easily found -.036 .257* .284* .528** .392** .329** .344** .365** .412** .419** .372** 1
M. consistent .005 .497** .415** .708** .491** .329** .261* .458** .565** .579** .655** .473** 1
N. comparable to past -.026 .282* .307* .466** .383** .149 .448** .371** .431** .524** .433** .457** .377** 1
O. comparable to industry .131 .204 .128 .402** .182 .259* .254* .133 .184 .341** .198 .320** .284* .236* 1
P. only part of the story -.105 -.019 -.187 -.117 -.090 -.161 -.056 -.269* -.297* -.099 -.201 -.028 -.251* -.051 .028 1
Q. difficult to understand .175 -.063 -.018 -.093 -.104 -.245* -.155 .050 -.128 -.151 -.147 -.242* -.214 -.089 -.228 .011 1
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Differences in Debt and Equity Investors Perception
The results for both debt and equity investors support the statistically sig-
nificant negative correlation for the overall transparency item B. (“Holcim’s
management wants to be accountable to its investors for its actions.”) and
for the secretiveness item M. (“Holcim is slow in providing information to its
investors.”).
The positive, statistically significant correlation between the accountability
and the participation items is driven by the debt investors (the equity side
shows no significance). All the other statistically significant correlations stem
from equity investor conviction.
The cross-tab and chi-square analysis also reveal some differences in debt and
equity investor perceptions regarding Holcim’s communication policy (see Table
XVIII).
Table XVIII
Difference in Perception by Debt and Equity Side
This table shows debt and equity investor perceptions with respect to the components of
transparency.
Components of Transparency Cramér’s V Sign.
Transp-B: Holcim’s management wants to be accountable to its
investors for its actions.
0.343 0.012
Partic-A: I am asked for feedback about the quality of the infor-
mation provided by Holcim.
0.335 0.031
Account-E: Even information that might be damaging to the com-
pany is provided.
0.322 0.039
Secret-A: Holcim is slow in providing information to its investors. 0.314 0.039
Regarding overall transparency Transp-B, the debt holders clearly (75%)
agree less with the statement than the equity holders, whose responses are more
scattered, but still with a focus in the middle. For the three other items there is
very strong agreement (60% or more) on the debt holder side. The shareholders
are rather scattered with a focus in the middle.
Differences in Analyst and Asset Manager Perception
It is mostly the asset managers’ positive opinion that drives the correlations,
except for the correlations between participation and accountability, where the
analysts’ opinion dominate. The cross-tab and chi-square analysis shows only
one statement for which analysts show less agreement, i.e.: “Holcim’s manage-
ment is open to criticism.”131
131Cramér’s V 0.445, Sign. 0.002.
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Analysis of Multicollinearity
The high correlations between the variables suggest that there might be a prob-
lem of multicollinearity132. This was tested for by using the variance inflation
factor (VIF). As the VIF is between 1 and sightly above 2 for all the variables
multicollinearity has to be borne in mind when interpreting model results. This
is particularly true for the variables competence, integrity, goodwill, and substan-
tial information.
C.3. Interrelationship Between Different Forms of Trust
Another goal of this survey was to check on some of the statements found in the
literature regarding the interrelationship of different forms of trust. Apart from
measuring the trustworthiness respondents express specifically with respect to
Holcim, I also asked them to evaluate:
• their general trust propensity,
• their opinion on whether investing in general is perceived to be an act of
trust, and
• five institutional trust features that may feed into an attitude of company
trust, i.e.
– trust in the stock market,
– trust in the general economic development,
– trust in large corporations,
– trust in the government,
– trust in shareholders.
The correlation matrix on the different forms of trust (see Table XIX) high-
lights five things133:
132Multicollinearity means that there is a strong correlation between two or more predictors
in a regression model. Problems that might arise due to multicollinearity are that the beta
coefficient becomes untrustworthy because multicollinearity increases the standard error as
well. It may also limit the size of R-Square and make it difficult to assess the individual
importance of the predictors (Field (2009)).
133The conclusions can be drawn from both the parametric and the non-parametric analysis.
See appendix for non-parametric analysis.
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1. The two specific forms of perceived trustworthiness—of Holcim as a firm
and of management respectively—relate highly and positively to each
other.
2. The other forms of trust do not relate to the specific perceptions of Hol-
cim’s trustworthiness.
3. The general trust propensity does not relate to the other forms of trust
regarding investing.
4. The general attitude regarding investing as an act of trust is only statis-
tically significant with respect to the trust put in the stock market.
5. The various institutional forms of trust correlate positively, and highly
significantly with each other.
Table XIX
Correlation Analysis of Different Forms of Trust
This table shows the Pearson correlations for different forms of trust. * denotes significant at 5%, **
denotes significant at 1%.
Pearson Correlations
Forms of Trust A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I.
A. Holcim as a firm 1
B. Holcim’s management .328** 1
C. General propensity .145 .195 1
D. Investing .060 -.169 .149 1
E. Stock market .049 -.111 .107 .311* 1
F. Large corporations .034 .168 .164 -.018 .351** 1
G. Government .145 -.095 .021 .112 .098 .378** 1
H. Economy .053 .078 .216 .113 .390** .364** .280* 1
I. Shareholders -.084 .166 -.032 .205 .401** .571** .321* .315* 1
Differences in Opinion Between Debt and Equity Investors
The positive correlations and statistical significance derive mainly from the eq-
uity side. Positive correlations are also common for debt investors but due to
the small number of respondents they are not statistically significant.
One exception here is given by the relationship between the trust in large
corporations and in shareholders (variables F and I). Here the correlation is
strongly positive and statistically significant for both debt and equity investors.
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A further exception exists with respect to the correlation between trust in the
government and trust in the economy (variables G and H). For debt investors
correlations are negative (without being significant). A positive correlation and
significance is based entirely on equity investor responses.
Differences in Opinion between Analysts and Asset Managers
While most of the positive and statistically significant correlations derive from
both analysts and asset managers, the asset managers have a clearer opinion on
the following four positive correlation pairs134: investing as an act of trust with
the trust in the stock market (variables D and E), trust in the general economic
development with trust in the stock market (variables H and E), trust in the
general economic development with trust in the government (variables H and
G), and trust in the shareholders with trust in the government (variables I with
G).
One major exception concerns the correlation between the general economic
development and shareholders. Here the positive correlation derives significantly
only from the responses of analysts, not from those of asset managers.
C.4. Summing Up
The main analysis on the interrelationship between perceptions of trustwor-
thiness and transparency was performed at an aggregate level. The various
sub-items of the different components of trustworthiness and transparency were
merged giving the variables trustworthiness, competence, integrity, goodwill, and
transparency, substantial information, participation, accountability, and secre-
tiveness.
The correlation analysis of these aggregated items showed there to be a high
correlation with overall trustworthiness and with the different trustworthiness
and transparency components. The only item for which this was not true was
participation. Investor doubts concerning this last point were confirmed by
checking the non-aggregated data.
The regression analysis revealed that integrity was the most important com-
ponent of overall perceived trustworthiness, as was the component substantial
information in the perception of overall transparency. The analysis also con-
firmed that the components of transparency do not explain transparency as
well as in the case of trustworthiness. Of the transparency components, it is
134Only for the asset managers statistically significant.
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the component substantial information which influenced overall trustworthiness
most strongly. This is true also for the analysis of competence and the trans-
parency items. Integrity is additionally influenced by accountability, whereas
goodwill is influenced by openness (as reverse item to secretiveness) of Holcim.
When adding investor and relationship characteristics to the analysis, it is
only the integrity item that remains robust to any changes in the model. The
more relationship variables are added, the more the components substantial in-
formation and goodwill lose whereas competence gains in significance. Those,
who cultivate personal contact with the firm, either with the senior manage-
ment, the investor relations team, or the treasury team, perceive Holcim as
more trustworthy. Overall, the asset managers perceive the firm to be more
trustworthy than the analysts do. Regarding overall trustworthiness, no signif-
icant difference between debt and equity investors was found.
When distinguishing between the perceived trustworthiness of the firm in
general, and the perceived trustworthiness of the management, the effects of
overall trustworthiness are mainly driven by the trustworthiness of the manage-
ment. In case of the firm’s trustworthiness the effects are more or less the same,
except that equity investors perceive Holcim as less trustworthy than debt in-
vestors. This seems primarily due to the goodwill component which is associated
with trustworthiness. This changes when adding the investor characteristics and
relationship variables. Here it all comes down to integrity again.
D. Summary Section VII
As a final summary of the empirical results, the following insight can be sum-
marized regarding the initially stated research hypotheses:
• Hypothesis IA: Overall trustworthiness is the result of the components com-
petence, integrity, and goodwill.
Hypothesis IA can be confirmed in the case of Holcim: the components
competence, integrity, and goodwill are highly positively correlated with
the perceived trustworthiness of the firm. The most important component
is integrity.
• Hypothesis IB: There is a difference between perceived firm trustworthiness
and perceived management trustworthiness.
Hypothesis IB can also be confirmed. There is a slight difference between
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the perceived trustworthiness of a firm in general, and the perceived trust-
worthiness of the management. Regarding the former, the items of goodwill
are particularly important, followed by the integrity items. Regarding the
latter, integrity is foremost, followed by the competence items.
• Hypothesis IC: Overall transparency is the result of the components sub-
stantial information, participation, accountability, and secretiveness (a re-
verse item to openness).
Hypothesis IC can only be confirmed partially. Substantial information is
the most important component of transparency. For the other components
the association is less clear. On an overall level, the item participation ap-
pears weakest since it does not explain transparency at all. The most
interesting and clearest result is found for the two items of the component
accountability concerning the provision of bad news and admission of mis-
takes in time. This was also confirmed in an analysis of other statements
relating to the transparency effort of Holcim.
• Hypothesis IIA: There is no interrelationship between the general trust
propensity and the perception of trustworthiness regarding a specific firm.
Hypothesis IIA can be confirmed, there is no interrelationship between the
general trust propensity and the perception of Holcim’s trustworthiness.
• Hypothesis IIB and IIC: There is an interrelationship between the general
attitude of institutional investors regarding investing as an act of trust
and the perception of trustworthiness regarding a specific firm. There is
no interrelationship between the general trust propensity and the perception
of trustworthiness regarding a specific firm.
Hypothesis IIB and Hypothesis IIC have to be rejected. There is no visible
interrelationship between the general attitude of seeing investing as an
act of trust and perceived trustworthiness specific to Holcim. Attitudes
towards the different forms of institutional trust are not correlated with
the specific trustworthiness of the company.
• Hypothesis IIIA: Overall perceived trustworthiness and overall perceived
transparency are positively related concepts.
The core of this study’s analysis—the interrelationship of trustworthiness
and transparency—, i.e. Hypothesis IIIA, can generally be confirmed.
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While there is a link between the provision of substantial information and
the perceived overall trustworthiness of Holcim, at the end of the day, it
is integrity that counts most.
• Hypothesis IIIB: Investor and relationship characteristics influence the
perception of trustworthiness and transparency and their interrelationship.
The addition of investor and relationship characteristics to the analysis
makes the result of Hypothesis IIIA even clearer. Hypothesis IIIB can be
confirmed: these variables influence the perception of trustworthiness and
transparency.
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VIII. Conclusions
This last section concludes by responding to the research questions posed at
the beginning of the present essay. After highlighting the key insights some
limitations and further research ideas are presented.
A. Responding to the Research Questions
The first research question concerned how trust is defined, whether trust is a
phenomenon in economic exchange, and whether it can be analyzed in economic
terms.
The prime meaning of trust in human and social life is reflected in numerous
research contributions on the topic. It is a phenomenon with various dimensions
and presents itself in distinct forms. Over the last decade, also economic research
on trust advanced considerably, in particular empirically regarding the impact
of general propensities to trust on social and economic behavior.
The view that the calculative approach of economics is inherently unsuitable
for the analysis of trust, together with difficulties relating to an exact measure-
ment of trust, have led over a long time to great reluctance of a treatment of
trust in economics. In addition, trust was deemed to be a moral problem, and
as such more suitable for analysis within the framework of ethics than that
of economics. The newer schools of economic thought now allow for a more
holistic view of the human actor. This opens up space for treating trust as a
phenomenon of high relevance to social exchange and therefore, to economic
exchange as well. Once the assumptions of perfect rationality and complete
and symmetric information are loosened, trust becomes amenable to economic
analysis.
Trusting is foremost a positive attitude towards another party, i.e. an in-
dividual, an organization, or a system. A situation that involves trust always
entails an element of uncertainty, i.e. potential loss for the party that places
trust. This aspect is referred to as vulnerability. Vulnerability is the key to any
situation of trust since its presence differentiates trust from any other decision
under risk.
A temporal dimension is also inherent in trust. Trust is by its very nature
prospective since it points to an unpredictable future. In contrast to a situation
governed by explicit contracts which fix relevant and possible contingencies, it
remains anticipative and open at the same time. Retrospective trust is based
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on information acquired in the past and acts as a basis for prospective trust.
Multiple forms of trust can be distinguished. First, the general trust propen-
sity of an individual shall be mentioned, i.e. the general attitude of a person
when first confronting a stranger. With respect to society as a whole, this form
of trust is called aggregate trust or social trust. Apart from this base level
of trust, the trust phenomenon depends strongly on the specific circumstances
of a situation. Further, the nature of trust differs depending on whether it is
relationship- or system-based.
If an individual has a general positive attitude towards a particular situation
which is uncertain, not directly controllable, and potentially damaging, the
literature speaks of the actor exhibiting confidence or system trust.
Trusting in the narrow sense originates in relationships between the party
placing trust, called the trustor, and the party to be trusted, referred to as
the trustee, when the trustor is uncertain regarding the capabilities or inten-
tions of the trustee. Trust in the strictest sense refers to the latter aspect, i.e.
uncertainty about the motivation or integrity of the trustee.
The first act of trust by the trustor might lead to relational trust if the
placement of the risky advance is positively reciprocated by the trustee. The
decision to trust is embedded in and influenced by its social context. Trusting
means that trustworthiness is expected but it becomes only manifest when a
trusting action takes place which makes the trusting agent vulnerable. Upon
the trusting action, the trust receiver may decide whether or not to exploit the
vulnerability of the opponent.
This essay follows the economic definition of trust Fehr (2009) who states
that the trustor exhibits trust in the narrow sense “[...] if she voluntarily places
resources at the disposal of another party (the trustee) without any legal com-
mitment from the latter. In addition, the act of trust is associated with an
expectation that the act will pay off in terms of the investor’s goals. In particu-
lar, if the trustee is trustworthy the investor is better off than if trust were not
placed, whereas if the trustee is not trustworthy the investor is worse off than
if trust were not placed.”(p.3).
Modeling trust as an implicit contract between the trustor and the trustee
highlights three forms of behavioral risk involved from the trustor’s perspective.
First, there is an adverse selection problem before placing the risky advance be-
cause the trustee has access to private information concerning her trustworthi-
ness. Second, once the trusting action is performed, the trustor faces a hold-up
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risk as the risky advance is a one-sided irreversible investment, a situation which
may be abused by the trustee. Finally, there may be a situation of moral hazard
since the trustor might not be able to distinguish between the level of effort of
the trustee in reciprocating and the impact of exogenous events on the situation.
The second research question concerned the role of trust in the investment deci-
sion and within the investment relationship.
Applying the insight of the first research question to the context of investing
demonstrates that investing can be seen as an act of trust because the investor,
as the trustor, faces various forms of uncertainty when placing her money in
the hands of a company, the trustee. Through the separation of ownership
and control there is a natural information gap between the management mak-
ing strategic decisions and the information provided to investors. Thus, there
is a one-sided dependency of the investor which makes her vulnerable as the
consequences of managerial decisions are only revealed after the investment is
placed. The investor will only invest if she has a positive attitude towards the
specific firm and its profitability. Such an attitude comprises belief in the com-
pany’s competence, i.e. its strategic positioning, and trust in the integrity of
the management and in the provision of honest information.
Besides the specific characteristics of a firm, other forms of trust are also
relevant and feed into the final investment decision in a market setting. The
investor will only invest if she has a positive attitude with respect to the general
economic development, and if she believes in the well functioning of the market
system and related institutions.
Within the neoclassical framework of modern finance the investor invest-
ment decisions are based upon risk and expected return. The probabilistic
models used in this context assume perfect rationality and complete and sym-
metric information, and do not leave any room for the analysis or inclusion of
trust in the decision calculus. In contrast, new institutional economics inter-
connect the aspect of trust by linking it to the possibility of a risk premium. In
other words, where investors suspect managers may take advantage of private
information, they demand compensation in the form of a higher return, i.e. a
premium of mistrust. Some behavioral approaches also discuss the relationship
between trust and risk within the investment setting, and the impact of aggre-
gated trust on financial markets. From their point of view the perceived risk
of an investment target is shaped by various forms of trust given. Besides the
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objective measures of risk and expected return, individuals also apply subjective
probabilities to assess the reliability of the information provided, the fairness of
the overall system, and the possibility of being cheated.
The investment decision of an institutional investor choosing to invest in a
listed firm is actually the result of an investment process which comprises a pre-
investment and a post-investment stage. In the pre-investment stage the asset
manager will acquire information and screen investment opportunities. Along
the line of this process, the investment-trust process can be modeled. The in-
vestor as the trustor establishes an expectation concerning the trustworthiness
of the firm by gathering information and evaluating the target regarding the
factors competence, integrity, and goodwill. The general trust attitude of the
investor is combined with the beliefs on the trustworthiness of the trustee to
form the so-called expectation of trust. The actual investment decision as the
trusting action will further depend on the specific characteristics of the situa-
tion, i.e. on the perceived risk. As investing is part of a dynamic environment,
the investment decision has to be continuously re-evaluated. Investing remains
a trusting action even after the initial act of investing since although outside in-
vestors become stakeholders of the firm, a one-sided dependency on information
provision remains. However, there is a change in that the relationship generates
new personal experience and this feeds back continuously into investor percep-
tions concerning the extent and form of trust.
As a third step the role of information in establishing trust within the investment
relationship was to be challenged.
In general, it can be said that information is an important element in the
formation of trust. Even though some researchers claim that trusting a stranger,
i.e. acting without experience with or information on the party to be trusted, is
the purest form of trust, the trust phenomenon can also be looked at as a process
that starts with an analysis of the trustee’s trustworthiness by the trustor. This
initial analysis is both a cognitive and an emotional process, and here cognition
depends on all information available being processed. This up-front analysis, i.e.
being cautious before actually engaging in trust, does not contradict the concept
of trust since trusting for the trustor involves vulnerability by definition, thus,
potentially negative consequences.
The above holds true for investing as well. Information is clearly essential for
investing, both before and during the investment period, as the investment deci-
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sion is continuously re-assessed and has to be taken over and over again. Owing
to the separation of ownership and control (potential) investors depend upon
the company to provide the information needed for their investment decision.
Thus, information is crucial for an investor, particularly at the stage of an
initial potential investment engagement with a firm. In the absence of personal
experience, information provided by others and in particular the reputation of
the firm are decisive in that they will strongly influence the perception of the
investor. Reputation can only be built up through the observation of trustwor-
thy behavior, one further indication that investing can really be looked at as a
trusting action. Information in the pre-investment stage has fundamental signif-
icance since without it, the initial placement of trust—the risky advance—would
be rejected as being too risky.
Information also remains important in the post-investment phase, as the
investment decision is part of a dynamic process and has to be continuously
re-evaluated. Additionally, information-dependency is still present since even
though investors become stakeholders of the firm, they remain outsiders. How-
ever, once the relationship is initiated, both outside information and personal
experience become a basis for the investment decision.
Finally, I analyzed the interdependency between the investor perception of firm
trustworthiness and the transparency effort of a listed firm.
Credible information provision and trust are phenomena that reinforce each
other through interaction and communication. In this sense an effort to improve
corporate transparency may be seen as a positive signal because, besides helping
investors to take better informed decisions, transparency can only be lived with
firm outsiders when a firm’s internal structure is well manageable. Further, a
spirit of openness also implies that there is nothing to hide.
Transparency is defined as being based upon perception of specific factors
such as substantial information, participation, accountability, and openness.
Trust and transparency are related to each other through the establishment
of a trustworthy reputation, the latter being defined in terms of the factors
competence, integrity, and goodwill. Even though trustworthiness is not pri-
marily a question of information, information transparency does entail a clear
ethical element, and this is which acts as bridge between the two phenomena.
For the management, the concept of accountability refers to their willingness to
take responsibility for their decisions. Openness inheres a form of vulnerability
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from the firm’s perspective. Greater openness entails a belief that the recipi-
ents of information will act maturely and responsibly. In other words, greater
informational transparency is not to be interpreted as a mere chimera used to
“promote” trustworthiness but can be seen as a positive sign speaking for the
firm’s trustworthiness.
As part of an empirical investigation designed to examine the above ques-
tions and theoretical insights, institutional investors of the Swiss listed firm
Holcim were surveyed regarding their perceptions of Holcim’s trustworthiness
and transparency. A statistical analysis of the investor responses revealed that
while substantial information, as one factor in the perception of transparency, is
highly associated with the perception of trustworthiness, integrity is even more
pronounced.
The correlation analysis shows statistically significant positive correlations
for the factors competence, integrity, and goodwill with the overall perceived
trustworthiness of the firm, which confirms their relevance in the establishment
of a perception of trustworthiness. Slight differences where found when com-
paring the perceived trustworthiness of the firm in general and the perceived
trustworthiness of the management. For the former goodwill appears to be par-
ticularly important, followed by integrity. For the latter, the trustworthiness
of the management, the factor integrity dominates in impact, followed by the
factor competence. These results also indicate that the formation of an opinion
on a firm’s trustworthiness is not primarily based on uncertainty with respect
to competence, but rather on the uncertainty regarding intentions of the man-
agement.
The appraisal of Holcim’s transparency effort in terms of the factors sub-
stantial information, participation, accountability, and secretiveness (a reverse
item for openness) shows that substantial information is highly correlated with
overall transparency, as are the accountability and openness items concerning
provision of timely information and admission of mistakes. The participation
component is the one factor that shows no significant interrelationship with over-
all transparency, indicating that investors do not associate participation highly
with transparency.
In a regression analysis all factors of trustworthiness and transparency were
used in an attempt to explain overall trustworthiness. This analysis reveals that
integrity is the most important factor in overall perceived trustworthiness, fol-
lowed by substantial information. The analysis was extended to include investor
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and relationship characteristics such as debt or equity investors, asset managers
or analysts, personal relationship to the firm, and past experience with the firm.
After adding these variables, the only factor for which significance remained
robust was the factor integrity, while the factors substantial information and
goodwill lost in significance, and competence gained. Those, who cultivate per-
sonal contact with the firm, either with the senior management, the investor
relations team, or the treasury team, perceive Holcim as being more trustwor-
thy. Overall, the asset managers perceive the firm as more trustworthy than
the analysts do. Regarding overall trustworthiness, no statistically significant
difference between debt and equity investors was found.
In looking at the perceived trustworthiness of the firm in general and that of
the management, overall trustworthiness is mainly driven by the trustworthiness
of the management. The above described results are more or less the same for
both forms of trustworthiness, except that in the case of the trustworthiness of
the firm, it turns out that shareholders perceive Holcim as being less trustworthy
than do debt investors and that primarily the goodwill component is associated
with overall trustworthiness. This changes once investor characteristics and
relationship variables are added, when once again it all comes down to integrity.
B. Limitations and Outlook
This essay attempted to analyze the highly important social phenomenon of
trust and the role of information and transparency in the context of invest-
ing. Any analysis with respect to such a fundamental and elusive topic such
as trust will always be found wanting and to some extent incomplete. While
the introductory theoretical discussion can be seen as quite abstract, the subse-
quent empirical discussion also faced specific limitations. First and foremost the
limited size and composition of the sample means that no representative con-
clusions can be drawn and generalization is impossible. Further, the problem of
multicollinearity needs to be addressed in more detail.
This was the first time that the survey tool used here was applied to the
context of investing. It would thus be interesting in future to see how investors
of other listed firms perceive the various factors feeding into the perception
of overall trustworthiness. Regarding the topic of trust within the investment
setting, it would be especially worthwhile to find out more about the implications
of perceived trustworthiness on investing and the connection between perceived
trustworthiness and perceived risk.
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Despite the modest explanatory power of the empirical analysis, the key
message drawn from it is congruent both with the theoretical analysis and with
latest experimental research results, which prove that values such as honesty,
integrity, and reliability are indeed factors influencing investor decisions (Tanner
et al. (2010)). A study on perceptions in capital markets underlines the crucial
importance of the perception of market participants by saying that “whoever
does not communicate, remains invisible” (Meckel et al. (2007)). In this sense,
information and communication as part of the transparency effort are necessary
in establishing a reputation of trustworthiness, which then serves as the basis
for investing. But it needs to be remembered that trustworthiness can not be
communicated unless it is actually lived.
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IX. Appendix
A. The Questionnaire
The questionnaire is divided into two parts: those questions focusing on a pro-
fessional perspective (Questions 1.–25.) and those questions focusing on a per-
sonal perspective (Questions 26.–30). Equity and debt investors were addressed
separately, and results then merged afterwards. A generalized version of the
questionnaire can be found below. The possibility of routing within the web-
survey meant that analysts had to answer slightly fewer questions than asset
managers. Questions that were only posed to asset managers are marked with
(AM), those only posed to analysts with (A). Whenever reasonable, response
options were randomized.
1. Which of the following best describes your position within the company
you are working for?
2. What kind of institutional investor best characterizes the company you
are working for?
3. What is the investment horizon for the major part of the funds managed
by yourself? What is the funds volume under your personal management
and responsibility? (AM)
4. Please evaluate the following statement: “I perceive investing in a company
as an act of trust.”
5. Which sources of information about a company do you normally consult
to inform yourself about a company? (A)
6. Which sources of information about a company do you normally consult
before investing? (AM)
7. How are investment decisions generally taken for the major part of the
funds in your responsibility? What is the investment style of the major
part of the funds in your responsibility? (AM)
8. Which sources of information of a company do you normally consult while
you are invested in a company? (AM)
9. Are you currently invested in Holcim? Have you ever held Holcim in your
portfolio? (AM)
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10. What is the fraction of Holcim in your portfolio (in percent) and since
when have you been holding Holcim (year)? (AM)
11. What are the reasons you would currently recommend Holcim or you are
currently invested in Holcim?
12. If I have established trust in a company, I could imagine not selling my
investment despite the following signals:... (AM)
13. News I heard about Holcim during the last twelve months were...
14. I cultivate a personal relationship to...
15. Please evaluate your relationship to Holcim by assessing the following
statements using a scale between “Strongly disagree” (- - -) and “Strongly
agree” (+++) or No Statement.
(a) I trust Holcim to take care of its investors.
(b) I trust Holcim’s management.
(c) I feel very confident about the skills of Holcim as a firm.
(d) Holcim’s management has the ability to accomplish what it says it
will do.
(e) The company is known to be successful at the things it plans to do.
(f) I perceive to be treated fairly and justly by Holcim.
(g) I know I can rely on Holcim to keep its promises.
(h) The behavior of the people that work for Holcim seems to be guided
by sound principles.
(i) Holcim does not mislead any of its stakeholders.
(j) I am sure that information which is relevant for me is honestly con-
veyed by Holcim.
(k) Whenever decisions are taken I know Holcim’s management is con-
cerned about its investors.
(l) Investors’ opinion is taken into account when Holcim is making de-
cisions.
(m) This company is interested in the well-being of its investors, not just
itself.
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16. Please evaluate the following statements on how Holcim is handling in-
formation relevant for debt investors using a scale between “Strongly dis-
agree” (- - -) and “Strongly agree” (+++) or No Statement.
“The information provided by Holcim to its investors...
(a) ...is useful.”
(b) ...is relevant to me.”
(c) ...is detailed.”
(d) ...arrives in a timely fashion.”
(e) ...is complete.”
(f) ...can easily be understood.”
(g) ...is accurate.”
(h) ...is reliable.”
(i) ...can easily be found.”
(j) ...is consistent throughout different sources of information.”
(k) ...can be compared to previous performances.”
(l) ...can be compared to industry standards.”
(m) ...tells only part of the story.”
(n) ...seems to be intentionally written in a difficult way to understand.”
17. Please evaluate Holcim’s behavior regarding communication by assessing
the following statements using a scale between “Strongly disagree” (- - -)
and “Strongly agree” (+++) or No Statement.
(a) Holcim’s management wants to understand how its decisions affect
its investors.
(b) Holcim’s management wants to be accountable to its investors for its
actions.
(c) Holcim wants its investors to know what it is doing and why it is
doing it.
(d) I am asked for feedback about the quality of the information provided
by Holcim.
(e) Holcim involves people like me to help identify the information in-
vestors need.
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(f) I am asked for my opinion before decisions are taken.
(g) Holcim presents more than one side of controversial issues.
(h) Even information that might be damaging to the company is pro-
vided.
(i) Holcim’s management is open to criticism.
(j) Mistakes are freely admitted.
(k) Bad news is provided in a timely fashion.
(l) Often important informational details are left out.
(m) Holcim is slow in providing information to its investors.
(n) Holcim only discloses information when it is required to do so.
18. Has Holcim ever disappointed you? What was it that caused your disap-
pointment? Did the disappointment cause you to take any action?
19. Is there information that you need or expect from Holcim as an investor
that you do not get right now?
20. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or
that you have to be very careful in dealing with other people?
21. Please evaluate the following items on a scale between “I do not trust at
all” (- - -) and “I trust completely” (+++) or No statement:
(a) The stock market
(b) Large corporations
(c) The government
(d) The general economic development
(e) Shareholders
22. Since when have you been professionally involved in the area of asset
management (year)?
23. Sex and Year of birth
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B. Non-parametric Correlation Analysis
Table XX
Non-parametric Correlation Analysis of Different Forms of Trust
This table shows the Kendall Tau correlations between different forms of trust. * denotes significant
at 5%, ** denotes significant at 1% level.
Kendall Tau Correlations
Forms of Trust A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I.
A. Holcim as a firm 1
B. Holcim’s management .318** 1
C. General propensity .123 .163 1
D. Investing .115 -.027 .123 1
E. Stock market .043 -.087 .114 .316** 1
F. Large corporations .091 .167 .178 .072 .294** 1
G. Government .112 -.083 .029 .042 .098 .323** 1
H. Economy .035 .044 .192 .102 .309** .325** .255* 1
I. Shareholders -.078 .141 .022 .180 .315** .474** .306** .273* 1
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Table XXI
Non-Parametric Correlations of the Reasons for Holcim
This table shows Kendall Tau evaluation of reasons for an investment in Holcim. * denotes significant at 5%, ** denotes significant at 1% level.
Kendall Tau Correlations
A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J. K. L. M. N. O. P. Q.
A. Rating 1
B. Industry 0.550 1
C. General strategy -0.060 .312* 1
D. Geographic exposure 0.060 0.092 0.186 1
E. Operations/Organization 0.060 0.226 0.056 0.183 1
F. Financials -0.100 0.053 .489** 0.185 0.251 1
G. Dividend policy -0.158 0.089 .282* 0.043 0.040 0.191 1
H. Risk/Return -0.316 -0.125 -0.043 0.056 0.223 0.240 .316* 1
I. Senior management 0.632 0.190 0.244 0.051 0.200 0.255 0.039 0.068 1
J. Corporate governance 0.350 0.093 0.208 0.111 .289* 0.097 0.341** 0.085 .492** 1
K. Reputation 0.350 0.187 0.111 -0.035 0.018 0.019 0.219 -0.115 .353** .600** 1
L. Recommendations 0.598 -0.052 0.131 0.003 -0.052 -0.009 .286* -0.069 0.000 .311* .508** 1
M. Success in the past 0.316 -0.026 -0.110 0.189 0.097 -0.108 0.104 -0.130 0.194 .329** .350** .347** 1
N. Future potential 0.060 0.063 0.030 .448** 0.122 0.198 -0.072 0.238 .268* 0.063 0.048 0.056 0.139 1
O. Sustainability 0.462 0.000 .278* .274* 0.133 0.092 0.229 0.058 0.183 .312* .252* .397** .302* .310* 1
P. Communication policy 0.060 0.131 0.030 0.192 0.111 0.070 0.206 -0.040 0.232 .297* .458** 0.191 .313* 0.178 .399** 1
Q. Momentum 0.158 0.197 0.000 0.123 0.225 -0.081 -0.130 -0.207 -0.057 0.034 0.111 0.148 .282* 0.166 0.22 .328** 1
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Table XXII
Non-Parametric Correlation Analysis of the Components of Trust
This table shows the Kendall Tau correlations for perception of overall trust in the firm, overall trust in the management, and the components of trust—competence,
integrity, and goodwill—with their items respectively. * denotes significant at 5%, ** denotes significant at 1% level.
Kendall’s Tau Correlations
T-F T-M C-A C-B C-C I-A I-B I-C I-D J-E G-A G-B G-C
Trust-F: I trust Holcim to take care of its in-
vestors.
1
Trust-M: I trust Holcim’s management. .318** 1
Compet-A: I feel very confident about the
skills of Holcim as a firm.
.354** .436** 1
Compet-B: Holcim’s management has the abil-
ity to accomplish what it says it will do.
.253* .225* .339** 1
Compet-C: The company is known to be suc-
cessful at the things it plans to do.
.265* .280** .482** .346** 1
Integ-A: I perceive to be treated fairly and
justly by Holcim.
.502** .501** .361** .295** .304** 1
Integ-B: I know I can rely on Holcim to keep
its promises.
.483** .512** .401** .304** .202 .421** 1
Integ-C: The behavior of the people that work
for Holcim seems to be guided by sound princi-
ples.
.450** .302** .552** .314** .289* .436** .408** 1
Integ-D: Holcim does not mislead any of its
stakeholders.
.458** .430** .194 .382** .270* .445** .350** .273* 1
Integ-E: I am sure that information which is
relevant to me is honestly conveyed by Holcim.
.363** .272* .110 .193 .331** .415** .180 .247* .555** 1
Good-A:Whenever decisions are taken, I know
Holcim’s management is concerned about its in-
vestors.
.405** .362** .254* .226* .250* .379** .281* .245* .482** .354** 1
Good-B: Investors’ opinion is taken into ac-
count when Holcim is making decisions.
.171 .105 .208 .217 .202 .237* .251* .255* .260* .260* .230* 1
Good-C: This company is interested in the
well-being of its investors, not just itself.
.642** .261* .312** .327** .297** .312** .320** .489** .448** .354** .373** .231* 1
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Table XXIII
Non-parametric Correlation Analysis of the Components of Transparency (Part Communication)
This table shows the Kendall Tau correlations of Holcim’s perceived communication policy, overall transparency, and the components participation, accountability, and
secretiveness with their items respectively. * denotes significant at 5%, ** denotes significant at 1% level.
Kendall Tau Correlations
T-A T-B T-C P-A P-B P-C A-A A-B A-C A-D A-E S-A S-B S-C
Transp-A: Holcim’s management wants to
understand how its decisions affect its in-
vestors.
1
Transp-B: Holcim’s management wants to be
accountable to its investors for its actions.
.216 1
Transp-C: Holcim wants its investors to know
what it is doing and why it is doing it.
.196 .335** 1
Partic-A: I am asked for feedback about the
quality of the information provided by Holcim.
-.071 -.023 .040 1
Partic-B: Holcim involves people like me to
help identify the information investors need.
.119 .164 .112 .416** 1
Partic-C: I am asked for my opinion before
decisions are taken.
-.225 .048 -.089 -.035 .098 1
Account-A: Holcim presents more than one
side of controversial issues.
.093 -.030 .030 .184 .159 .326* 1
Account-B: Even information that might be
damaging to the company is provided.
.174 .050 .240 .059 .098 -.026 .190 1
Account-C: Holcim’s management is open to
criticism.
.142 .080 .073 .277* .303* -.136 .168 .077 1
Account-D: Mistakes are freely admitted. -.019 -.108 -.103 .201 -.011 .080 .022 .056 -.055 1
Account-E: Bad news is provided in a timely
fashion.
.365** .107 .333** .192 .140 -.242 .126 .363** .163 .142 1
Secret-A: Often important informational de-
tails are left out.
-.100 -.151 -.180 -.029 -.107 -.241 .010 -.009 -.047 -.064 -.235* 1
Secret-B: Holcim is slow in providing infor-
mation to its investors.
-.085 -.404** -.130 -.081 -.077 .063 .121 .054 -.189 .029 -.150 .244* 1
Secret-C: Holcim only discloses information
when it is required to do so.
-.236 -.068 -.057 .081 .124 .231 .145 .020 .202 -.148 -.194 .203 .094 1
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Table XXIV
Non-parametric Correlation Analysis of the Components of Transparency (Part Information)
This table shows the Kendall Tau correlations of the items of Holcim’s perceived information policy. * denotes significant at 5%, ** denotes significant at 1% level.
Kendall Tau Correlations
T-A T-B T-C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q
Transp-A 1
Transp-B .216 1
Transp-C .196 .335** 1
D. useful .119 .453** .364** 1
E. relevant -.091 .215 .214 .430** 1
F. detailed -.002 .019 .297** .305** .311** 1
G. timely .086 .358** .334** .354** .309** .215* 1
H. complete .013 .172 .319** .443** .358** .371** .288** 1
I. understandable -.045 .275* .381** .567** .224* .360** .296** .318** 1
J. accurate .029 .341** .344** .491** .656** .367** .398** .412** .386** 1
K. reliable -.030 .335** .192 .450** .562** .248* .206 .372** .291** .717** 1
L. easily found -.023 .235* .257* .492** .367** .303** .317** .325** .389** .393** .350** 1
M. consistent .039 .481** .398** .680** .459** .307** .245* .426** .529** .550** .624** .448** 1
N. comparable to past -.016 .266* .280* .430** .352** .143 .410** .333** .404** .496** .407** .429** .353** 1
O. comparable to industry .124 .192 .114 .375** .171 .236* .231* .107 .173 .324** .175 .297** .270* .225* 1
P. only part of the story -.087 -.023 -.166 -.107 -.085 -.115 -.054 -.228* -.267* -.099 -.197 -.025 -.231* -.050 .025 1
Q. difficult to understand .150 -.037 -.008 -.077 -.116 -.227* -.144 .051 -.111 -.164 -.152 -.214* -.189 -.090 -.206 .014 1
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